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Abstract
Leveraging New Technologies and Interdisciplinarity to Study Political Behavior, Attitudes,
and Beliefs
John Ternovski
2021
I make use of new technological and scholarly developments to study political sentiments
and behavior in three independent papers. In my lead paper, I address an important
consequence of political deepfakes (i.e., computer-manipulated video misinformation): does
the provision of information about deepfakes cause people to disbelieve real political videos?
Through a set of online survey experiments, I find that information that is typical of news
coverage of deepfakes induces people to disbelieve real political information. My second
paper uses new social media datasets to address pressing questions about how organized
American far-right groups (e.g., neo-Nazis, white supremacists, etc.) recruit new members,
and whether the rise of Trump was used as a catalyst in far-right recruitment efforts. I made
use of prior sociological and anthropological research that found that far-right music scenes
(featuring bands with such names as Aryan Terrorism) are a key part of day-to-day
functioning of the overwhelming majority of far-right hate groups in the United States. As
such, I made use of public databases of song listenership on the music social network,
Last.fm, before and after Trump events. I find that online friends of frequent listeners of
hate music were more likely to increase their levels of hate music listenership after Trumprelated events (e.g., xenophobic tweets, primary election victories, etc.). Finally, in my third
paper, I leverage new theoretical frameworks in the cognitive sciences and the growth of
large-scale, data-driven voter mobilization programs among non-profit organizations to

address the puzzle of “voting habits.” Namely, prior research provides strong empirical
evidence that voting in one election makes the average individual more likely to vote in a
subsequent election, but this kind of turnout persistence does not comport with habit as it is
defined in psychological sciences (elections happen too infrequently and voting is never an
automatic behavior). So, in my third paper, I apply Duckworth and Gross’s (2020) Process
Model of Behavior Change to turnout persistence to bridge the gap between classic
economic models of voter turnout and the large body of rigorous empirical evidence
showing turnout persistence. I evaluate the concrete predictions made by this model in a
novel dataset of ~1.8 million voters across 9 different independent experiments.
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1. Introduction

Technological advances have begun to change critical aspects of the American
political system. The increased connectedness of our systems of communication has led to a
world where political misinformation disseminates more rapidly than ever (Vosoughi, Roy &
Aral 2017), while Americans’ trust in the traditional news media is at historic lows (Ladd
2011). Some scholars claim that we have now entered an era of “post-truth” or “post-fact”
politics (e.g., Mihailidis, & Viotty, 2017; Higgins, 2016). Coupled with the recent resurgence
of far-right ideologies, these developments have led some scholars to claim that America is
in danger of backsliding out of democracy (Mickey, Levitsky & Way, 2017). The unprecedent
storming of the US capitol building in January 2021 by right-wing rioters highlight the reality
of that danger. These circumstances leave a critical need for political science to rigorously
address key questions relating to American political sentiments and behavior: How does the
rapidly changing media environment affect how Americans receive and trust political
information? Do far-right groups in America make use of highly publicized events to recruit
others? What motivates Americans to stay politically engaged and continue to turn out to
vote? Answering these research questions can both provide invaluable guidance to public
policy and allow us to make better sense of longstanding puzzles in political science.
Though the rapidly changing political environment has resulted in difficult political
challenges, the silver lining is that new technological developments have allowed political
scientists to make use of new disciplines and data sources to produce research that would
have been all but impossible just two decades ago. Many of these opportunities require the
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tools and knowledge of growing interdisciplinary fields, including data science,
computational social science, and judgement-and-decision-making science. As part of this
dissertation, I provide three research studies that illustrate the importance of leveraging
advances in interdisciplinary fields to answer pressing political science questions. In this
chapter, I provide an overview of each of my three papers in turn. For each paper, I present
the motivating research question, explain why it is of timely importance, and illustrate how
interdisciplinarity opens unique opportunities for political science research on that question.

1.1: Does the Rise of Deepfakes Affect Political Accountability?
Massive increases in partisan polarization (e.g., Layman & Carsey, 2002) and high
levels of uninformed voters (e.g., Bartels, 1996) have long been viewed with some alarm
(e.g., Achen & Bartels, 2016; Hacker & Pierson, 2019), but empirical research has generally
found that the influence of irrational voters tends to wash out in aggregate (e.g., Healy &
Malhotra, 2013) and even a polarized electorate will ultimately prefer politicians who reflect
their policy preferences (e.g., Costa, 2021). In other words, even in the presence of these
challenges, the policy choices made by politicians generally reflect the policy preferences of
the electorate. However, democracies can only overcome these issues if key institutional
fundamentals are in place. For one, voters need to receive and trust information about what
politicians do in office to be able to hold politicians accountable for their actions. If voters,
on aggregate, are unable to learn the policy positions of a politician, political accountability
breaks down (e.g., Warren, 2014).
A new development in machine learning now allows tech-savvy users to create
highly-convincing videos of public figures saying something they’ve never said. These videos
are commonly known as “deepfakes” and they have been the cause of alarm for policy2

makers and scholars alike (Dack 2019; O’Sullivan 2019). Unlike textual misinformation,
where any attentive individual can pick up clear indications that something is “fake news”
(Pennycook et al. 2021), deepfakes have become nearly impossible to detect with the naked
eye (see Chapter 2). And though malicious political deepfakes have, so far, been rare, there
has been extensive news coverage of the threat of deepfakes (e.g., Gosse & Burkell 2020;
Yadlin-Segal & Oppenheim 2021). If this news coverage begins to make the typical
American skeptical of direct video footage of politicians making policy statements, and since
Americans are already distrustful of the news media (Ladd 2011), the pathways by which real
political information reaches the electorate are substantially limited. Political deepfakes and
news coverage of deepfakes is not currently widespread, but due to the magnitude of the
threat to foundational mechanisms underlying a functioning democracy, there is a clear need
to study the impacts of deepfakes on political accountability—especially while there is a
substantial “control” group of individuals still unfamiliar with deepfakes.
To adequately address this research question, political scientists must borrow
techniques from data science. For one, researchers who are interested in testing the impact
of a deepfake that doesn’t already exist in the wider environment must use the most up to
date machine learning algorithms to manufacture a deepfake. But in doing so, they should
also borrow and develop ethical frameworks from the data science and computer science
communities (e.g., Thomas et al. 2017). Since there are still few peer-reviewed studies on the
social impact of deepfakes (Dobber at al. 2020; Vaccari & Chadwick 2020), it is critical to
balance the needs of research transparency with potential social harms. Namely, deepfake
researchers must be wary of unintentionally introducing convincing misinformation into the
broader environment. Our colleagues in data science and computer science have much
greater experience with similar issues (e.g., Poor and Davidson, 2017), and it would be of
3

mutual benefit to make use of that knowledge to inform research design decisions to ensure
that the social impacts of new technologies are studied ethically.
In Chapter 2 of my thesis, I present a paper that looks at direct and indirect impacts
of deepfakes by both applying machine learning algorithms to create a deepfake and making
use of ethical principles from data science to ensure that my study clearly avoids ethical gray
areas.

1.2: Do Far-Right Hate Groups Use Newsworthy Trump-Related Events
to Recruit Others?
Former President Donald Trump’s populist speeches and tweets have been linked to
a resurgence of far-right and neo-Nazi movements in America even in the early years of his
presidency (e.g. see Bass, 2018; Raghunathan, 2018). The consequences of these alleged links
were poignantly felt after the storming of the Capitol in January 2021, as many of the rioters
included “self-described Nazis and white supremacists” (Diaz & Treisman, 2021). While the
former president was successfully impeached for the “incitement of insurrection” that
resulted in the Capitol riot (Naylor, 2021), it is still unclear whether xenophobic, sexist, and
racist rhetoric from a President (or a Republican nominee) actually increased far-right group
membership. After all, one alternative explanation is that the same complex social processes
that led to Trump’s electoral victory in 2016 also led to the growth in far-right hate groups.
While this question has some immediate relevance to, for instance, Trump’s recent
de-platforming from Twitter, answering this question can lead to more generalizable
knowledge. Particularly, to what an extent are prominent public figures, who themselves are
not members of far-right hate groups, nevertheless used as springboards for the recruitment
efforts of far-right groups? Research on this question can increase our understanding of how
4

far-right groups grow and operate, while potentially leading to actionable policy insights as to
how their growth and influence can be inhibited.
The key issue is that it is extremely difficult to empirically link a statement Trump
made to hate group membership. Many far-right organizations implicitly or explicitly
endorse racial violence, which means that membership is not widely publicized. Even
organizations dedicated to tracking hate groups in America have not been able to estimate
hate group membership precisely enough to measure changes in membership over narrow
windows of time (e.g., Southern Poverty Law Center 2020). However, new technological
developments have led to the proliferation of large-N behavioral trace data on social
networks. In the field of computational social science, there is a growing number of tools
and approaches to collecting and making sense of the data that is available. The use of these
new datasets has led to innovative research on hate groups and hate crime. For instance,
through an instrumental variable design, Muller and Schwarz (2018) estimated the effect of
Twitter use on hate crimes, while other researchers made use of far-right online forum posts
as a time-series dataset (Scrivens et al. 2020). Furthermore, by consolidating qualitative
research with computational social science, it is possible to make use of novel datasets to
gain entirely new perspectives on this question.
Specifically, in Chapter 3, I draw on anthropological and sociological research, which
found that far-right groups make extensive use of hate music (e.g., bands with such names as
“Aryan Terrorism”) for recruitment, organizing, and expression of racist beliefs. I
consolidated this qualitative research with techniques in computational social science.
Specifically, I made use of Last.fm, one of the largest public repositories for music
listenership in the world, to scrape its API (Application Programming Interface), the Last.fm
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website, and a historic version of Last.fm on archive.org to generate a dataset of over half a
billion song plays from ~250,000 Last.fm users. Such a large-scale collection of data would
simply be extremely time-intensive without innovations in computational social science,
which has allowed for researchers to collect online data at scale. I also make use of
developments in network science in analyzing recruitment processes of far-right groups by,
for instance, looking at networrk centrality measures of users in a far-right music listeners’
social network.

1.3: What Motivates Americans to Continue to Turn Out to Vote?
Former president Donald Trump’s attempt to discredit the legitimacy of the
2020 election may have long-term consequences for future Republican voter turnout.
Indeed, as-yet unpublished research seems to indicate that the residents of the state of
Georgia who most strongly believe in the “election fraud” conspiracy on Twitter were less
likely to vote in the 2021 Georgia runoff election (Green et al. 2021). Are attempts to
discredit the electoral process likely to be self-defeating or are the consequences for voter
turnout more complex? This question highlights the importance of understanding the
mechanism behind why an individual turns out to vote in the first place.
Though the political behavior literature on voter turnout is extensive (see Green &
Gerber 2019 for an overview), there is one piece of empirical evidence on voting behavior is
not yet integrated within a cohesive theoretic framework. Namely, there is strong, consistent
evidence showing that turning out in one election makes the same individual more likely to
turn out in a subsequent election (e.g., Coppock & Green 2016). Some scholars have
concluded that this phenomenon implies that voting is “habit-forming,” but turnout
persistence fails to comport with habit as it is defined by psychologists—habit is an
6

automatic behavior that forms from frequent repetition of an activity (e.g., Dinas 2012).
Fortunately, the growing field of judgement and decision-making (JDM) science has
developed important research that filled the gaps between social psychology and more
applied social science fields such as economics and political science (Duckworth & Gross
2020). By leveraging developments in this interdisciplinary cognitive science, it is possible to
bridge a gap in the literature between conventional economic models of voting and the
voting-as-a-habit literature. In Chapter 4, I illustrate the usefulness of applying theories
developed in the JDM literature by applying a new JDM model (Duckworth and Gross’s
(2020) Process Model for Behavior Change) to an existing puzzle in political science. I also
make use of the fact that American campaigns and non-profits have increasingly begun to
incorporate field experiments in their Get Out the Vote (GOTV) programs. Namely, I
partnered with a large labor organization to test the predictions of the JDM model as applied
to turnout persistence across 9 independent experiments with a total of ~1.8 million voters.
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2. The Negative Consequences of Informing Voters
about Deepfakes: Evidence from Two Survey
Experiments∗

2.1: Significance Statement
We evaluate the social impacts of a new development in machine learning:
computer-manipulated video misinformation (so-called “deepfakes”). While prior research
focused on political deepfakes’ limited capacity to mislead, this research, in contrast, explores
important second-order effects: what happens when voters are informed about the existence
of seemingly undetectable manipulated videos? Is the public’s confidence in video as a
source of political information undermined? These questions have serious consequences for
the health of a democracy. Many Americans distrust the news media; if they begin to
disbelieve real videos of politicians, they are left with few trusted sources for factual
information about politicians’ statements and actions in office, which jeopardizes their ability
to vote out bad actors.

2.2: Abstract
Advances in machine learning have made possible “deepfakes,” or realistic, computergenerated videos of public figures saying something they have not actually said. Policymakers
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have expressed concern that deepfakes could mislead voters, but existing research has found
minimal effects. There has nevertheless been extensive media coverage on the dangers of
deepfakes, urging voters to be critical consumers of political video. We explore whether
these well-intentioned activities have an unintended consequence: if voters are warned about
deepfakes, they may begin to distrust all political video. Through two online survey
experiments, we found that informing participants about deepfakes did not enhance
participants’ ability to successfully spot manipulated videos but consistently induced
participants to believe that the videos they watched were fake, even when the videos were
real. Our findings suggest that even if deepfakes are not themselves persuasive, information
about the existence of deepfakes can nevertheless be weaponized to dismiss real political
video.

2.3: Introduction
Breakthroughs in machine learning have led to the development of software that can
seamlessly fabricate videos of any given individual. Computer-generated videos, so-called
“deepfakes,” can be made in which a politician appears to say something they have never
actually said in real life. 1 Computer and social scientists have raised concerns that deepfakes
may mislead voters and sway election outcomes (e.g., Dack 2019). Policymakers have echoed
these concerns. For example, during a hearing of the United States House of Representatives
Intelligence Committee, Adam Schiff, the Committee’s chair, noted that deepfakes allow
“malicious actors to foment chaos, division or crisis,” and that such videos “have the
capacity to disrupt entire campaigns, including that for the presidency” (O’Sullivan 2019, 1).
Since the hearing, Congress has passed two laws (IOGAN Act 2020; NDAA for FY2021

1

For a sociological overview of the development of deepfakes, see Paris & Donovan (2019).
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2021) that explicitly directed “the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Science Foundation (NSF) to issue
reports on and bolster research into deepfakes… These bills ask for recommendations that
could lay the predicate for federal regulations of such media.” (Ferraro, 2020, 1) However,
recent randomized experiments on the impacts of deepfakes in American politics have
found no evidence that people believe the content of the manipulated videos (Wittenberg,
Zong, & Rand 2020; Vaccari & Chadwick 2020). More recently, Barari, Lucas & Munger
(2021) did find that deepfakes were persuasive but their effects were comparable to that of
textual misinformation.2
Despite this evidence from social scientists, news coverage of deepfakes continues to
be extensive and predominantly emphasizes the threat of deepfakes (e.g., Gosse & Burkell
2020; Yadlin-Segal & Oppenheim 2021). A cursory search of the five most popular news
websites in the US (according to YouGov (2021)) for the search term “deepfake” 3 on the
news aggregator Google News finds 11,700 news articles discussing deepfakes and 62.5% of
those articles use cautionary language (“threat”, “worried”, “danger”, “warn”, “risk”). 4 ,5
Attempts to inform the public of the dangers of deepfakes even led to the creation of a
widely-viewed deepfake of former President Barack Obama, in which the comedian Jordan
There is also a recent deepfake study in the Netherlands that found modest persuasive effects among a subset
of participants (Dobber at al. 2020).

2

The search was conducted on March 30th, 2021 with the input: deepfake AND (site:news.yahoo.com OR
site:nbc.com OR site:cbs.com OR site:nbcnews.com OR site:cnn.com)

3

The search was conducted on March 30th, 2021 with the input: deepfake AND ("threat*" OR "worried" OR
"danger*" OR "warn*" OR "risk*") AND (site:news.yahoo.com OR site:nbc.com OR site:cbs.com OR
site:nbcnews.com OR site:cnn.com)
4

We qualitatively assessed these search results. While there were, unsurprisingly, many false positives for both
search queries, we did find that, in concordance with Gosse & Burkell (2020) and Yadlin-Segal & Oppenheim
(2021), the overwhelming majority of articles that did specifically address deepfakes focused on their potential
danger or, at best, described them as “creepy.”

5
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Peele partnered with BuzzFeed Video to create a deepfake of himself impersonating Obama
to warn Americans about deepfakes (Castillo 2018). This public service announcement has
since accrued over 8.4 million views on YouTube. But do these well-intentioned attempts to
inform and educate the public have an unintended consequence: does information about the
existence and dangers of deepfakes cause voters to distrust all political video footage—
whether real or fake?
This question has not been answered in the context of deepfakes, but a robust
literature on textual misinformation (for a review, see Lazer et al. 2018) has found that elite
discourse about “fake news” may lower trust in the media and prime participants to
disbelieve the veracity of real news (Van Duyn & Collier 2019). Official warnings about fake
news similarly induce participants to disbelieve true headlines (Clayton et al. 2020;
Pennycook, Bear et al. 2020). There are already high-profile cases of American voters
alleging that real political videos are deepfakes. For example, in January 2021, supporters of
Donald Trump suggested that a video Trump shared via Twitter in which he conceded the
2020 election was a deepfake (Villarreal 2021).
It isn’t only highly-motivated partisans that disbelieve real video footage. Recently,
there was a high-profile case of the American justice system erroneously alleging that real
video footage was deepfaked. Namely, a Pennsylvania woman was accused of making a
deepfake of high school cheerleaders vaping “to try to get them kicked off the squad”
(Associated Press, 2021), but upon a closer examination, video forensic experts found no
evidence that the video was manipulated (Harwell 2021). “When pressed on how police
made their determination that the footage had been manipulated… [the police officer who
made the arrest said] that he had relied on his ‘naked eye.” (Thalen 2021). Without the law
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enforcement officer’s awareness of the existence of deepfake technology, such an accusation
would have been all but impossible.
This paper explores whether information warning about the existence of deepfakes
makes American voters more likely to disbelieve real political videos. Or do these efforts to
inform voters about the dangers of deepfakes work as intended—leading to a more critical
consumption of political video? If the former is true, as media coverage of deepfakes
continues to increase, Americans’ trust in political video may continue to erode. The other
danger is that politicians could use factually true statements (e.g., “deepfakes exist”) to subtly
disavow and dismiss video recordings of their past statements and behavior. Such outcomes
could potentially undermine political accountability and so it is imperative to understand the
social impacts of information about deepfakes before political deepfakes are commonplace.
Across two online survey experiments, we demonstrate that informing voters about
deepfakes increases disbelief in both real and manipulated videos without improving
participants’ ability to successfully identify the deepfake. Study 1 used an actor posing as a
politician sharing an extreme policy position. Using a factorial design, participants were
randomized in a first factor to either see a real video of the politician or a deepfake version
of the video and, in a second factor, to receive information about deepfakes or not. Study 2
made use of Americans’ low levels of policy knowledge (e.g., Barabas et al. 2014) to show a
real video of a real-world politician making a policy statement that is atypical of his party and
is not widely known (and thus might reasonably be inferred by voters to be a deepfake).
Both studies measured belief in the content of the videos and trust in video as a source of
political information.
We found that participants were unable to discriminate between real and deepfaked
video even when they were informed about the existence of deepfakes. Instead, information
16

about deepfakes induced participants to disbelieve any associated political video—real or
fabricated. In other words, a general statement about the dangers of deepfakes, as one might
see in a headline from a trusted news source, was enough to nudge participants to disbelieve
real video clips of politicians making policy statements. The effects were large and consistent
across both studies. Information about deepfakes even affected what policy stances
participants associated with a real-world US politician. In other words, providing
information about the dangers of deepfakes not only made participants suspect that real
videos of politicians speaking are fake, but even affected how the content of the video is
internalized.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we present a brief overview of the data and
the designs of both survey experiments. Next, we report our main findings and discuss the
implications of the results. We conclude with broader policy implications and delineate
avenues for further research.

2.4: Experimental Design
We ran two pre-registered6 online survey experiments on Lucid Theorem7 using
convenience samples 8 in the spring and fall of 2020. The full survey questionnaires are
provided in the Supplementary Materials.

6

See https://osf.io/rqfz5/?view_only=e2807b367a534262bb6c7aeb5727b999 for our pre-analysis plans.

Lucid is an increasingly popular alternative to Amazon Mechanical Turk for social science survey research.
Many well-known findings have been replicated on Lucid, suggesting the platform is capable of providing highquality data (Coppock & McClellan 2019, Peyton, Huber, & Coppock 2020). During the COVID-19 pandemic,
Aronow et al. (2020) found that Lucid data can provide reliable data when researchers screen on attentiveness,
which we do here.

7

Treatment effects from online convenience samples have been shown to generalize to nationally
representative samples (e.g., Mullinix et al., 2015).

8
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2.4.1: Study 1 - Fictional Politician
We created a video of an actor playing a fictional politician advocating an extreme
policy position: support for a law requiring doctors to use essential oils to treat cancer before
attempting treatments with conventional medicine. 9 (A screenshot of the video can be
viewed in Figure 2.1.) The actor also recorded another video that we used as training footage
for our deepfake, where he recited a generic political speech. 10 We used this visual data to
construct a SAEHD (High Definition Styled AutoEncoder) model (trained over 65,000
iterations). The resulting model is essentially a moldable mask that was superimposed on the
actor in the “destination” video (i.e., the video where our hired actor talks about essential
oils in medicine). The full technical details of the deepfake model are found in the
Supplementary Materials (2.8.1). This process emulates a malicious agent using a look-alike
actor as a training set for the deepfake. The real video on essential oils and the deepfake
thereof were used as treatments in Study 1.

We confirmed that the fictional politician appeared sufficiently non-partisan by asking participants to guess
the politician’s political party at the end of the survey. The plurality of respondents (30%) said they “didn’t
know” (or it was “unclear” as to) what political party the politician was affiliated with. 27% thought the
politician was a Democrat, 16% thought the politician was a Republican, and 27% thought the politician was
Independent. The partisanship of respondents did interact with respondents’ guesses, but the relationship was
weak (Cramer’s V = 0.08; see Table 2.6 in the Supplementary Materials for more details).
9

The speech was composed using excerpts from Swaim & Nussbaum (2016), a FiveThirtyEight article
wherein Republican and Democratic speechwriters collaborated “to write a totally pandering bipartisan stump
speech for an imaginary presidential candidate — one who espouses only positions that a majority of voters
agree with” (p. 1).

10
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Figure 2.1: Screencap of video used in Study 1
(fictional political)

Study 1 began with a series of screener and pre-treatment measures (for details,
please see the survey script in the Supplementary Materials). Participants were then shown a
separate page with the following text: “On the next page, you will watch a brief political
speech. You will then be asked about how you feel about the person making the speech and
whether or not you would vote for them in the upcoming election.” We randomized
participants to receive either the real video or the deepfake version and either information
about deepfakes or no additional information in a 2x2 fully factorialized experiment. The
four conditions are summarized in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Description of Study 1 treatment arms

Real Video
(N=696)

Deepfake
Video
(N=700)

No Information
(N=696)
(1)
Participants were shown a real
video of the actor stating that, if
elected, he would mandate
doctors to try using essential
oils to treat cancer before they
are allowed to use conventional
medicine.
(N=347)

Information about Deepfakes
(N=700)
(2)
Participants were shown the same
video as (1) but with the following
message above the clip “WARNING:
Computer scientists are increasingly
concerned about "DeepFake" videos.
With DeepFakes, it's now possible to
use a computer to convincingly
manipulate videos of people to make
them appear to say things they've never
said.”
(N=349)

(3)
This treatment arm was
identical to (1) except
participants were shown the
deepfake version of the video.
(N=349)

(4)
This treatment arm was identical to (2)
except participants were shown the
deepfake version of the video.
(N=351)

After viewing the video, we measured participants’ perceived favorability of and
intention to vote for the politician, their view on essential oils in medicine, whether they
believed the video was real, and their overall confidence in other video footage of politicians
speaking. Due to the risk of priming latent beliefs by asking participants if the video they just
saw was real, 11 we attempted to measure this outcome unobtrusively by asking whether they
were convinced that the politician “believes what is said.” We only explicitly ask participants
whether they believed the video was deepfaked at the very end of the survey.

Research on textual fake news found that asking participants about the accuracy of a specific piece of
misinformation affected how likely they were to share that misinformation online (Pennycook et al. 2021;
Pennycook, McPhetres et al. 2020). If priming accuracy can affect behavior, it has the potential to affect latent
beliefs.

11
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In this study, we found evidence that survey attrition varied significantly across
treatment conditions (Pearson chi2(3) = 11.3, p = 0.01). 4.9% participants in the No
Information + Real Video condition did not finish the survey compared to 1.8% in the
aggregate sum of the three remaining conditions. Because our pre-analysis plan did not
explicitly stipulate how we would address differential attrition, we used Manski-type worstcase bounds (Manski 2003) that require only that the support of the outcome is bounded
when constructing our confidence intervals. 12 These bounds are considered the goldstandard approach when analyzing experiments with attrition (Gerber and Green, 2012).
Additional details are provided in Section 2 of the Supplementary Materials.

2.4.2: Study 2 - Real Politician
One weakness of Study 1 is that the extreme policy stance in the video could
plausibly be genuine. Participants were not familiar with the politician (as he is fictional) and
may not have had any expectation that the video they were watching could be deepfaked.
McDonald (2019) empirically illustrated how people make use of prior knowledge of realworld politicians in online survey experiments and how studies using solely hypothetical
politicians can produce misleading estimates of real-world political behavior. We therefore
replicated the impact of providing information about deepfakes using a real politician in
Study 2.
We identified a well-known politician who, at one point in his political career, had
expressed a policy stance that was atypical given his party affiliation. Specifically, we found
2002 video footage of Republican Mitt Romney asserting, in a Massachusetts gubernatorial
The “best” and “worst” cases used to estimate the CI are also covariate adjusted and use robust standard
errors.
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debate, that he would protect a woman’s right to choose – an unusual stance for a
Republican. 13
The design of this study was nearly identical to Study 1 with the following
modifications. First, Study 2 had only two conditions, Information about Deepfakes and No
Information (see Table 2.2 for a description of the two conditions), as we did not create a
deepfake of Mitt Romney given ethical considerations. Second, our analysis was restricted to
participants who knew Romney was a Republican pre-treatment, as Romney’s (formerly)
pro-choice position would not appear surprising to those participants with no knowledge of
Romney’s party affiliation. In Study 2, we found no evidence of differential attrition: survey
completion rates did not differ significantly across treatment arms.

Table 2.2: Description of Study 2 treatment arms

Real Video
(N=1,925)

13

No Information
(N=966)
(1)
Participants watched a real
video of Mitt Romney saying,
“And I’ve been very clear on
that, I will preserve and protect
a woman’s right to choose and
I’m devoted and dedicated to
honoring my word…”

Information about Deepfakes
(N=959)
(2)
Participants were shown the same video
as (1) but with the following message
above the clip “WARNING: Computer
scientists are increasingly concerned
about "DeepFake" videos. With
DeepFakes, it's now possible to use a
computer to convincingly manipulate
videos of people to make them appear to
say things they've never said.”

As of 2020, there were only 2 pro-choice Republicans in the Senate (Sussman 2020).
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2.5: Results and Discussion
News articles about the dangers of deepfakes and PSAs like Jordan Peele’s Obama
deepfake are intended to make viewers more critical when consuming political video. Ideally,
a viewer will believe real videos and disregard fake videos. It is possible that the intent of
such messages is to make Americans more skeptical of all information; but such a goal could
have deleterious impacts on democratic functioning. Belief in fake videos may lead to
misinformed voters, but disbelief in real videos of politicians discussing their policy positions
may lead to uninformed voters (for further analysis of uninformed and misinformed voters,
see Kuklinski et al. 2000). High levels of uninformed voters have been linked to serious
electoral consequences; for instance, Fowler and Margolis (2014) found that “[a] lack of
knowledge on the policy positions of the parties significantly hinders the ability of lowsocioeconomic-status citizens to translate their preferences into partisan opinions and vote
choices.” (p. 100).
As such, our first analysis assesses whether informing participants about the danger
of deepfakes affects the rate at which voters disbelieve a deepfaked political video. The
primary outcome measure used asked participants how much they agreed with the statement
“This video was doctored, manipulated and/or faked by a computer (i.e. it is a ‘Deep Fake’)”
on a 7-point agree/disagree scale ranging from strongly disagree (-3) to strongly agree (3).14
In the leftmost column of Figure 2.2, we see that when the information about deepfakes was
randomly added to a deepfake video, participants were 0.5 points more likely to believe that

Alternative survey instruments found similar (but smaller) treatment effects for all analyses. The results of
these alternative outcome measures can be viewed in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 in the Supplementary Materials.

14
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the video they were watching was fabricated (p<0.001). 15 It is worth noting that this
treatment effect was not driven by people affirmatively identifying the deepfake. When
participants watched a deepfaked video without information about deepfakes, they were
fairly confident that what they were watching was not a deepfake (-0.4 points on our 7-point
scale or approximately halfway between “somewhat disagree that the video is a deepfake”
and “neither agree nor disagree that the video is a deepfake”); when information about
deepfakes was added, they became more uncertain about whether the video was a deepfake
(0.1 points).16 This result is consistent with Vaccari & Chadwick’s (2020) conclusions that
deepfakes increase uncertainty.

Cohen’s d of this effect is 0.3, which suggests that this effect size is somewhere between small and medium
(Cohen 2013).

15

Participants were not able to discern between a real video and a deepfake version of the same video without
the Information treatment (see Section 3 of the Supplementary Materials for more details).
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Figure 2.2: Information about deepfakes induced disbelief in accompanying video
regardless of whether the video is real or fake
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The top row illustrates covariate unadjusted mean sentiment in each treatment arm, while the bottom row
shows the resulting treatment effects with 95% confidence intervals. The leftmost column illustrates the impact
of information about deepfakes added above a deepfake video; the remaining columns illustrate the impact of
information about deepfakes added above a real video. All three columns measure impact in terms of the same
outcome: do you believe the video clip is a deepfake? [7-point scale from -3=“strongly disagree” to
3=“strongly agree”]. The two leftmost treatment effect graphs use OLS estimates of Manski-type worst-case
bounds with robust standard errors and covariate adjustment to calculate 95% confidence intervals. The
rightmost treatment effect graph uses OLS estimates with robust standard errors and covariate adjustment, as
there was no differential attrition.
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The next step is to investigate whether the effect of providing information about
deepfakes has the unintended consequence of reducing belief in real video. We see a
comparable treatment effect (.75 points [p<0.001]) when information about deepfakes was
randomly added to a real video of the same content (see the middle column in Figure 2.2). 17
The interaction of the deepfake treatment and the information treatment is not statistically
significant. 18 Rather than helping participants detect deepfake videos, information about
deepfakes instead caused participants to disbelieve whatever video they were watching—real
or fake. This interaction effect is directionally opposite from the normative ideal: adding
information about deepfakes to videos made participants more likely to disbelieve the real
video rather than successfully identify the deepfake.
We find similar effects with the real video of Romney in Study 2. The results are
summarized in the rightmost column of Figure 2.2. As before, we see that information about
deepfakes induced participants to disbelieve real videos—an effect of 0.26 points on a 7point scale (p<0.001). 19
Pooling the data from the two studies and including a study fixed effect, we find that
information about deepfakes increased participants’ belief that the video was fabricated by
0.40 points on a 7-point scale (p<0.001). 20 Information about deepfakes also increased how
unconvinced participants were that the politician actually believed what he was saying by

17

Cohen’s d of this effect is 0.5, which suggests that this is a medium effect size (Cohen 2013).

Even without bounds, the p-value is 0.13 and the effect is in the opposite direction from what would be
desired.

18

19

Cohen’s d of this effect is 0.2, which suggests that this is a small (but nontrivial) effect size (Cohen 2013).

We exclude Study 1 participants randomized to the deepfake condition in the reported specification, but the
results do not change meaningfully when we include the deepfake condition.

20
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0.13 points on a 3-point scale (p<0.001). Finally, information about deepfakes also increased
the rate at which participants said that they “didn’t know whether the politician believed
what was said in the video” (a binary variable) by 6.3 percentage points (p=0.001).
We also evaluated whether information about deepfakes can affect how participants
internalize the content of the video. Namely, does information about deepfakes change what
facts participants associate with the politician in the video? Towards the end of Study 2, we
asked participants to name three facts about Romney in an open-ended question. We found
that information about deepfakes did not significantly change how likely participants were to
mention abortion (p=0.68), but there was a major shift in what participants perceived
Romney’s position on abortion to be. The information about deepfakes caused a 3.0
percentage point drop in the percentage of participants who associated Romney with a prochoice position (p=0.001). (For more details on the open-ended question, please see Table
2.7 in the Supplementary Materials.) An alternative measure of this outcome asked
participants in a close-ended question if Romney had ever “supported women’s access to
abortion”; we found that adding information about deepfakes decreased the likelihood that
participants marked “true” by 14.2 percentage points (p<0.001).

2.5.1: Heterogenous Treatment Effects
We also examined heterogeneous treatment effects, but as we noted in both preanalysis plans, we were underpowered for most of these analyses. We give a brief overview
of the most noteworthy results here (see Sections 4-5 of the Supplementary Materials for full
results). First, we found some evidence that participants surveyed before the election have
higher levels of distrust in political videos than participants surveyed after the election
(p<.05). While we originally planned to investigate motivated reasoning in Study 2, by the
27

time the study was launched, Romney had already become a polarizing figure among
Republicans, so our data does not allow us to adequately address this question. A more
thorough discussion of this point can be found in Section 6 of the Supplementary Materials.

2.6: Discussion and Conclusions
Our findings add to the growing body of literature on textual misinformation, which
has consistently found that warnings about fake news may help readers reject
misinformation but may have the undesirable backlash of increasing Americans’ disbelief in
true news stories (e.g., Pennycook, Bear et al. 2020; Clayton et al. 2020). We find strong
evidence that cautionary information about deepfakes, as one might see in a news headline,
increases disbelief in accompanying video clips—regardless of whether the video is fake or
real. This is particularly problematic as the information about deepfakes did not state that
the accompanying video was fake; the information treatment simply stated that deepfakes
exist and are challenging to spot, which is something that an American might hear on a news
program. Such a nudge nevertheless induced people to disbelieve a video that revealed a
little-known but real policy stance of a real-world politician. And not only did participants
suspect that the video was fake, participants’ beliefs about the politician’s policy stances
changed as a result of the information treatment.
There are limitations to these findings. The data is sourced from online survey
experiments with convenience samples of participants, which means that there are legitimate
concerns over the external validity of our results (see Coppock (2019) for a thorough
analysis of these general concerns.) We acknowledge that the deepfake information
treatment does not resemble how the average person is likely to be exposed to information
about deepfakes in the real world. But one advantage of our treatment is that we remove
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many of the contextual cues of real world exposure (e.g., news source), which helps isolate
the effect of being informed about deepfakes from other related effects (e.g., having an
emotional reaction to the source of the information). One other notable limitation is that the
time between exposure to information about deepfakes and videos of politicians making
policy statements may be much longer in the real world than in our survey experiments.
Future studies should investigate if and how quickly these treatment effects decay. One
countervailing possibility is that, in the real world, people may receive higher dosages of
deepfake information (e.g., through more extensive news coverage) which may cause larger
increases in skepticism. As such, future research should assess the impact of dosage.
Our results illustrate that, while well-intentioned, attempts to warn the public about
deepfakes may inadvertently cause the delegitimization of true information. Our findings
suggest that the news media, elites, and social media platforms may need to take great care in
their attempts to educate the public. We show that providing information about the
existence and the potential dangers of deepfakes erode trust, and it is thus imperative that
other approaches be the subject of future research.
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2.8: Supplementary Materials
2.8.1: Deepfake Model Specifications
We used Amazon’s graphics-accelerated Elastic Computing (EC2) environment to
parse the training footage into a training set of still .jpg images of the actor. These images
were used to build a deepfake model using a widely available, open-source deepfake software
package, DeepFaceLab. The package uses Google’s deep learning library, TensorFlow.
Only the video component was deepfaked—not the audio. This was a conscious
choice since vocal impersonations are much easier and often more convincing than audio
deepfakes. For example, one of the most widespread deepfakes in the wild (Jordan Peele as
Obama) did not deepfake audio; Jordan Peele merely impersonated Barack Obama’s voice.
The actor’s training video was a generic political speech, which was composed using
excerpts from a FiveThirtyEight article wherein Republican and Democratic speechwriters
collaborated “to write a totally pandering bipartisan stump speech for an imaginary
presidential candidate — one who espouses only positions that a majority of voters agree
with” (Swaim & Nussbaum, 2016; p. 1).
The deepfake was created on Amazon’s g3s.xlarge instance, which uses a Tesla M60
GPU. Using the 2/3/2020 NVIDIA build of DeepFaceLab, we first ran SAEHD for 50,000
iterations using the following specifications:
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Table 2.3: Initial model specifications (50,000 iterations)
flip faces
batch size
resolution
face type
AE architecture
autoencoder
encoder dims
decoder dims
decoder mask dim
learn mask
optimizer on GPU
learning rate dropout
random warp
GAN power
face style power
background style
power
color transfer
gradient clipping
enable pretraining

No
8
128
F
dfhd
512
64
48
16
no
yes
no
yes
0
0
0
none
yes
no

The above model resulted in flickering, so we proceeded for 15,000 more iterations using the
following settings:
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Table 2.4: Additional model specifications (15,000 additional iterations)
flip faces
batch size
resolution
face type
AE architecture
autoencoder
encoder dims
decoder dims
decoder mask dim
learn mask
optimizer on GPU
learning rate dropout
random warp
GAN power
face style power
background style
power
color transfer
gradient clipping
enable pretraining

no
4
128
f
dfhd
512
64
48
16
yes
yes
yes
no
0
0
0
none
yes
no

To merge the model to the destination video, a seamless histogram match was used with the
mask eroded by 30.

2.8.2: Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP)
2.8.2.1: Study 1
This study had one major and two minor deviations from the PAP.
The major deviation is the use of Manski bounds for confidence intervals and
statistical significance. For convenience, we provide a brief summary of the method here (for
more details, please refer to Manski (2003)). We impose the distribution of outcomes that
least favors our hypothesis onto all missing outcomes (i.e., the survey instrument maximum
for all missing outcomes in the control and the survey instrument minimum for all missing
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outcomes in treatment), run a covariate-adjusted OLS regression with robust standard errors
over all outcomes, and use the lower bound of the resulting 95% confidence interval as the
lower bound of our reported 95% CI. We do the same with a best-case distribution of
missing outcomes to estimate the upper bound of our reported 95% CI.
We also had two minor deviations from the PAP. To be consistent with Study 2’s
PAP, we 1) dropped the one IP address that was randomized three times (there were no
other IP duplicates that watched our video) and 2) used robust standard errors. These
modifications have negligible impacts on the reported results.

2.8.2.2: Study 2
There were no deviations from the PAP in Study 2.

2.8.2.3: Deviations from the .do Files Accompanying the PAP
There was a typo in the data cleanup code accompanying the PAP. Political party in
both studies was originally miscoded such that “Other - Neither Republican or Democrat”
was treated as Republican. There were also minor capitalization and naming errors. These
were fixed in the final code, which can be viewed in full in the Appendix. Additional changes
include dropping pilot data (as described in the original PAPs), de-duping on IP address in
Study 1 (as described above), adding an indicator identifying cases where self-reported age
was not within one year of age according to Lucid in Study 2 (as described in Study 2’s
updated PAP).

2.8.3: Discernment of Deepfakes Without Deepfake Information
One key question is whether American voters can discern between deepfakes and
real videos without being informed about deepfakes. In Figure 2.3, we show that participants
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were unable to do so. The leftmost column in Figure 2.3 uses an outcome measure that
asked participants how much they agreed with the statement “This video was doctored,
manipulated and/or faked by a computer (i.e. it is a ‘Deep Fake’)” on a 7-point
agree/disagree scale. Participants in the real video condition had a mean sentiment of -0.48,
which is nearly equidistant between “somewhat disagree” and “neither agree nor disagree.”
The mean sentiment of participants in the deepfake condition was not significantly different
from that value (only 0.07 points higher). As shown in the remaining two columns,
treatment effects were even smaller across alternative measures of disbelief. In other words,
a well-made deepfake video is unlikely to be detected by the naked eye of a typical American
voter. In fact, it appears that Americans are somewhat confident that a given political video
is not manipulated by a computer—even when it is.
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Figure 2.3: Voters were unable to discriminate between a real video and a deepfake (Study
1)

Believes video clip is a
deepfake

Unconvinced that politician
believes what is being said

.2
0
-.2
-.4
-.6

Sentiment on 2-point scale

Sentiment on 3-point scale

.2
0
-.2
-.4
-.6

Sentiment deepfake - Sentiment real

.4
.2
0
-.2
-.4
-.6
Treatment Effect

0
-.2
-.4

Real Video Condition
Deepfake Condition

.6

.6

.6

.2

-.6

Real Video Condition
Deepfake Condition

Real Video Condition
Deepfake Condition

Sentiment deepfake - Sentiment real

Sentiment on 7-point scale

.4

.4

.4

Sentiment deepfake - Sentiment real

Don’t know if politician truly
believes what is being said

.4
.2
0
-.2
-.4
-.6

.4
.2
0
-.2
-.4
-.6

Treatment Effect

Treatment Effect

This figure includes only those participants who did not receive a deepfake information. The top row
illustrates covariate unadjusted mean sentiment in each treatment arm for each outcome. The bottom row
shows covariate-adjusted treatment effects with Manski bounds used to calculate 95% confidence intervals.
The three columns represent three outcomes (from left to right): 1) do you believe the video clip is a deepfake?
[7-point scale from -3=“strongly disagree” to 3=“strongly agree”]; 2) how convinced are you that the
politician believes what is being said? [3-point scale from 1=”not at all convinced” to -1=”very convinced”];
and 3) I don’t know if the politician truly believes what is said [binary variable].
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2.8.4: Additional Tables and Figures
Table 2.5: Summary statistics
Study 1

Study 2

Pooled

18-29
30-49
50-64
65+

24%
33%
27%
16%

15%
34%
28%
24%

19%
33%
27%
21%

% Female

51%

54%

53%

White
Black
Hispanic

73%
11%
12%

79%
9%
6%

77%
10%
8%

South
Midwest
Northeast
West

38%
19%
21%
22%

38%
20%
22%
20%

38%
20%
21%
21%

HS or less

18%

16%

17%

Some College

37%

29%

32%

Bachelor’s Degree

27%

29%

29%

Postgrad

17%

25%

22%

Identify or Lean Democrat

48%

48%

48%

Identify or Lean Republican

39%

43%

41%

Median
Household
Income

$45,000
to
$49,999

$55,000
to
$59,999

$50,000
to
$54,999

Total N

1396

1925

3321

Age

Gender
Race

Region

Education

Partisanship

41

Table 2.6: Study 1 – Participants’ Political Party versus their Guess of the Fictional
Politician’s Political Party

Participants'
Political Party
Repub.

Which political party do you think the speaker in the video
belongs to?
Dem.

Don't Know / Not
Clear

Indep.

Repub.

Total

N
169
149
127
89
534
%
31.65
27.9
23.78
16.67
100
N
37
68
49
22
176
Indep.
%
21.02
38.64
27.84
12.5
100
N
163
189
194
104
650
Dem.
%
25.08
29.08
29.85
16
100
N
369
406
370
215
1,360
Total
%
27.13
29.85
27.21
15.81
100
Lucid asks for participants’ political party before they are able to enroll in any surveys. ANOVA f-statistic=2.84
(p<.0369).

42

Figure 2.4: Study 2 - Impacts of information about deepfakes on disbelief (3-point scale):
unconvinced that politician believes what is being said
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Real Video (Study 1)
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0

-.2

Treatment Effect

-.2

-.4

-.4

-.4

0

Treatment Effect

Treatment Effect

The top row illustrates covariate unadjusted mean sentiment in each treatment arm, while the bottom row
shows the resulting treatment effects with 95% confidence intervals. The leftmost column illustrates the impact
of information about deepfakes added above a deepfake video; the remaining columns illustrate the impact of
information about deepfakes added above a real video. All three columns measure impact in terms of the same
outcome: how convinced are you that the politician believes what is being said? (3-point scale from 1=”not at
all convinced” to -1=”very convinced”). The two leftmost treatment effect graphs use Manski bounds to
calculate 95% confidence intervals. The rightmost treatment effect graph uses covariate-adjusted standard
errors from an OLS regression, as there was no differential attrition.
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Figure 2.5: Study 2 - Impacts of information about deepfakes on disbelief (binary): don’t
know if politician truly believes what is being said
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The top row illustrates covariate unadjusted mean sentiment in each treatment arm, while the bottom row
shows the resulting treatment effects with 95% confidence intervals. The leftmost column illustrates the impact
of information about deepfakes added above a deepfake video; the remaining columns illustrate the impact of
information about deepfakes added above a real video. All three columns measure impact in terms of the same
outcome: how convinced are you that the politician believes what is being said? (3-point scale from 1=”not at
all convinced” to -1=”very convinced”). The two leftmost treatment effect graphs use Manski bounds to
calculate 95% confidence intervals. The rightmost treatment effect graph uses covariate-adjusted standard
errors from an OLS regression as there was no differential attrition.
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Table 2.7: Study 2 - Hand-coded Romney facts across conditions

Don't Know / No Response Given
N
Is Republican
N
Ran for President
N
Subjective Evaluation of Character (e.g., trusworthy, traitor,
etc.)
N
Is Senator / Former Governor
N
Other
N
Demographic Fact (e.g., white, male, bussinessman)
N
Mormon
N
Is/Was Pro-Choice
N
Stance on Other Policies
N
Is/Was Pro-Life
N
Believe Video is Real
N
Believe Video is Fake
N
Total
N
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No Info
Info
about
about
Deepfakes Deepfakes
28.2%
27.0%
818
777
16.5%
16.5%
477
475

Total
27.6%
1,595
16.5%
952

9.7%
281

10.7%
309

10.2%
590

9.2%

9.3%

9.3%

266
8.9%
259
8.9%
258
7.7%
224
7.6%
219
1.7%
49

268
8.3%
240
8.3%
240
8.8%
252
7.4%
214
0.7%
19

534
8.6%
499
8.6%
498
8.2%
476
7.5%
433
1.2%
68

0.8%
24
0.3%
9
0.3%
9
0.2%
5
100%
2,898

0.9%
25
1.4%
39
0.5%
15
0.1%
4
100%
2,877

0.9%
49
0.8%
48
0.4%
24
0.2%
9
100%
5,775

Table 2.8: Study 1 – Information about deepfakes has no impact on favorability, vote
choice, or support for essential oils in medicine (but we are underpowered)

Favor

Vote

More
Essential
Oils in
Medicine?

Information
Treatment
Effect

-0.23

-0.11

-0.26

95% Upper
Bound

0.25

0.08

0.27

95% Lower
Bound

-0.75

-0.32

-0.77

As mentioned in the PAP, this analysis excludes participants who are likely supporters of alternative medicine. This is
defined as ALL participants EXCEPT those who BOTH oppose government mandates for vaccination AND
support government subsidies for acupuncture procedures.
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Table 2.9: Study 1 – Deepfakes have no impact on favorability, vote choice, or support for
essential oils in medicine (but we are underpowered)

Favor

Vote

More
Essential
Oils in
Medicine?

Deepfake
Treatment
Effect

0.16

0.04

-0.16

95%
Upper
Bound

0.64

0.22

0.36

95%
Lower
Bound

-0.35

-0.18

-0.66

As mentioned in the PAP, this analysis excludes participants who are likely supporters of alternative medicine. This is
defined as ALL participants EXCEPT those who BOTH oppose government mandates for vaccination AND
support government subsidies for acupuncture procedures.
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Table 2.10: Study 2 - Alternative measure of trust in video as a source of information
Trust
TV

Trust
Online

Information
Treatment
Effect

0.01

-0.03

95% Upper
Bound

0.09

0.05

95% Lower
Bound

-0.07

-0.12

The survey question is “Imagine you saw a video of a politician saying something controversial on [Facebook or

Twitter/television news] . How likely are you to believe that the politician actually said what you see in the
video?” Answers are on 5-point scale from “Completely certain the video is real” to “Completely certain the video is

not real.”

Table 2.11: Study 2 – Republicans appear to have directional (non-significant) increases in
favorability when information about deepfakes is added to Romney video
Vote

Favor

Information*Republic
an

0.05

0.22

95% Upper Bound

0.20

0.52

95% Lower Bound

-0.10

-0.08

Vote is measured via “Given the information that you have, would you consider voting for the politician pictured in the
video?” with answers on a 3-point scale: -1 = “No”, 0 = “Don’t Know / Not Sure”, 1 = “Yes.” Favorability is
measured via “How favorable or unfavorable is your view of the politician pictured in the video?” with answers on a 7point scale ranging from extremely unfavorable to extremely favorable.
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Table 2.12: Study 2 – Participants who are pro-life appear to have directional (nonsignificant) increases in favorability when information about deepfakes is added to Romney
video
Vote Favor
Information*ProLife

0.03

0.12

95% Upper
Bound

0.18

0.43

95% Lower
Bound

-0.12

-0.18

Vote is measured via “Given the information that you have, would you consider voting for the politician pictured in the
video?” with answers on a 3-point scale: -1 = “No”, 0 = “Don’t Know / Not Sure”, 1 = “Yes.” Favorability is
measured via “How favorable or unfavorable is your view of the politician pictured in the video?” with answers on a 7point scale ranging from extremely unfavorable to extremely favorable.
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Table 2.13: Study 2 – No evidence of motivated reasoning
Don’t
Know
Deepfake? Unconvinced
if
Real
Information*Republican

-0.11

-0.03

0.03

95% Upper Bound

0.17

0.11

0.12

95% Lower Bound

-0.39

-0.17

-0.06

The three columns represent three outcomes (from left to right): 1) do you believe the video clip is a deepfake?
[7-point scale from -3=“strongly disagree” to 3=“strongly agree”]; 2) how convinced are you that the
politician believes what is being said? [3-point scale from 1=”not at all convinced” to -1=”very convinced”];
and 3) I don’t know if the politician truly believes what is said [binary variable].
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Table 2.14: Study 2 – Some evidence of more distrust immediately before a major election
Don’t
Know
Deepfake? Unconvinced
if
Real
Post
Election
Indicator

-0.14

-0.04

-0.01

95%
Upper
Bound

0.00

0.03

0.04

95%
Lower
Bound

-0.27

-0.11

-0.05

The three columns represent three outcomes (from left to right): 1) do you believe the video clip is a deepfake?
[7-point scale from -3=“strongly disagree” to 3=“strongly agree”]; 2) how convinced are you that the
politician believes what is being said? [3-point scale from 1=”not at all convinced” to -1=”very convinced”];
and 3) I don’t know if the politician truly believes what is said [binary variable].
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Table 2.15: Study 2 – No evidence that the information treatment effect is different before
versus after a presidential election
Don’t
Know
Deepfake? Unconvinced
if
Real
Information*Post
Election
Indicator

0.10

-0.06

0.04

95% Upper
Bound

0.37

0.08

0.13

95% Lower
Bound

-0.17

-0.20

-0.05

The three columns represent three outcomes (from left to right): 1) do you believe the video clip is a deepfake?
[7-point scale from -3=“strongly disagree” to 3=“strongly agree”]; 2) how convinced are you that the
politician believes what is being said? [3-point scale from 1=”not at all convinced” to -1=”very convinced”];
and 3) I don’t know if the politician truly believes what is said [binary variable].
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Figure 2.6: Information about deepfakes had no impact on trust in future videos found on
TV and online 21

Trust Footage on TV
Trustinfo - TrustNOinfo

.4
.2
0
Study 1

-.2

Study 2
Pooled

-.4
Treatment Effects

Trust Footage Online
Trustinfo - TrustNOinfo

.4
.2
0
Study 1

-.2

Study 2
Pooled

-.4
Treatment Effects

The outcome measure has the same wording across both studies: “When you see videos of politicians making
controversial statements [on television news/online], how confident are you that they haven't been faked, altered, or
manipulated?” Responses range from 0 = “not at all confident” to 4 = “completely confident.” The two panels
illustrate covariate-adjusted treatment effects. Study 1 treatment effects use Manski bounds to calculate 95% confidence
intervals. The confidence intervals in Study 2 are estimated using covariate-adjusted standard errors from an OLS
regression, as there was no differential attrition. The pooled estimate is estimated using a regression with shared
covariates; it excludes all participants in the deepfake condition in Study 2.

An alternative wording of the same outcome (“Imagine you saw a video of a politician saying something
controversial on [television news/Facebook or Twitter]. How likely are you to believe that the politician
actually said what you see in the video?”) was used in Study 2 and produced very similar treatment effects. See
Table 2.10 in the Supplementary Materials.

21
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2.8.5: Discussion of Secondary Research Question Results
2.8.5.1: Study 1
Due to the necessity of using bounds, we were severely underpowered when
examining the secondary research questions in Study 1. We assessed whether information
about deepfakes or deepfakes themselves have any impact on favorability towards the
politician or the extreme policy (mandating doctors to use essential oils to treat cancer). As
shown in Tables 2.8-2.9, we saw no statistically significant differences.

2.8.5.2: Study 2
Study 2 was split into two waves directly before and after the election to assess
whether a highly salient election context with high levels of ambient misinformation makes
Americans more distrustful of new political information. There is some indication that this
may be the case. As seen in Table 2.14 of the Supplementary Materials, we find that
participants surveyed before the election have higher levels (0.14 points more) of belief that
the video they watched is deepfaked than participants surveyed after the election (p<.05).
We emphasize that caution should be used when interpreting these results, as we found that
the sample of participants had significantly different demographics (F(34, 1727) = 1.69,
p<.01). Even though we control for these differences, it is possible that there are
unobserved confounds driving this difference in trust levels.

2.8.5.3: Pooled
Information about deepfakes appears to have some impact on favorability and
intention to vote for the politician featured in the video clip. Overall, information about
deepfakes decreases intention to vote for the politician by 4.2 percentage points (p<0.05),

54

with little difference in effect sizes across studies. Similarly, information about deepfakes
decreases the politician’s favorability by 0.17 points on a 7-point scale (from extremely
unfavorable to extremely favorable) (p<0.05). There are, however, strong theoretical reasons
to believe that there should be considerable heterogeneity in these effects. For instance, in
Study 2, pro-life Republicans should be less likely to favor Romney if they believe that he
was or is pro-choice. And since information about deepfakes increases disbelief that Romney
was ever pro-choice, favorability and vote intention levels in the Information condition
should be higher than in the No Information condition. This pattern should be reversed for
pro-choice Democrats. Our results (see Supplementary Materials, Tables 2.11-2.12) are
consistent with this theory in terms of estimate directions but are not statistically significant.
We did not see support for this theory in Study 1—even those participants who
should oppose the extremist essential oils policy reported lower levels of favorability when
treated with information about deepfakes. We must emphasize that we did not have similarly
clear predictors of policy preference as Republicanism for abortion, so we could not
accurately identify people who were for or against extreme policies in favor of holistic
medicine.

2.8.6: Discussion of Motivated Reasoning
The literature on politically-motivated reasoning suggests that people are skeptical of
information that contradicts the beliefs of their political affiliation. If this is the case, we
expect Republicans will be more likely to dismiss the real video of Mitt Romney in Study 2
as a deepfake, because the view expressed by a well-known Republican contradicts the policy
stance of the Republican party. While we do include results illustrating the interaction of the
information treatment and Republican self-identification (see Table 2.13 in the
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Supplementary Materials), we cannot directly address the question of motivated reasoning
with this data for three reasons. First, Romney had recently a become a polarizing figure
among Republicans due to his criticism of Donald Trump and support of Black Lives Matter
protests. Second, we did not measure Romney favorability pre-treatment. And finally, it is
not clear that all rank-and-file Republicans identify being pro-choice as a clearly Republican
position; 31% of surveyed Republicans identified themselves as pro-choice in 2019
(Kirzinger et al. 2020).

2.8.7: Ethical Considerations
The authors declare that the human subjects research in this article was reviewed and
approved by the Yale University Human Subjects Committee. The authors affirm that this
article adheres to the APSA’s Principles and Guidance on Human Subjects Research.
Participants were compensated for their participation by the panel provider.
Additionally, these studies were designed such that there was no deception and they
avoided ethical gray areas of similar deepfake studies. If we use existing ethical frameworks
(e.g., Thomas et al. 2017), the typical risks of an experimental study on deepfakes are 1) the
possibility of behavioral/sentiment change (i.e., the possibility of introducing new
information into the broader informational environment), 2) the potential for abuse (i.e.,
results of research can be used by malicious actors) and 3) necessary use (i.e., is it possible to
answer the same research question with an alternative design)? We avoid those risks
completely, as these studies do not introduce any new misinformation. And because we do
not create a deepfake of a real politician, there is no potential for abuse by malicious actors
(i.e., there is no material detailing how to create a deepfake of a real politician). Finally, our
studies illustrate two alternative designs to study the impact of political deepfakes without
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creating a new deepfake of a real politician: 1) using a fictional politician or 2) using a real
video of a real politician where the content only appears spurious.

2.8.8: Materials
2.8.8.1: Study 1 Original PAP
The full PAP can be found online at
https://osf.io/rqfz5/?view_only=e2807b367a534262bb6c7aeb5727b999 but is reproduced in full
for convenience.

2.8.8.1.1: Hypotheses
Primary Hypotheses:
H1: Are people are able to discern DeepFakes from real video?
•

[DeepFake & NoWarning] compared to [Real & NoWarning]  Increase in
Disbelief

H2: How effective are DeepFake warnings?
H2a: Do DeepFake warnings cause people to (correctly) believe that
DeepFakes are fake?
•

[DeepFake & Warning] compared to [DeepFake & NoWarning] 
Increase in Disbelief

H2b: Do DeepFake warnings cause people to (incorrectly) believe that real
videos are fake?
•

[Real & Warning] compared to [Real & NoWarning]  Increase in
Disbelief
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H2c: Do DeepFake warnings help people discern DeepFakes from real
videos?
•

Difference between H2a and H2b  Increase in Disbelief

H3: Do DeepFake warnings make people less likely to believe in any (real or fake)
political footage?
•

[Warning] compared to [NoWarning]  Decrease in Trust in Footage of
Politicians Online

•

[Warning] compared to [NoWarning]  No Change in Trust in Footage of
Politicians on TV News

Secondary Hypotheses:
S_H1a: Are DeepFakes as persuasive as real videos with respect to the
favorability/likelihood of voting for the faked politician?
•

Among those who are NOT likely to support the expansion of alternative
medicine:22
[DeepFake] compared to [Real]  Increase in Support23

S_H1b: Do warnings reduce the persuasive impact of videos with respect
to the favorability/likelihood of voting for the faked politician?

This population is defined as ALL participants EXCEPT those who BOTH oppose
government mandates for vaccination AND support government subsidies for acupuncture
procedures.
22

In other words, we expect that people who are against the proposed policy will be more
supportive of the politician if they suspect the video is fake.
23
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•

Among those who are NOT likely to support the expansion of alternative
medicine:24 [Warning] compared to [NoWarning]  Increase in Support25

S_H2: Are DeepFakes as persuasive as real videos with respect to the position
articulated by the fake politician?
•

[DeepFake] compared to [Real]  Decrease in Support for the Expansion of
Essential Oils in Medicine

S_H3: Do warnings reduce the persuasive impact of videos with respect to the
position articulated by the fake politician?
•

[Warning] compared to [NoWarning]  Decrease in Support for the Expansion
of Essential Oils in Medicine

2.8.1.1.2: Design Plan
This survey experiment is designed in Qualtrics and is to be implemented via Lucid.
All participants who consented, met our eligibility requirements (18+ US citizens who are
eligible to vote), and passed the video, sound, and attention checks proceed to the
randomization phase. They are randomized to either receive a warning about modified
videos or not, and to either view a real video of the speaker or a computer-generated
modification thereof. In other words, there are 4 unique treatment conditions:
1)

No Warning + Real Video

This population is defined as ALL participants EXCEPT those who BOTH oppose
government mandates for vaccination AND support government subsidies for acupuncture
procedures.
24

In other words, we expect that people who are against the proposed policy will be more
supportive of the politician if they suspect the video is fake.
25
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2)

Warning + Real Video

3)

No Warning + DeepFake Video

4)

Warning + DeepFake video

In all 4 conditions, the speaker, a hired actor playing the part of a politician, will speak in
favor of a policy position (e.g. mandating the use of essential oils for the treatment of
cancer). (Please see “Supplementary Materials: Script” for the exact wording.)

2.8.1.1.3: Sampling Plan
This study will use a sample of individuals paid by Lucid to participate in our
Qualtrics survey. We ran a small pilot of this study via Lucid. This pilot was used to devise
the analysis code only; the data from this pilot will not be included in the final analysis.
We use the pilot to calculate statistical power. Among our primary hypotheses, we
isolated the smallest difference that we believe is meaningfully different from zero. The
effect size was 0.1 with a baseline of .45 and a standard deviation of .48. This difference was
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between two (of four) treatment arms. To get 80% power, this kind of effect size
necessitates 362 observations in each condition. Since we have 4 conditions in total, we will
need approximately 1,500 observations to detect similarly sized effects. 26

2.8.1.1.4: Variables
We use three questions to test H1 and H2:
DeepFake: This video was doctored, manipulated and/or faked by a computer (i.e. it is a
“Deep Fake”).
-3 = Strongly disagree
-2 = Disagree
-1 = Somewhat disagree
0 = Neither agree nor disagree
1 = Somewhat agree
2 = Agree
3 = Strongly agree
NotConvinced: 27 How convinced are you that the politician believes what is being said?
1 = Not at all convinced

26

Stata code: sampsi .45 .55, sd(.48) power(.8)

To ease exposition, the three variables are coded such that a positive increase in each variable is associated
with more disbelief in the video.

27
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0 = Not sure
-1 = Very convinced
Don’tKnow: Which statement comes closer to your view?
0 = The politician truly believes what is said in the video
0 = The politician is only saying things in the video in order to get elected
1 = I don’t know if the politician truly believes what is said in the video
To test H3, we use:
When you see videos of politicians making controversial statements on television news,
how confident are you that they haven't been faked, altered, or manipulated?
When you see videos of politicians making controversial statements online, how
confident are you that they haven't been faked, altered, or manipulated?
Trust is measured on a 4-point scale (ranging from “0 = not at all confident” to “4 =
completely confident”).
To test S_H1, we use:
How favorable or unfavorable is your view of the politician pictured in the video?
-3 = Extremely unfavorable
-2 = Unfavorable
-1 = Somewhat unfavorable
0 = Neither favorable nor unfavorable
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1 = Somewhat favorable
2 = Favorable
3 = Extremely favorable
Given the information that you have, would you consider voting for the politician
pictured in the video?
1 = Yes
-1 = No
0 = Not sure / don’t know
To test S_H2, we use:
The US government should encourage the use essential oils in medicine
-3 = Strongly disagree
-2 = Disagree
-1 = Somewhat disagree
0 = Neither agree nor disagree
1 = Somewhat agree
2 = Agree
3 = Strongly agree
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2.8.1.1.5: Analysis Plan
For details, please see the attached (annotated) Stata code. The code was written
before the analysis was conducted.
The analysis will code the variables of interest as depicted above. We exclude only
those who do not consent, fail to meet our eligibility criteria, or fail the audio, visual, and
attention checks. We check for differential attrition and check that all pre-treatment
covariates are balanced across conditions. If there is imbalance on any covariate (p<.05), we
control for it in our covariate-adjusted specification. For individuals, who did not state where
they are on the ideological spectrum, we impute their ideology via an OLS regression using
their self-reported policy stances to predict an ideology score. We include an indicator to
denote observations that have an imputed ideology.
The main analysis will use a covariate adjusted OLS regression to maximize the
precision of our estimates. The regression is denoted as SPECIFICATION 3 in the attached
code and will be run as-is (controlling for ideology, policy stance on vaccination, and policy
stance on acupuncture) if all pre-treatment covariates are balanced. If there is any imbalance
(p<.05), we will add the imbalanced covariates to the regression. Unless otherwise specified,
SPECIFICATION 1 and 2 will be run as robustness checks.
SPECIFICAITON 1 will report raw means, while SPECIFICATION 2 is designed
to better isolate the “scandalous content” component of the treatment. Namely, the policy
stance is designed to be scandalous regardless of ideology. From the pilot, a non-trivial
proportion of people who are 1) against government mandates for vaccination and 2) in
favor of Medicare/Medicaid covering the cost of acupuncture had favorable views of the
hypothetical politician and were in favor of expanding essential oils in medicine. This may
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create two different conceptual treatment constructs: one where the DeepFake is of
scandalous content and another where it is of "normal" content—depending on who is
viewing the footage. As such, in SPECIFICATION 2, we exclude individuals who are BOTH
against mandatory vaccination of school children AND in favor of government subsidies for
acupuncture procedures.
Statistical significance for all analyses will be reported at the conventional p<.05 level
(2-sided).
To answer S_H1(a-b), we must use only SPECIFICATION 2, since we expect that
people who favor the use of essential oils in medicine may be disappointed if they suspect
the policy stance has been faked, while people who are against alternative medicine may have
the exact opposite effect (they may not judge the politician as harshly if they suspect that the
video has been faked). We evaluate only the treatment effects among those who are not
highly likely to favor the expansion of essential oils in medicine. We lack sufficient sample
size to test for the opposite effect among those who are most likely to favor essential oils in
medicine.
As an additional diagnostic, we will also check that the speaker is not perceived as
obviously partisan. We will also run a manipulation check with a simple t-test to ensure that
the experiment was executed correctly.

2.8.8.2: Study 2 PAP
The full PAP can be found online at
https://osf.io/rqfz5/?view_only=e2807b367a534262bb6c7aeb5727b999 but is reproduced in full
for convenience.

65

2.8.8.2.1: Introduction
There is concern that political DeepFakes (AI-doctored videos of politicians speaking)
may mislead voters; and there have been several studies evaluating the impact of DeepFake
exposure on belief in the content of the faked videos (Wittenberg, Zong, & Rand, 2020;
Vaccari & Chadwick, 2020). The study in this pre-analysis plan assesses whether messaging
about DeepFakes makes people more likely to disbelieve real video information. Much like
warnings about textual fake news caused people to disbelieve real headlines (Clayton et al.
2019), we suspect information about DeepFakes may make people less likely to believe policy
statements that are surprising or controversial—even when the voter sees video footage of the
politician actually making that statement.

2.8.8.2.2: Design Plan
This survey experiment is designed in Qualtrics and is to be implemented via Lucid.
All participants who consented, met our eligibility requirements, and passed the video,
sound, and attention checks proceed to the randomization phase. (We discuss exclusions in
greater detail in the Exclusion section.) They are randomized to either receive a warning
about modified videos or not.
In both conditions, participants view the same historical clip of Romney saying,
“And I’ve been very clear on that. I will preserve and protect a woman’s right to choose and
I’m devoted and dedicated to honoring my word…” while campaigning for governor of
Massachusetts. (Please see the figure below for a screencap of the video.)
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2.8.8.2.3: Sampling Plan
This study will use a sample of individuals (expected N of 3,000) paid by Lucid to
participate in our Qualtrics survey. We ran a small pilot of this study via Lucid. This pilot
was used to devise the analysis code only; the data from this pilot will not be included in the
final analysis.

2.8.8.2.4: Research Questions
Primary Questions:
(Q1_believe_any_vid) Do DeepFake warnings make people less likely to believe in any
(real or fake) political footage?
•

Prediction: Decrease in trust in footage of politicians online

•

Prediction: Increase in trust in footage of politicians on TV news

(Q2_disbelieve_real) Do DeepFake warnings cause people to (incorrectly) believe that a
concrete real video is fake?
•

Prediction: Increase in disbelief in veracity of video
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•

Prediction: Increase in disbelief that Romney was ever pro-choice

Secondary Questions:
(SQ1_favorability_increase) Do warnings increase the favorability/likelihood of voting for
the faked politician…
(SQ1a_repub_fav_increase) more among Republicans than among Democrats?
•

Prediction: The interaction of treatment and a Republican indicator is expected to
be positive

(SQ1b_pro_life_fav_increase) more among pro-lifers than among pro-choicers?
•

Prediction: The interaction of treatment and a pro-life indicator is expected to be
positive

(SQ2_motiv_reason) Are Republicans more likely to disbelieve the real video than
Democrats (e.g., motivated reasoning)?
•

Prediction: For the outcomes 1) disbelief in veracity of video and 2) disbelief that
Romney was ever pro-choice…
o the interaction of treatment and a Republican indicator is expected to be
positive

(SQ3_election1) Is distrust stronger directly before the 2020 US General election?
•

Prediction: For the outcome disbelief in veracity of video…
o an indicator for whether the respondent took the survey after midnight
on November 3rd, 2020 is expected to be negative
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(SQ4_election2) Are effects on disbelief stronger directly before the 2020 US General
election?
•

Prediction: For the outcome of disbelief in veracity of video…
o the interaction of treatment and an indicator for whether the respondent
took the survey after midnight on November 3rd, 2020 is expected to be
negative

2.8.8.2.5: Outcome Measures
We use the following survey questions to evaluate Q1_believe_any_vid:
Trust_Faked: When you see videos of politicians making controversial statements [on
television news/online], how confident are you that they haven't been faked, altered,
or manipulated?
0 = not at all confident
1 = somewhat confident
2 = very confident
3 = completely confident
Trust_ActuallySaid: Imagine you saw a video of a politician saying something
controversial on [television news/Facebook or Twitter]. How likely are you to
believe that the politician actually said what you see in the video?
0 = Completely certain the video is not real
1 = Somewhat certain the video is not real
2 = Don't know if the video is real or not
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3 = Somewhat certain the video is real
4 = Completely certain the video is real
For Q2_disbelieve_real and SQ2_motiv_reason we use the following questions to measure
disbelief 28 in veracity:
DeepFake: This video was doctored, manipulated and/or faked by a computer (i.e. it is a
“Deep Fake”).
-3 = Strongly disagree
-2 = Disagree
-1 = Somewhat disagree
0 = Neither agree nor disagree
1 = Somewhat agree
2 = Agree
3 = Strongly agree
NotConvinced: How convinced are you that the politician believes what is being said?
1 = Not at all convinced
0 = Not sure

To ease exposition, the three variables are coded such that a positive increase in each variable is associated
with more disbelief in the video.

28
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-1 = Very convinced
Don’tKnow: Which statement comes closer to your view?
0 = The politician truly believes what is said in the video
0 = The politician is only saying things in the video in order to get elected
1 = I don’t know if the politician truly believes what is said in the video
and the following two questions (Free Response and Fact List) will measure disbelief in the
content:
Free Response: In the text boxes below, please write three facts you know to be true
about Mitt Romney. If you can’t think of a fact, you may answer “don’t know” in as
many boxes as you need to.
[Any answer containing “choose”, “choice”, “abort”, and “life” will be
automatically flagged as =0 (=1 otherwise) and then will be manually
reviewed to confirm that the free-response correctly identifies that Romney
was once pro-choice.]
Fact List In the following table, please mark all positions that you believe Mitt
Romney has ever held.
[Facts about Romney]
Supported women’s access to abortion
0 = True
1 = False
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1 = Not sure / Don’t know
To test SQ1_favorability_increase, we use:
How favorable or unfavorable is your view of the politician pictured in the video?
-3 = Extremely unfavorable
-2 = Unfavorable
-1 = Somewhat unfavorable
0 = Neither favorable nor unfavorable
1 = Somewhat favorable
2 = Favorable
3 = Extremely favorable
Given the information that you have, would you consider voting for the politician
pictured in the video?
1 = Yes
-1 = No
0 = Not sure / don’t know

2.8.8.2.6: Analysis
The main analysis will use a covariate adjusted OLS regression. The covariates are: Lucid
demographic variables, policy stances, ideology, Big Five personality traits, political
knowledge, and political interest. For details, please see the attached annotated Stata code.
The code was written before the analysis was conducted. The analysis will code the variables
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of interest as depicted above. We will also check for covariate balance using a logistic
regression (see line 22 of the accompanying Stata code).

2.8.8.2.7: Exploratory Analysis
As an additional exploratory analysis, we conduct the same analysis as in
SQ2_motiv_reason on the following outcome variables: believing that Romney was once the
governor of Massachusetts and is currently pro-life. We expect these treatment effects to
have the same direction as in SQ2_motiv_reason but smaller in magnitude.
Finally, we will check to see if a participant’s personal stance on abortion changes as
a result of the Warning. We do not expect that there will be much of an effect, but any
individual with weak views on this issue may opt to adopt elite cues. We expect that the prepost difference of participants’ own stance on abortion will be larger in favor of pro-choice
in the No Warning condition than in the Warning condition.

2.8.8.2.8: Missing Data
For individuals, who did not state where they are on the ideological spectrum, we
will impute their ideology via an OLS regression using their self-reported policy stances to
predict an ideology score. We will include an indicator to denote observations that have an
imputed ideology.
Since there may be individuals who are randomized but do not finish the survey (and
thus do not provide outcome responses), we will check for differential attrition using a chisquared test (see line 13 in the Stata code). If there is no differential attrition, we conclude
that missingness occurs at random and exclude all affected observations from analysis. If
there is differential attrition (i.e., chi-squared p-value<.05), we will use inverse probability
weights to weight the population of all subjects who passed the attention checks. The
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missingness propensity score will be fit via a logistic regression of missingness on covariates,
treatment, and their interactions.29 Any propensity scores under .05 will be Winsorized to
0.05.

2.8.8.2.9: Exclusions
We exclude all participants who satisfy any one of the following conditions:
•

Did not consent or meet our eligibility criteria (18+ US citizens who are eligible
to vote).

•

Have duplicate IP addresses and reached randomization.

•

Failed any one of the audio, visual, and attention checks.

•

Self-reported age was not within one year of their age according to Lucid.30

All main analyses will also exclude those participants who were not able to
successfully identify Mitt Romney’s political party. 31
For SQ3_election1 and SQ4_election2, we exclude respondents who:
•

Take any portion of the survey between 8am and midnight November 3rd

2.8.8.2.10: Robustness and Placebo Checks
Romney’s pro-choice stance in the video is atypical of Republicans but not
Democrats. If the participant does not know Romney’s political party, the content of the

Bang, H., & Robins, J. M. (2005). Doubly robust estimation in missing data and causal inference
models. Biometrics, 61(4), 962-973.

29

This is due to data quality concerns raised by Aronow, P. M., Kalla, J., Orr, L., & Ternovski, J. (2020).
Evidence of Rising Rates of Inattentiveness on Lucid in 2020. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/8sbe4

30

31

We interact knowledge of Romney’s partisanship with our treatment effects as a robustness check below.
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video may not seem surprising. Responses from these participants will be tested as a
robustness check with the expectation that all Romney-specific treatment effects (i.e., all
questions with the exception of Q1_believe_any_vid) will be reduced among individuals who
were not able to correctly identify Romney’s party. This will be evaluated by interacting an
indicator variable (where correctly identifying Romney’s party = 1, = 0 otherwise) with
treatment.
We will use the same specification as SQ2_motiv_reason on the Romney facts not
mentioned above as a placebo check (i.e., we expect to see no treatment effects on Romney
facts that are unrelated to the content of the video).

2.8.8.3: Study 1 Survey Script
The full script is titled DF_Study1_Script.pdf and can be found online at
https://osf.io/rqfz5/?view_only=e2807b367a534262bb6c7aeb5727b999 but is provided here in full
for convenience:

Start of Block: Eligibility Criteria

Q46 Are you 18 years of age or older?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
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Q47 Are you a citizen of the US?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q48 Are eligible to vote in the US?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
End of Block: Intro Continued
Start of Block: AUDIOVISUAL CHECK

Q57 In this survey, you will watch a brief political speech. Before showing you the speech,
we want to make sure videos properly play for you. Please watch this short clip. Turn up
your volume and when you are ready, click the play button to start.
[MOBILE ONLY] If the video appears cut off, please rotate your phone.
Page Break
Q58 How many fingers did the actor hold up?
________________________________________________________________

Q59 What is the number the speaker said?
________________________________________________________________
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Q60 For our research, careful attention to survey questions is critical! To show that you are
paying attention please select "I have a question."

o I understand (1)
o I do not understand (2)
o I have a question (3)
End of Block: AUDIOVISUAL CHECK

Start of Block: Ideology (ANES)

Q9 When it comes to politics do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal,
slightly liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, extremely
conservative, or haven't you thought much about this?

o Extremely liberal (1)
o Liberal (2)
o Slightly liberal (3)
o Moderate or middle of the road (4)
o Slightly conservative (5)
o Conservative (6)
o Extremely conservative (7)
o Other (8) ________________________________________________
o I haven't thought much about this (9)
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Q10 People are very busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in
the government. We are testing whether people read questions. To show that you've read
this much, answer both "extremely interested" and "slightly interested".

▢Extremely interested (1)
▢Very interested (2)
▢Moderately interested (3)
▢Slightly interested (4)
▢Not interested at all (5)

End of Block: Ideology (ANES)
Start of Block: Policy Preferences (from Broockman, 2016)
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Q11 Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please pick the option that
most accurately represents your views.)
Agree (1)
The federal government
should pay for medical care
for elderly Americans. (36)

Disagree (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

There should be strong
restrictions on the
purchase and possession of
guns. (42)

o

o

Illegal immigrants should
not be allowed to enroll in
government food stamp
programs. (43)

o

o

Legalize the recreational
use of marijuana. (37)
Increase taxes for those
making over $250,000 per
year. (38)
Women should have a
constitutional right to have
abortions. (39)
Same-sex couples should
be allowed to marry. (40)
Implement a universal
healthcare program to
guarantee coverage to all
Americans, regardless of
income. (41)
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Q28 Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please pick the option that
most accurately represents your views.)
Agree (1)
Include sexual orientation
in federal antidiscrimination laws. (4)
Prohibit the use of
affirmative action by state
colleges and universities.
(5)
I support the death penalty
in my state. (6)
Prohibit the EPA from
regulating greenhouse gas
emissions. (7)
Health insurance plans
should be required to fully
cover the cost of birth
control. (8)
The federal government
should subsidize student
loans for low income
students. (9)
Medicare and Medicaid
should include coverage for
acupuncture. (10)
All students should be
required to be vaccinated
before starting school. (11)

Disagree (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

End of Block: Policy Preferences (from Broockman, 2016)
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Start of Block: INTRO TO VIDEO

Q17
On the next page, you will watch a brief political speech. You will then be asked about how
you feel about the person making the speech and whether or not you would vote for them in
the upcoming election. Please keep your volume turned up.

Page Break
[RANDOMIZATION AND VIDEO]
Start of Block: Outcomes

Q19 How favorable or unfavorable is your view of the politician pictured in the video?

o Extremely unfavorable (1)
o Unfavorable (4)
o Somewhat unfavorable (5)
o Neither favorable nor unfavorable (6)
o Somewhat favorable (7)
o Favorable (8)
o Extremely favorable (9)
Page Break
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Q20 Given the information that you have, would you consider voting for the politician
pictured in the video?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
o Not sure / don't know (4)
Page Break
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Q21 Rank how much you believe the politician agrees with each of the following
statements.
Strongly
disagrees
with (1)
Gas prices
are too high
(1)
The US
government
should
encourage
the use of
essential oils
in medicine.
(2)

Somewhat
disagrees
with (2)

Not Sure
(3)

Somewhat
agrees with
(4)

Strongly
agrees with
(5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Q22 How convinced are you that the politician believes what is being said?

o Not at all convinced (1)
o Not sure (2)
o Very convinced (3)
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Q23 Which statement comes closer to your view?

o The politician truly believes what is being said in the video. (1)
o The politician is only saying things in the video in order to get elected. (2)
o I don't know if the politician truly believes what is said in the video. (3)
Page Break

84

Q24 How trustworthy will you find videos you see on television news of politicians
making controversial statements?

o Not at all trustworthy (1)
o Somewhat trustworthy (2)
o Very trustworthy (3)
o Completely trustworthy (4)
Q25 How trustworthy will you find videos you see online of politicians making
controversial statements?

o Not at all trustworthy (1)
o Somewhat trustworthy (2)
o Very trustworthy (3)
o Completely trustworthy (4)
Page Break
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Q26 Please rank how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

This video
was
doctored,
manipulate
d and/or
faked by a
computer
(i.e. it is a
"Deep
Fake"). (1)
The US
governmen
t should
encourage
the use of
essential
oils in
medicine.
(2)

Neither
agree
nor
disagre
e (4)

Strongl
y
disagre
e (1)

Disagre
e (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o o

o

o

o

o

o

o o

Somewha
t disagree
(3)
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Somewha
t agree
(5)

Agre
e (6)

Strongl
y agree
(7)

Q27 Which political party do you think the speaker in the video belongs to?

o Democrat (1)
o Republican (2)
o Independent / Other (3)
o Don't Know / Unclear (4)
End of Block: Outcomes

2.8.8.4: Study 2 Survey Script
The full script is titled Study 2 - Script.pdf and can be found online at
https://osf.io/rqfz5/?view_only=e2807b367a534262bb6c7aeb5727b999 but is provided here in full
for convenience:

Start of Block: Eligibility Criteria

Q46 Are you 18 years of age or older?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Q47 Are you a citizen of the US?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
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Q48 Are you eligible to vote in the US?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Page Break

Q65 How familiar are you with the politician Mitt Romney?

o Very familiar (1)
o Somewhat familiar (2)
o Never heard of (3)
Q67 Which political party is Mitt Romney affiliated with? Some people don't know
politicians' political affiliations. If you're not sure, please select not sure / don't know.

o Democrat (1)
o Republican (2)
o Independent / Other (3)
o Not Sure / Don't Know (4)

88

Q10 People are very busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in
the government. We are testing whether people read questions. To show that you've read
this much, answer both "extremely interested" and "slightly interested".

▢Extremely interested (1)
▢Very interested (2)
▢Moderately interested (3)
▢Slightly interested (4)
▢Not interested at all (5)

End of Block: Intro Continued
Start of Block: AUDIOVISUAL CHECK

Q57 In this survey, you will watch a brief political speech. Before showing you the speech,
we want to make sure videos properly play for you. Please watch this short clip. Turn up
your volume and when you are ready, click the play button to start.
[IF MOBILE] If the video appears cut off, please rotate your phone.
Page Break

Q58 How many fingers did the actor hold up?
________________________________________________________________
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Q59 What is the number the speaker said?
________________________________________________________________

Q60 For our research, careful attention to survey questions is critical! To show that you are
paying attention please select "I have a question."

o I understand (1)
o I do not understand (2)
o I have a question (3)
End of Block: AUDIOVISUAL CHECK

Start of Block: Ideology (ANES)

Q9 When it comes to politics do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal,
slightly liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, conservative, extremely
conservative, or haven't you thought much about this?

o Extremely liberal (1)
o Liberal (2)
o Slightly liberal (3)
o Moderate or middle of the road (4)
o Slightly conservative (5)
o Conservative (6)
o Extremely conservative (7)
o Other (8) ________________________________________________
o I haven't thought much about this (9)
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End of Block: Ideology (ANES)
Start of Block: Policy Preferences (from Broockman, 2016)

Q11 Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please pick the option that
most accurately represents your views.)
Agree (1)
The federal government
should pay for medical care
for elderly Americans. (36)
Legalize the recreational use
of marijuana. (37)
Increase taxes for those
making over $250,000 per
year. (38)
Women should have a
constitutional right to have
abortions. (39)
Same-sex couples should be
allowed to marry. (40)
Implement a universal
healthcare program to
guarantee coverage to all
Americans, regardless of
income. (41)
There should be strong
restrictions on the purchase
and possession of guns. (42)
Illegal immigrants should not
be allowed to enroll in
government food stamp
programs. (43)

Disagree (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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o

Page Break

Q28 Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please pick the option that
most accurately represents your views.)
Agree (1)
Include sexual orientation in
federal anti-discrimination
laws. (4)
Prohibit the use of
affirmative action by state
colleges and universities. (5)
I support the death penalty
in my state. (6)
Prohibit the EPA from
regulating greenhouse gas
emissions. (7)
Health insurance plans
should be required to fully
cover the cost of birth
control. (8)
The federal government
should subsidize student
loans for low income
students. (9)
Medicare and Medicaid
should include coverage for
acupuncture. (10)
All students should be
required to be vaccinated
before starting school. (11)

Disagree (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

End of Block: Policy Preferences (from Broockman, 2016)
Start of Block: Big5 [BF-10]
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Q106 We will now ask you some questions about yourself.
I see myself as someone who...
Strongly
Agree (1)
is reserved (1)
is generally
trusting (2)
does a
thorough job
(3)
is relaxed,
handles stress
well (4)
has an active
imagination
(5)
is outgoing,
sociable (6)
tends to find
fault in others
(7)
tends to be
lazy (8)
gets nervous
easily (9)
has few
artistic
interests (10)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree (3)

Agree (2)

Disagree (4)

Strongly
Disagree (5)

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o
o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
o
o
o

o

o

o

o

o
o

o
o

o

o

o

o
o
o
o

o

o
o
o
o

End of Block: Big5

On the next page, you will watch a brief political speech. You will then be asked about how
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you feel about the person making the speech and whether or not you would vote for them in
the upcoming election. Please keep your volume turned up.
[IF MOBILE:] If the video appears cut off, please rotate your phone.
[RANDOMIZATION AND VIDEO]
Start of Block: Outcomes1

Q19 How favorable or unfavorable is your view of the politician pictured in the video?

o Extremely favorable (1)
o Favorable (4)
o Somewhat favorable (5)
o Neither favorable nor unfavorable (6)
o Somewhat unfavorable (7)
o Unfavorable (8)
o Extremely unfavorable (9)
Page Break
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Q20 Given the information that you have, would you consider voting for the politician
pictured in the video?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
o Not sure / don't know (4)
Page Break
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Q22 How convinced are you that the politician believes what is being said?

o Very convinced (3)
o Not sure (2)
o Not at all convinced (1)
Q23 Which statement comes closer to your view?

o The politician truly believes what is being said in the video. (1)
o I don't know if the politician truly believes what is said in the video. (3)
o The politician is only saying things in the video in order to get elected. (2)
Page Break
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End of Block: Outcomes1
Start of Block: Outcomes2

Q89 When you see videos of politicians making controversial statements on television
news, how confident are you that they haven't been faked, altered, or manipulated?

o Completely confident (4)
o Very confident (3)
o Somewhat confident (2)
o Not at all confident (1)
Page Break
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Q90 When you see videos of politicians making controversial statements online, how
confident are you that they haven't been faked, altered, or manipulated?

o Completely confident (4)
o Very confident (3)
o Somewhat confident (2)
o Not at all confident (1)
Page Break
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Q91 Imagine you saw a video of a politician saying something controversial on television
news. How likely are you to believe that the politician actually said what you see in the
video?

o Completely certain the video is real (1)
o Somewhat certain the video is real (2)
o Don't know if the video is real or not (3)
o Somewhat certain the video is not real (4)
o Completely certain the video is not real (5)
Page Break
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Q92 Imagine you saw a video of a politician saying something controversial on Facebook
or Twitter. How likely are you to believe that the politician actually said what you see in the
video?

o Completely certain the video is real (1)
o Somewhat certain the video is real (2)
o Don't know if the video is real or not (3)
o Somewhat certain the video is not real (4)
o Completely certain the video is not real (5)
End of Block: Outcomes2
Start of Block: Outcomes3
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Q104 In the following table, please mark all facts you know are currently true about the
politician, Mitt Romney.
True (1)
Is Mormon (1)
Is Republican (2)
Currently Senator of
Utah (3)
Wants to cut taxes
(4)
Opposes marijuana
legalization (5)
Opposes women's
access to abortion (6)
Opposes same-sex
marriage (7)

False (2)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Page Break
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Not sure (3)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Q105 In the following table, please mark all facts you know have been true in the past
about the politician, Mitt Romney.
True (1)
Was Baptist (1)
Was a Democrat (2)
Was Governor of
Massachusetts (3)
Raised taxes (4)
Supported marijuana
legalization (5)
Supported women's
access to abortion (6)
Supported same-sex
marriage (7)

False (2)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Page Break
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Not sure (3)

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Q106 Please rank how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.
Strongly
Agree
agree
(2)
(1)
The video
you watched
in this survey
was
doctored,
manipulated
and/or faked
by a
computer
(i.e. it is a
"Deep
Fake"). (1)
Women
should have
a
constitutional
right to have
abortions. (4)

Neither
agree
Somewhat
Somewhat
Disagree
nor
disagree
(6)
agree (3)
disagree
(5)
(4)

Strongly
disagree
(7)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

End of Block: Outcomes3
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2.8.8.5: Study 1 Video Transcript
ACTOR: I believe that the future of health care is going to involve a mix of old and
new methods of treatment. Despite what the pharmaceutical companies tell you, it turns out
that not all medical professionals think that the best way to treat cancer is to simply zap
bodies with radiation and hand out more pills. Natural and organic essential oils are safer,
more affordable, and more effective at treating and even curing cancer than the drugs sold
by pharmaceutical companies. If I am elected, the first thing I will do is work to pass a law
requiring doctors to use essential oils to treat cancer. Only if essential oils don’t work will
they be allowed to use pharmaceutical drugs, radiation, and conventional medicine. I believe
that this will save the American healthcare system millions of dollars every year and save
countless lives.

2.8.8.6: Final Study 1 Data Cleanup Code
The final code used for data cleanup is titled study1_data_cleanup_FINAL.do and can be
found online at https://osf.io/rqfz5/?view_only=e2807b367a534262bb6c7aeb5727b999
Please note that it has slight modifications from the original code
(STUDY1_1exclusions_recode_cleanup_v2.do), which are described fully in Section 2 of the
Supplementary Materials, Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan.

2.8.8.7: Final Study 2 Data Cleanup Code
The final code used for data cleanup is titled study2_data_cleanup_FINAL.do and can be
found online at https://osf.io/rqfz5/?view_only=e2807b367a534262bb6c7aeb5727b999
Please note that it has slight modifications from the original code
(STUDY_2exclusions_recode_clean.do), which are described fully in Section 2 of the Supplementary
Materials, Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan.
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3. The Impact of Trump Tweets and 2016 Victories on
Hate Music Listenership∗
3.1: Abstract
Far-right music serves an important function in organized hate groups worldwide;
one of its primary uses is recruitment. In this paper, I identified frequent listeners of hate
music on the music listenership website, Last.fm, and tracked their song plays and the song
plays of their Last.fm friends before and after a set of unanticipated Trump-related events
between 2015 and 2017 (which include presidential primary victories and Trump posting
xenophobic content on Twitter). I found that friends of frequent listeners of hate music,
who themselves have not previously listened to hate music, experienced increases in hate
music listenership after Trump-related events. These effects appear to be larger for friends
of hate music listeners who are more influential (as measured by eigenvector centrality) in
the hate music listener social network. These results suggest that Trump-related events are
impetuses for recruiting and social influence by users who are likely committed to far-right
ideologies and their efforts appear to be successful.

3.2: Introduction
In the fall of 2020, members of a right-wing militia were arrested for, in the words of
the FBI, plotting “the violent overthrow of certain government and law-enforcement

∗
Conceptualization and study design was conducted in collaboration with David Rand (MIT Sloan). I was
responsible for all computing, data collection and analysis, and am the sole author of this chapter. Additionally,
Grace Kang provided research assistance in handcoding the far-right music artists. I presented this research at
MIT Sloan, the Joint Sunbelt and NetSci Conference (Networks 2021), and the 14th Annual Political Networks
Conference (PolNet 2021); I am grateful for all the useful feedback. This research was approved by Yale IRB.
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components” (Sheth and Haltiwanger, 2020; p. 1). Only months later, in January 2021, the
US capitol building was stormed, with many of the rioters affiliated with far-right groups
including “self-described Nazis and white supremacists” (Diaz & Treisman, 2021; p. 1).
Former president Donald Trump has been impeached for this “incitement of insurrection”
(Naylor, 2021).
Empirical research has linked former president Donald Trump’s 2016 general
election victory with increases in misogyny (e.g., Huang and Low, 2017), xenophobia (e.g.,
Crandall, Miller & White, 2018; Bursztyn, Egorov, Fiorin, 2019), and racism (Giani & Meon,
2019); exposure to statements made by Trump in survey experiments caused increases in
racist sentiments and xenophobia (e.g., Schaffner, 2020; Newman et al. 2021). These
increases in bigotry have been dubbed by some as the “Trump effect” (Costello 2016). But
this research has largely focused on the interaction between elected politicians and typical
American voters, which, while important, does not address the influence of a third strategic
actor: organized hate groups (such as the American Nazi Party). Including hate groups in
this interaction is particularly important, because they often not only endorse political
violence but have been empirically linked to ideologically-motivated fatal violence in
counties where they operate (Adamczyk et al., 2014). Outside of the US, communications
from far-right extremists have been modelled as part of the causal pathway that lead to hate
crimes (Dancygier et al. 2021). The FBI recently raised the threat level of domestic far-right
hate groups to the same level as the international terrorist group, ISIS (Woodward, 2020). As
such, it is critical to understand how hate group recruitment efforts interact with xenophobic
and racist rhetoric from a prominent elected politician. Particularly, does a political elite’s
normalization of racism and xenophobia go further than activate casual racism—does it play
a part in the radicalization of Americans into far-right ideologies?
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Anthropological and sociologists have found that far-right groups make extensive
use of hate music (e.g., bands with such names as “Aryan Terrorism”) for recruitment,
organizing, and expression of racist beliefs (e.g., Messner et al., 2007; Corte, & Edwards,
2008; Shekhovtsov, 2013; Woolf & Hulsizer, 2004). Indeed, as I discuss in subsequent
sections, far-right music can be construed as a proxy for subscription to extreme far-right
ideologies that go far beyond casual racism. As such, I generated a dataset of over half a
billion song plays from ~250,000 users on the website Last.fm, one of the largest public
repositories for music listenership in the world. I then applied an interrupted time series
estimator to examine listenership behavior of Last.fm users before and after various,
unanticipated Trump-related events. I find that for Last.fm users who have not listened to
hate music before but are friends with top listeners of hate music, hate music listenership
increased after unanticipated Trump-related events. This suggests that there is a link between
Trump and the activation of far-right ideologies among music listeners in the US.
This paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss the motivation behind this
research question and review prior studies on the relationship between political elites, hate
groups, and far-right radicalization. I then describe my theoretical framework. Next, I
describe my data and the empirical methods used. Finally, I present the results and conclude.

3.3: Motivation and Prior Research
Political elites’ influence on voter attitudes and behavior is a well-studied topic in
political science. While the initial formulations of the theoretical framework for democracy
understandably focused on how voters with static policy preferences affect elected
politicians’ behaviors (e.g., Black, 1948), there has since been extensive research into how
political elites themselves affect the policy preferences and political attitudes of voters (e.g.,
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Abramowitz 1978; Gabel and Scheve 2007; Lenz 2009, 2012; Minozzi et al. 2015;
Broockman and Butler, 2017; Barber & Pope, 2019; Agadjanian, 2021). Just prior to Donald
Trump’s presidency, this research focused on how political elites exploited subtle cues to
prime racial resentment among whites; one of the key takeaways is that only subtle,
“implicit” cues seemed to consistently work (e.g., Stephens-Dougan 2016; White, 2007). But
the anti-prejudice norms that underpinned these effects appeared to change dramatically in
recent years (Valentino, Neuner, & Vandenbroek 2018). After Donald Trump’s victories,
scholars looked at the impact of explicit racial and xenophobic statements made by Trump
on typical voters’ attitudes towards people of color and immigrants (e.g., Schaffner, 2020;
Newman et al. 2021). Schaffner (2020) found that exposure to an elected elite flouting antiprejudice norms made the participants of a survey experiment less likely to endorse norms
against the expression of prejudice.
This research is important in showing direct effects of elites’ prejudiced rhetoric on
highly consequential voter attitudes; for instance, such attitudes may ultimately swing
elections in favor of politicians who implement prejudiced policies (for a more extensive
discussion see Schaffner 2020). But these studies do not address an important intermediary:
organized hate groups. After all, it isn’t just politicians and political elites that influence
public opinion. In certain contexts, organized interest groups can have large effects in
reducing prejudice (e.g., Broockman and Kalla, 2016; Kalla and Broockman, 2020), but
political scientists have also noted the many ways they can increase it. For instance, Green,
Glaser & Rich (1998) provide historical examples illustrating that it is both “political elites
and organizations [that can attribute] blame and [foment] public resentment toward minority
groups in times of economic contraction” (p. 89). They draw on the findings of Foner
(1975), who found unions and elected politicians alike argued that emancipated black citizens
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would threaten white workers and that such propaganda may have led to the 1917 St. Louis
riots (Green, Glaser & Rich, 1998). An in-depth analysis of the Ku Klux Klan, meanwhile,
noted the group’s strategy of exploiting economic conditions for recruitment and persuasion
efforts (Wade 1987; Green, Glaser & Rich 1998). If organized groups such as the KKK
exploit economic conditions, it is likely that they may want to exploit political conditions, as
well. 32

3.3.1: Hate Groups
Before discussing the interaction of hate groups, political elites, and the electorate, it
is necessary to define far-right, hate groups more precisely. I use the terms far-right groups
and hate groups interchangeably, as my definition of hate group follows Fording & Cotter
(2014), who define the construct “as any group associated with racial or ethnic hatred…
[and] is associated with the ‘white racist right wing’” (p. 2-3). While there are hate groups
that are outside of this definition, for instance, SLPC classifies black separatist groups as hate
groups, the majority of far-right groups in the US share some form of commitment to white
supremacy (SLPC, 2020). White supremacist groups may have differences but all espouse the
myth of “white genocide” and “envision a racially exclusive world where ‘nonwhites’ are
vanquished, segregated, or at least subordinated to Ayran authority.” (Futrell, Simi, &

This gap in the literature may be partially motivated by the waning influence of infamous hate groups such as
the Ku Klux Klan. A recent Time headline read “9 People Showed Up for a KKK Rally in Dayton, Ohio. They
Were Drowned Out by 600 Protestors” (Law 2019) and recent Southern Law Poverty Center (SLPC) reports
confirmed the decline of the Ku Klux Klan (SLPC 2019). However, as SLPC notes, the decline of older hate
groups does not necessarily translate to an overall decline in white supremacist hate group membership in
America (SLPC 2019).

32
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Gottschalk, 2006; p. 281). Unsurprisingly, hate groups have been empirically linked to
ideologically-motivated fatal violence in counties where they operate (Adamczyk et al., 2014).
White-supremacist hate groups share another trait—far-right music scenes are often
essential to their functioning and growth (e.g., Messner et al., 2007; Corte, & Edwards, 2008;
Shekhovtsov, 2013; Woolf & Hulsizer, 2004). Far-right music is often used to recruit new
members, especially youths (e.g., Corte & Edwards, 2008). For instance, “[i]n 2004,
Panzerfaust Records, a successful North American White Power label, drew on a network of
volunteers to help distribute a sample CD to middle and high school students across the
country” (Corte & Edwards, 2008, p. 14). Far-right music artists are also often directly
involved with political and para-military organizations (Shekhvotsov, 2013). One of the
clearest examples in recent news is that the organizers of the largest far-right music festival
in Europe were also members of the far-right Azov movement (Hume, 2019), which gained
notoriety in 2014 due to the alleged war crimes of affiliated militia groups like the neo-Nazi
Azov Battalion (Walker, 2014; Sharkov, 2014).
Far-right music spans many genres but tends to share one characteristic: the lyrical
themes, which include “Aryan nationalism, white power, race war, anti-Semitism, antiimmigration, anti-race-mixing, and white victimization” (Futrell, Simi, & Gottschalk, 2006; p.
281). Even the band names are often explicit in their ideological message (e.g., Aryan
Terrorism, Racial Purity). Indeed, scholars of far-right violence find that “[g]roups that
recruit at… concerts… are likely to be attracting members that are more prone to participate
in violence” (Chermak, Freilich, & Suttmoeller, 2013 p. 196). As such, consumption of farright music may be construed as a proxy for subscription to extreme far-right ideologies that
go far beyond casual racism.
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3.3.2: The Relationship between Hate Groups and Trump
Non-profits like the Southern Law Poverty Center (SLPC) have connected Trump’s
xenophobic rhetoric to the growth of far-right hate groups (e.g., Beirich & Buchanan, 2018),
however their analysis focused primarily on numbers of hate groups and not concrete
estimates of total membership. Far-right hate groups are notoriously ephemeral with the
majority of the organizations dissolving in less than a year of existence (Chermak, Freilich, &
Suttmoeller, 2013). Other scholars did find that increases in hate speech online after
Trump’s general election victory (e.g., Scrivens et al., 2020; Zannettou et al., 2020). But
increases in socially adverse sentiments is distinct from subscription to the ideologies of
organized far-right groups. It is also possible that individuals who are already dedicated
members of far-right groups are simply more vocal and more mobilized (e.g., make duplicate
user accounts), but no new members are actually created.
Muller and Schwarz (2019) found that higher levels of Twitter exposure have been
linked to increased hate crime during Trump’s presidency and aggregate hate crime statistics
increased during Trump’s presidency (Beirch, 2019), but these results could be accounted for
by changes in hate crime reporting (e.g., greater media attention may have partially corrected
hate crime underreporting33). It is important to also emphasize that the causal link between
hate group membership and hate crime has not yet been clearly empirically established
(Adamczyk et al., 2014; p. 325), though this may simply be an artifact of incomplete data. 34

33

For a more detailed discussion of issues in hate crime data, see Pezzella, Fetzer, & Keller (2019).

Other scholars find that one tactic that is increasingly used by far-right groups is “leaderless resistance,”
where groups encourage unaffiliated individuals to engage in ideologically-motivated violence to shield the
group and its leader from criminal prosecution (Chermak, Freilich, & Simone, 2010). In other words, it’s
possible that a particular violent hate crime could be committed by an individual who closely associates with an
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There is, however, a clear opportunity to infer subscription to far-right ideology, as
foreshadowed above. The far-right’s reliance on music scenes allows one to study music
listenership and track changes in subscription to far-right ideologies. In this paper, I make
use of one the largest public music listenership databases (Henning & Reichelt, 2008) to
identify top listeners of far-right music. As other scholars found, Trump’s general election
victory was associated with increases in posts on neo-Nazi online message boards (e.g.,
Scrivens et al., 2020), so it logically follows that Trump’s primary victories, xenophobic
tweets, and speeches could all be used as opportunities for far-right organizers to influence
and recruit acquaintances and friends. Prior research has shown that Last.fm users influence
their Last.fm friends’ song choices (Ternovski & Yasseri, 2020); if white supremacists are
making use of Trump-related events and far-right music to influence others, we would be
able to detect increases in hate music listenership among users who have not previously
listened to far-right music.

3.4: Theory
Political elites’ influence on an electorate’s political attitudes does not occur in a
vacuum. As with all political communication, other groups and social contacts compete for
an individual’s attention (e.g., Zaller 1992). This is true in an online environment as much as
it was true when Zaller conducted his studies in 1992. For instance, though former president
Donald Trump used Twitter in an unprecedented way for a sitting president (Coe & ParkOzee 2020), he was one of many voices on social networks. Hate groups also make use of
social networks (Gaudette, Scrievens, Venkatesh 2020) and, in some cases, the two actors

organized hate group but has no formal affiliation with the group; in this case, the reported administrative data
would fail to link to the hate group to the hate crime.
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interacted with one another. For one, there were repeated incidents of Trump retweeting farright accounts (e.g., Trump retweeted a tweet made by WhiteGenocideTM (Kopan 2016)).
And when Trump directly addressed the hate group, Proud Boys, in a television appearance,
the hate group quickly interpreted the mention as an endorsement, going so far as to print
official Proud Boys t-shirts with Trump’s quote prominently positioned (Palmer 2020).
However, Trump and hate groups do not appear to have the same underlying
motivations, which may be why some far-right groups were ultimately “disillusioned” by
Trump’s presidency (Einbinder 2019). Trump’s motivation for his rhetoric are to consolidate
his own supporters,35 which has tended to include far-right extremists but was ultimately
dominated by conservatives with less extreme ideologies. This may explain why Trump did
eventually give a speech where he called racism “evil” and hate groups “repugnant” (Merica
2017). Hate groups on the other hand, by and large, have tended to be unwilling to
compromise their commitment to racial and xenophobic hatred; as such, membership within
such groups has tended to involve a “social stigma from mainstream society” (Jensen, James,
& Yates 2020, p. 6).
Despite having motivations that do not necessarily converge, Trump’s statements
and behavior stand to benefit far-right groups. As has been extensively documented,
exposing Americans to Trump‘s rhetoric has changed their perception of anti-prejudice
norms, thereby making them increasingly comfortable with expressions of racism and
xenophobia (Newman et al. 2021). In other words, the social stigma that members of
extremist groups had faced in the past that motivated disengagement and deradicalization

As Schneiker (2019) claims, this is accomplished by developing his brand as a “superhero anti-politician
celebrity.”
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(Jensen, James, & Yates 2020) appears to be weakening. So, under the proposed theoretical
framework in this paper, the joint effect of Trump’s normalization of expression of
prejudice and hate groups usual recruitment efforts could work in tandem to increase the
number of people who actively subscribe to extremist ideologies.
It is important to acknowledge that both political attitudes and prejudices develop
from childhood and tend to be very resistant to change (e.g., Sears & Funk 1999; Paluck &
Green, 2009). But person-to-person social contact has generally been documented
empirically as one of the most effective ways of changing a person’s mind in terms of
prejudiced attitudes and behavior (e.g., Munger 2017; Broockman & Kalla 2016; Kalla and
Broockman 2020). Far-right groups have used personal social influence for recruitment
efforts extensively (e.g., Fording & Cotter 2014) and have since made use of new online
spaces for recruitment (e.g., Gaudette, Scrievens, Venkatesh 2020). For instance, qualitative
studies found that individuals who became members of far-right groups generally didn’t just
“’stumble across the material’” (Gaudette, Scrievens, Venkatesh 2020, p. 6), but were
recruited, usually, by an online friend or social contact who was already a member of some
hate group.
As such, I hypothesize that Donald Trump’s erosion of anti-prejudice norms can
destigmatize far-right groups, which they, in turn, use as opportunities to recruit others in
their broader social network. The main outcome variable of interest in this paper is far-right
music listenership, which serves as a proxy for subscription to far-right, white supremacist
ideologies. This proxy hinges on the assumption that a person listening to a band like “Racial
Purity” actively espouses far-right ideologies that go beyond more common forms of racism.
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3.5: Methods and Materials
To evaluate these research questions, I made use of the music social network
website, Last.fm, to gather a list of far-right bands, the top listeners of those bands, and the
Last.fm friends of those top listeners. I then pulled song plays for all users in the sample.
This allowed me to use interrupted time series estimation with Trump-related events as
exogenous shocks. In this section, I provide an overview of the data and methods; for
greater detail, please see the Supplementary Materials.
First, I used news media sources to compile a list of 22 unanticipated Trump-related
events between 2015-2017 (a period when Trump’s many controversies were novel and
received intense media coverage). The list of unanticipated events includes 2016 Republican
primary victories and widely publicized Twitter controversies (such as him retweeting white
supremacist content on Twitter). This list doesn’t include planned36 events such as the
Charlottesville “United the Right” rally. Due to the risk of data dredging, the lists of Trumprelated events were pre-registered in the initial Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP) and only those
events were used for analysis. 37
I then collected an initial list of far-right hate bands using Last.fm’s crowdsourced
genre tags (e.g., white power, national socialist black metal). To ensure that the music artists
were, in fact, far-right, each Last.fm artist page was loaded in a web browser and the genre
tags, songs, album titles, the shout-box, the artist biography, pictures of the artists, and
related artists were inspected to confirm that every artist was indeed far-right. (The handUnanticipated Trump-related events are preferred, because far-right groups could recruit both before and
after, for instance, a planned Trump rally. I did also compile a list of planned Trump-related events, but, as
noted in the original Pre-Analysis Plan, I expected, at best, muted effects.

36

37

See https://osf.io/z5g27/ or the Supplementary Materials: Original PAP.
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coding protocol used can be found in the Supplementary Materials: Data and Materials). The
final sample consists of 1,119 hate bands from 43 countries.
I then scraped the top listeners of this set of bands using Last.fm’s API. Midway
through the project, Last.fm censored a large subset of artist pages associated with the farright, so top listeners became inaccessible. And so, an amendment to the PAP was
registered. 38 As specified in the amended PAP, I made use of archive.org’s “Wayback
Machine” to look up historic artist pages and scrape the top listeners of these artists. I then
scraped self-reported location and their Last.fm friends. For both the top listeners and their
friends, I scraped music listenership histories 2 weeks before and 2 weeks after each of the
22 unanticipated Trump-related events.39
To estimate the impacts of Trump-related events on listenership, I used an
interrupted time series (ITS) estimator, which is widely used to measure the impact of some
event in time on a running outcome (e.g. see Bernal, Cummins, Gasparrini, 2017; Briesacher
et al., 2013). A formalization of the ITS estimator can be found in the Original PAP, but a
brief overview follows. To aggregate the data, the time before and after any given Trumprelated event is rescaled, such that the cutoff is moved to 0 for every event (c.f., Imbens &
Lemieux, 2008). I then regress a running time variable, an indicator that equals 1 for all times
after a given Trump-related event (0 otherwise), an interaction of the two, and user and
event fixed effects against daily play counts of hate music. For expositional clarity, increases

38

See https://osf.io/z5g27/ or the Supplementary Materials: Amended PAP.

39

I did the same for the list of 10 anticipated Trump-related events in accordance to the Original PAP.
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in consumption of far-right music after Trump-related events will be referred to as the
“Trump effect” throughout this paper.
This identification strategy rests on the following assumptions. First, I assume that
listenership to far-right music does translate to subscription to the far-right ideologies of
hate groups. However, an individual may be listening to far-right music, because they like the
instrumental parts of the music even though they object to the lyrics. One respondent in a
prior qualitative study said that before they espoused far-right ideologies, they listened to farright music sent to them by friends because they thought the far-right bands were “actually
very musically talented. I can pick those things out being a bass player.” (Gaudette,
Scrievens, Venkatesh 2020, p. 6). But though, in this example, the listener eventually came to
embrace far-right ideologies, other individuals may listen to far-right music without ever
joining a far-right group or engaging in any violent behavior. But existing qualitative research
suggests that such individuals are uncommon (e.g., Corte & Edwards 2008).
Another key assumption is that the mode of music consumption does not differ
before and after Trump-related events. Namely, someone listening to a far-right vinyl record
is unlikely to register their listenership on Last.fm, which would imply that that data is
missing from our dataset.40 If individuals went from listening to far-right music on analog
media before a Trump event, but listened to far-right music on their computer after, the
reported results are overestimated. While this is possible, there is nothing to indicate that this
kind of behavior is common among listeners of far-right music. 41

40

Though it is theoretically possible to manually add non-digital media listens through Last.fm’s API.

I also assume that any observable differences before and after Trump events cannot be explained by false
positives. For instance, our list of hate bands includes the prominent white supremacist, punk rock band,
Skrewdriver. But Skrewdriver’s first release had no outward connections to racial hate or far-right ideology. It is
only in subsequent albums did the band begin to use far-right lyrics and images in their music. There is no

41
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3.6: Results
In this section, I first discuss Last.fm’s data censoring and how my analysis needed to
be amended. I then describe my sample. Finally, I preset the main results and a series of
placebo checks addressing plausible alternative explanations.

3.6.1: Data Censoring and Amended Analysis
Last.fm unexpectedly started to censor data related to far-right bands, which
effectively hid the identity of the top listeners of many far-right bands. As such, I had to
additionally collect data from older cached snapshots of the Last.fm website from
archive.org. The original PAP relied on scraping data of current top listeners of far-right
music; in the amended PAP, I noted that historic top listeners of far-right music would be
collected. Upon analyzing the data, I found that a large proportion of historic top listeners of
far-right music had ceased to listen to far-right music, which may indicate that they have
either disengaged or deradicalized. 42,43 This has two key consequences: 1) any analysis of
music consumption of far-right group members themselves around Trump-related events
severely underpowered, and 2) we have an excellent counterfactual when analyzing the music
listenership behavior of friends of these individuals. Namely, I expect only individuals who
are active in the far-right music scene to recruit their social contacts on Last.fm. Individuals

reason to believe that listenership in such false-positives should increase without any observable increases in
non-hate music (which is a placebo check I include in this paper).
While there is no rigorous estimate of the expected duration of far-right membership on an individual-level,
the relatively short half-lives of organized far-right groups (i.e., usually under a year) may be indicative that farright membership is similarly short-lived (Chermak, Freilich, & Suttmoeller, 2013).

42

Note that these are individuals who have continued to listen to some music on last.fm (hate or non-hate).
Individuals who have not listened to any music (hate or non-hate) in our time period of interest are
automatically excluded from analysis.

43
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who used to listen to far-right music but have since disengaged are unlikely to try to recruit
new members. And yet the unobservable characteristics (such as political preferences) of
these two samples are likely similar. 44 For more details, see Supplementary Materials: Data
and Materials, and Amended PAP.45

3.6.2: Sample
I was able to recover only 1,368 frequent listeners of hate music (“top listeners” 46)
who used their Last.fm account between 2015 and 2017, 47 and do not reside outside of the
United States. For conceptual clarity, I refer to the Last.fm user accounts in the top listener
list as “users.” Specifically, a Last.fm account is a user if it has, at one point, appeared in a
top listener list of the artist page of any of the far-right bands in our dataset. Users may
include:
(1) individuals active in far-right hate groups,
(2) individuals who listen to far-right music without hate group membership,
(3) individuals who have been either in category (1) or (2) but have since reformed
and ceased to listen to far-right music,

Unfortunately, we are unable to confirm this as there was no information about the political preferences or
even the demographics of last.fm users (aside from self-reported country of residence).

44

While this is mentioned in the amended PAP, the description in the PAP is not very detailed since the
number of disengaged far-right listeners was not apparent until after analysis had begun. I did keep lab notes
during the data collection and analysis processes, illustrating discussions and the decisions made for analysis,
which are available upon request. I also conduct extensive placebo tests, in an effort, to guard against data
dredging.

45

Last.fm compiles the top listeners of every catalogued music artist and presents a list of “Top Listener”
usernames on the artist’s page.

46

This time period does not include all days between 2015-2017—just all days two weeks before and two
weeks after each of our unanticipated Trump events.
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and (4) individuals who have never listened to far-right music (e.g., they listened to
only early albums of a band that had become far-right later in their career)
Since we expect only users active in far-right music scenes will attempt to recruit others, I
attempt to limit the analysis to category (1) (or at least categories (1) and (2)). As stated in the
amended PAP, there are three key metrics with which to identify users who are most likely
to be active in far-right music scenes: 1) how many hate bands they listen to, 2) how often
they were classified as top listeners of hate bands, and 3) how central they are in the hate
music listeners friends network (as measured by eigenvector centrality 48).
Users had a total of 45,602 unique friends 49 who do not reside outside of the US. Of
those friends, 16,397 were active on Last.fm and have not listened to hate music before;
these individuals comprise the primary sample of interest, as these users resemble
acquaintances on the periphery that organized far-right groups typically attempt to
ideologically influence and recruit (e.g., Woolf & Hulsizer, 2004). For conceptual clarity, I
refer to this population as “friends” throughout the main text of this paper.
We expect listenership to change only for friends of users in category (1) and (2) (i.e.,
users active in the far-right music scene), as users in category (3) and (4) (i.e., users inactive
in the far-right music scene) are unlikely to influence and recruit their Last.fm friends.
However, there is no precise way to delineate between active and inactive far-right users. To
approximate the likelihood that we are looking at the behaviors of friends of users active in
far-right music scenes, we can examine how many far-right bands the user listened to, how
1,185 of these users were friends with other top listeners of hate music, with 2,259 friendships amongst one
another.

48

Last.fm friends are analogous to Facebook friends, for a more thorough discussion of friend links, please see
Supplementary Materials: Original PAP.
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many times they showed up as top listeners of the same hate-band, and how central they are
in our network of users. (For a more thorough discussion of the mechanism behind these
variables, see Supplementary Materials: Amended PAP). I therefore limit the initial sample of
users on these three variables and analyze the listenership behavior of the resulting samples
of their friends. As such, I analyze six subgroups of friends of users (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: A description of the six samples analyzed
Users' Likelihood of being
Active Far-Right Music
Listeners

Characteristics of Users

1 (lowest)

2

3

4

5

6
(highest)

≤ Hate
Bands
than
Mean

≤ Hate
Bands
than
Mean

≤ Hate
Bands
than
Mean

> Hate
Bands
than
Mean

> Hate
Bands
than
Mean

> Hate
Bands
than
Mean

>
Times
a Top
Listene
r than
Mean

> Times
a Top
Listener
than
Mean

≤ Times a
Top
Listener
than
Mean

≤ Times
a Top
Listener
than
Mean

≤ Central
than
Mean
Resulting Sample Size of
Friends of Users

N=9,129

N=
11,436

N=
13,175

N=
3,222

N=
1,442

>
Central
than
Mean
N=801

3.6.3: Results
In Figure 3.1, I present interrupted time series estimates of hate music listenership
after Trump-related events for a series of subgroups conditioning on the above variables.
The first three columns depict friends of users who are least likely to be active in far-right
music scenes and so they are unlikely to start listening to hate music after Trump-related
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events. In column 1, the subgroup only includes friends of users who have been top listeners
of hate bands less than average50 (twice), have been top listeners of less hate bands than
average (two), and are less central in the hate music listenership network than average
(eigenvector centrality of 0.07). As expected, for this subgroup, the Trump effect is a
precisely estimated zero (95% CI: [-0.002, 0.002]). Columns 2-3 show similar null effects.
Since these three columns correspond to friends of likely inactive far-right users, we do not
expect a Trump effect. In the proposed theoretical framework, Trump victories alone should
not push the average individual to listen to hate music; rather, someone active in the far-right
music scene uses the Trump-related events as opportunities to actively influence their social
network.
Columns 4-6, in contrast, illustrate Trump effects among friends of likely active farright users. Specifically, Column 4 restricts the sample to friends of users who appeared as a
top listener of more than 2 hate bands (the average) between 2015-2017. Even with this
generous restriction and a modest sample size, I recovered a statistically significant (p=0.03)
increase in hate music listenership of 0.01 more hate songs per day. 51 Column 5 further
restricts the sample to friends of users who were top listeners of the same hate band more
than twice (the average). This sample experienced a Trump effect of 0.03 more hate songs
per day (p=0.04). 52 Finally, Column 6 illustrates a sample of friends of users who are most

All reported cutoff averages are calculated such that the unit of analysis is the friend of the hate listener. For
robustness checks of these variables, see Supplementary Materials: Robustness Checks.

50

The interaction of the post-Trump-related-event indicator and the number of hate bands a user’s friend was
a top listener of is significant at p<0.001. (To avoid collinearity, I omit user fixed effects in this and subsequent
subgroup interaction models.)

51

The interaction of the post-Trump-related-event indicator and the number of times a user’s friend was a top
listener of the same hate band is not significant (p=0.2), but I believe this variable is imprecise, as it relies on
how many times archive.org scraped a Last.fm artist page. Since archive.org scrapes more popular artist pages,
less overtly racist bands are likely to be more mainstream and thus garner more archive.org scrapes. As such,
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likely to be active in far-right music scenes. For this subgroup, I add a restriction that the
user must have a friend who is more central than average in the hate-music-listener network
(as measured by eigenvector centrality). The Trump effect for this sample is 0.05 more hate
songs per day (p=0.03). 53 As a point of comparison, previous studies found that attending a
music concert of a popular (non-hate) artist induces friends of the attendee to listen to 0.06
more songs by that artist immediately after the event (Ternovski & Yasseri, 2020).
Figure 3.1: Friends of top hate listeners who are more active and more central have

Impact of Trump Events on Friends' Hate Music
Listens (in tracks played per day)

significant effects

.1
.08

User Likely Inactive in Far-Right Music Scene
User Likely Active in Far-Right Music Scene
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.04
.02
0
(1)
(2)
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(3)

(4)
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How Active/Central is the Far-Right User?

(6)
Most
Active/Central

Alternate specifications of this figure can be found the Supplementary Materials (Figures 3.11-3.12).

higher values of this variable do not necessarily translate to more active far-right users. (See Supplementary
Materials: Robustness Checks for more details.)
The interaction of the post-Trump-related-event indicator and a user’s friend’s eigenvector centrality is
significant at the 90% CI (p=0.09). I rounded centrality to the nearest thousandths. The p-value does not
meaningfully change with alternative rounding schemes. All users outside of the giant component are treated as
zeros.
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As expected, when I examine the full sample of friends of users, which includes
friends of likely reformed (or otherwise inactive) far-right users, there is no statistically
significant Trump effect on hate music listenership (an increase in .002 songs, 95% CI: [.001, .005]). The large number of users who have not listened to any far-right music in the
time period of interest54 likely masks the Trump effect.

3.6.4: Placebo Checks
Since this is, nevertheless, an observational study, there may be alternative
explanations to what I interpret to be a Trump effect. I address several of these alternative
explanations through pre-registered placebo checks.
For one, it is not necessarily clear from this analysis that other political events aren’t
used in the same way by users active in the far-right music scene. Perhaps members of hate
groups use all elections as opportunities to recruit others. As stipulated in the original PAP, I
test to see if elections where Trump loses or is not directly involved have the same Trump
effects as with unanticipated Trump-related events. As such, I compiled a list of all state and
federal election events in the time period of analysis that did not coincide with either the
unanticipated or the planned Trump-related events. 55 Because these “placebo” events are still
temporally proximal to Trump-related events, we are more likely to see directionally positive
differences (i.e., due to lingering Trump effects). Instead, as seen in Figure 3.2, there were
directionally negative effects for friends of users most likely active in far-right music scenes.
This may be due to the fact that the placebo events include Trump losses.

54

Only 52% of all users have listened to any hate music in the time period of interest (576 days in total).

55

See the Supplementary Materials for a full list of the Placebo Events.
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Impact of "Placebo" Events on Friends' Hate
Music Listens (in tracks played per day)

Figure 3.2: Impact of placebo events on hate music listenership of friends of far-right users
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As stipulated in my original PAP, another registered placebo test looks at the impact
of Trump-related events on friends of frequent hate music listeners in other countries.
Though some scholars have found that Trump’s general election victory led to increases in
racist attitudes in Europe (Giani & Meon, 2019), I believe that such effects are unlikely to be
so granular as to reflect primary election wins and controversial tweets. As seen in Figure
3.3, there are indeed null effects for all subgroups. 56

Since Giani & Meon (2019) found that Trump’s rise may influence racial attitudes in Europe and many of the
hate bands in my sample are from Europe, as a robustness check, I also limit this placebo test to residents of
South American countries where it is unlikely that far-right music listeners would choose Trump-related events
as opportunities to recruit others, I obtain similarly null effects for all subgroups. That said, it is worth noting
that even Latin American countries appears to have active far-right music scenes. In coding far-right bands
from Mexico, I found that they similarly use overt Nazi iconography (e.g., swastikas), their song lyrics are rife
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Figure 3.3: Impact of Trump-related events on hate music listenership of non-US friends of

Impact of Trump Events on Friends' Hate Music
Listens in Placebo Countries (in tracks/day)

far-right users
.04

.02

0
User Likely Inactive in Far-Right Music Scene
User Likely Active in Far-Right Music Scene
-.02
(2)
(1)
Least Active/Central

(3)

(4)

(5)

How Active/Central is the Far-Right User?

(6)
Most
Active/Central

Finally, I examined whether Trump-related events had any impacts on non-hate
music consumption (i.e., all music artists who were not on our list of far-right bands). 57 As
seen in Figure 3.4, friends of likely active far-right users did not see similar increases in nonhate music listenership after Trump-related events. It is worth noting that Trump-related

with antisemitism and racial hatred, and they have released collaborations with European white supremacist
groups (e.g., “Aryan Roots (Mexican-Belgian Axis)”).
The original PAP stipulated that we use mainstream (i.e., Top 40) and similar niche music as placebos to test
the hypothesis that users do not modify their overall (i.e., non-hate) music consumption as a result of Trump
events, but this decision was due to Last.fm’s API limitations. The API initially allowed for look-ups based on
user name and artist name. Midway through analysis, Last.fm eliminated that functionality, so I had to scrape
the entirety of a user’s listenership history in the time windows of interest. As such, I have recovered a placebo
that better reflects overall music consumption (i.e., all non-hate music that a user listened to) and this is the
placebo dependent variable I use the analyses reported here.
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events appeared to reduce consumption of music among users who are friends with users
who are likely inactive in the far-right scene.
Figure 3.4: Impact of Trump-related events on non-hate music listenership of friends of

Impact of Trump Events on Friends' Non-Hate
Music Listens (in tracks played per day)
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Additional analyses, including robustness checks and placebo tests can be found in
the Supplementary Materials.

3.7: Discussion and Conclusions
The empirical results are consistent with my proposed theoretical framework: that
likely members of far-right groups did use Trump’s primary victories and controversies to
influence and recruit their friends on Last.fm. However, these results have notable
limitations. The biggest drawback is that I have no way of documenting the communication
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between far-right users and their Last.fm friends. It is entirely possible that friends of active
far-right users may have already had far-right political preferences and a public Trump event
was all that was necessary to embolden them to listen to hate music quasi-publicly. However,
what makes this explanation less likely is that friends of inactive far-right users do not show
similar increases in hate music listenership.58
It is also important to emphasize that hate music listenership does not necessarily
translate to hate group membership or even an espousal of far-right ideology. Individuals
may simply listen to far-right music without endorsing its message. Currently, there are no
rigorous studies estimating how many individuals listen to far-right music without embracing
the expressed ideologies. Regardless, given that many of the bands often have explicit lyrics
with the goal of inciting racial hatred, increases in consumption of this material are
nevertheless alarming.
Still, despite these limitations, this study adds another perspective to the literature on
how elites and organizations can affect political attitudes of the electorate. This paper speaks
to the extremes—namely, how far-right hate groups can exacerbate the social impacts of a
president who showed little restraint in communicating extremist content. Future research
should better establish my proposed causal pathway; I assert that when elites erode antiprejudice norms, extremist hate groups use the opportunity to recruit others in their social
networks. If the reader is unconvinced by the causal identification strategy in this paper, I
argue that this paper, at the very least, illustrates that friends of active listeners of far-right
music themselves listen to far-right music at higher rates after unanticipated Trump-related

While this placebo test makes this explanation less likely, my results may still be explained by homophily.
Namely, individuals who are friends with active far-right users may simply be systematically different (i.e., more
far-right) from individuals who are friends with inactive far-right users.
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events. So even if the results in this paper are not evidence of active recruitment, they
further support the theory that Trump didn’t just erode norms, but emboldened individuals
to listen to music that incites racial and xenophobic hatred and violence.
Finally, this paper illustrates the usefulness of an alternative behavioral data source to
estimate subscription to far-right ideologies and that such data can be used on a large scale.
Given the difficulty of measuring far-right group activity and the proliferation of data of
online behavior, it may be possible to estimate far-right group membership using similar
trace data on other platforms (such as YouTube) without needing to parse and interpret the
content of, for instance, video blogs.
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3.9: Supplementary Materials
3.9.1: Data and Materials
3.9.1.1: Trump-Related Events
A list of Trump-related events was compiled using media sources and registered with
our original PAP. There were two types of events: 1) unanticipated events and 2) planned
events. Unanticipated events are unexpected victories, speeches, tweets, or announcements.
Planned events are events where the timing is known in advance (such as rallies).

3.9.1.1.1: Full List of Unanticipated Trump-Related Events
1. February 28, 2015 – CNN Interview in an answer about David Duke and the KKK:
“Well, just so you understand, I don’t know anything about David Duke, OK? I
don’t know anything about what you’re even talking about with white supremacy or
white supremacists. So I don’t know.” (Trump, 2015 qtd. in Finnegan & Barabak,
2018)
2. June 16, 2015 – Tweet: “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their
best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that
have lots of problems.…They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re
rapists, and some, I assume, are good people.” (Trump, 2015 qtd. in Finnegan &
Barabak, 2018)
3. November 22, 2015 – “Trump retweets fake, racially charged crime data from nonexistent group” (Bradner, 2015)
4. February 9, 2016 – Won New Hampshire Primary (Balz, Eilperin, Fahrenthold,
2016).
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5. February 20, 2016 – Won South Carolina Primary, “clears path to nomination”
(Jacobs, Bixby, Siddiqui, Sullivan & Gabbatt, 2016)
6. February 23, 2016 – Won Nevada Caucus, “further solidifies standing as the frontrunner for the GOP nomination” (Goldmacher, 2016)
7. February 28, 2016 – “Donald Trump Retweets Post with Quote from Mussolini”
(Haberman, 2016)
8. March 1, 2016 – Super Tuesday, “With a big Super Tuesday, Trump has the
Republican nomination in his sights” (Barabak, 2016)
9. March 15, 2016 – Trump wins Florida, Rubio drops out. (Mazzei, Sherman, & Clark,
2016)
10. May 3, 2016 – Ted Cruz drops out of race leaving “Donald Trump as the only
candidate capable of clinching the nomination outright” (Glueck & Goldmacher,
2016)
11. May 26, 2016 – “Trump reaches delegate count needed to clinch Republican
nomination” (McCarthy, 2016)
12. June 5, 2016 – CBS interview, calling U.S. District Judge Gonzalo Curiel “a member
of a club or society very strongly pro-Mexican” (Trump, 2016 qtd. in Finnegan &
Barabak, 2018)
13. July 2, 2016 – Trump retweets anti-Clinton graphic previously posted “on an antiSemitic, white supremacist message board” (Diamond, 2016).
14. July 5, 2016 – Trump tweets about “setting the record for the most GOP primary
votes ever” (Doran, 2016).
15. October 7, 2016 – Publication of recording where “Trump brags about groping
women” (Graham, 2016).
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16. November 8, 2016 – Trump wins Presidential Election “in stunning upset over
Clinton” (Tumulty, Rucker, & Gearan, 2016)
17. January 25, 2017 – “Trump orders construction of border wall, boosts deportation
force.” (Diamond, 2017).
18. January 27, 2017 – Trump’s “Muslim Ban” Executive Order signed (Yuhas &
Sidahmed, 2017)
19. March 4, 2017 – “Trump, citing no evidence, accuses Obama of ‘Nixon/Watergate’
plot to wiretap Trump Tower” (Rucker, Nakashima & Costa, 2017).
20. July 2, 2017 – “Trump appears to promote violence against CNN with tweet.”
(Nakamura, 2017).
21. November 29, 2017 – Trump retweet of far-right Nationalist who was “recently
arrested for inciting hatred and violence against Muslims.” (Finnegan & Barabak,
2018)
22. December 23, 2017 – New York Times report claims Trump said Haitians “all have
AIDS” and Nigerians “[o]nce they had seen the United States… would never `go
back to their huts’ in Africa” (Shear & Davis, 2017; Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)

3.9.1.2: Full List of Planned Trump-Related Events
1. December 7, 2015 – South Carolina rally, calling for “total and complete shutdown
of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure
out what the hell is going on.” (Trump, 2015 qtd. in Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
2. June 3, 2016 – Redding rally: “Look at my African American over here. Look at
him.” (Trump, 2016 qtd. in Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
3. July 19, 2016 – Trump officially awarded Republican nomination (Rafferty, 2016)
4. July 21, 2016 – Trump speaks at RNC (Plumer, 2016)
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5. August 9, 2016 – North Carolina rally, Trump “suggesting violence against Mrs.
Clinton or liberal jurists” (Corasaniti & Haberman, 2016)
6. September 26. 2016 – Second Presidential debate, Trump says that if he were in
charge of the law Clinton “would be in jail” (Roberts, Jacobs, & Siddiqui, 2016)
7. January 20, 2017 – Trump’s inauguration (Collinson, 2017)
8. August 15, 2017 – Press conference, Trump on the rioting from the pro-Confederate
rally in Charlottesville: ““I think there is blame on both sides.…You also had people
that were very fine people on both sides.…Not all of those people were neo-Nazis,
believe me. Not all of those people were white supremacists by any stretch.”
(Trump, 2017 qtd. in Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
9. August 22, 2017 – Phoenix rally, Trump on the removal of Confederate monuments:
““They’re trying to take away our culture. They’re trying to take away our history.
And our weak leaders, they do it overnight. These things have been there for 150
years, for a hundred years. You go back to a university and it's gone. Weak, weak
people.” (Trump, 2017 qtd. in Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
10. September 22, 2017 – Alabama rally, Trump on the black football players protesting
racial discrimination during National Anthem: “Wouldn’t you love to see one of
these NFL owners, when somebody disrespects our flag, to say, ‘Get that son of a
bitch off the field right now. Out. He’s fired. He’s fired!’” (Trump, 2017 qtd. in
Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
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3.9.1.2: Hate Music Artists
We first collected a sample of far-right artists on Last.fm by querying popular hate
music genres 59 on Last.fm’s API. The genres included are rac, white power, hatecore, rock
against communism, nsbm, or ns black metal. 60 This yielded approximately 6,097 unique
bands.
Midway through our research, Last.fm had taken action against hate music pages and
censored a large subset of artist pages associated with the far-right. In Figure 3.5, we can see
the difference between a censored page and an uncensored artist page. Furthermore, in
Figure 3.6, we can see the effect of this censorship policy on the Listeners pages of both
bands. 61
As such, we made use of Last.fm’s lengthy history online and archive.org’s Internet
archiving project to compile a list of top listeners of hate music. Using the list of hate bands
that we had compiled before Last.fm’s censorship policy went into effect, we extract all
listeners associated with those hate bands on archive.org. (We draw on all relevant Last.fm
snapshots that are available on archive.org.) We then narrow our sample of hate music artists
to only those artists for whom we were able to scrape top and/or recent listeners; this yields
2,018 artists.

Last.fm uses a crowdsourced genre tagging system, where every registered Last.fm user is able to tag an artist
as being in a particular music genre. The most popular tags become the primary music genres for that artist.

59

60

There were other hate music genres, but they had high levels of vandalism (i.e., mistagged artists).

61

These changes are also reflected in Last.fm’s API.
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Figure 3.5: Uncensored (left) and censored (right) artist pages

Figure 3.6: Uncensored (left) and censored (right) listener pages

A closer look at our list of hate bands revealed that despite the precautions we took
to avoid vandalized genre tags, there were artists who were clearly mistagged (e.g., j-pop
artist, Kahimi Karie) or spurious (e.g., Geico [the Insurance Company]). Additionally, we
noted that some hate bands had the same name as artists who had no connection to far right
ideologies (e.g., Evil). As such, for every artist where we were able to successfully extract
143

listeners from archive.org, we manually looked up the Last.fm artist page in a web browser
and inspected the genre tags, songs, album titles, the shout-box, the artist biography, pictures
of the artists, and related artists. We then hand-coded them as either “mistagged/fake”,
“suspect”, or “multi.” Mistagged/fake was used in cases where it was clear that the artist was
either not a hate music artist (e.g., several Eurovision pop stars) or not a real music artist
(e.g., politicians, cartoon characters, etc.). “Suspect” was used in cases where the connection
to far-right ideologies was either disputed (based on the shout-box activity and/or artist
biography), the band was a “troll” artist (e.g., certain grindcore bands), or the ideologies were
not immediately clear (e.g., anti-racist hatecore). Finally, an artist was tagged “multi” if the
biography or the shout-box made it clear that multiple artists shared the same band name.62
To reduce the amount of noise in our data, we exclude all artists (and the corresponding
listeners) who were tagged as either “mistagged/fake,” “suspect,” or “multi.” This yields a
total of 1,119 unique artists.

3.9.1.2.1: Hand-Coding Protocol Used
1. Go to Last.fm page for each band
2. Fill in first column with “sole” “multi” “fake” or “mistagged”
3. Fill in second column with “suspect” or leave blank
Coding protocol:
IF censored (no images, no comments, no top listeners)
MARK: “sole”

There were a few cases where multiple artists shared the same name, but all were explicitly far-right (e.g.,
Ahnenerbe, originally the name of a Nazi pseudoscientific institute that was to research the supposed
archaeological and cultural history of the hypothesized "Aryan race"); these cases were not tagged as “multi,”
since, for our purposes, they are no different from uniquely named far-right bands.

62
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IF bio indicates there’s only one band
MARK: “sole”
IF no bio, but no clear evidence that there are more than one band
MARK: “sole”
IF bio, pictures or shout box activity indicates that there are multiple bands
with the same name
MARK: “multi”
IF page indicates that the band is not a real music artist (e.g. novelty Youtube
videos, advertisements, historical figures who never made music, celebrities
that never made music)
MARK: “fake”
IF tags, shout box activity, photos, album titles and song titles CLEARLY
demonstrate that the artist has no ties to far-right music. There should be not
a single doubt here.
MARK: “mistagged”
IF there is no evidence of far-right ideologies OR nazi status disputed
MARK: “suspect”
KEY WORDS TO LOOK FOR: “NSBM, National Socialist, white nationalist, white pride,
white power, RAC, rock against communism, hatecore, skinhead, oi, racist, nazi, 14/88, 88,
14”, photos with censored faces, usually all white males (though there are some exceptions)
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Table 3.2: Hate bands by country
Country
GERMANY
US
RUSSIA
POLAND
FRANCE
SWEDEN
UKRAINE
UK
ITALY
CANADA
HUNGARY
SERBIA
FINLAND
CZECHIA
GREECE
SLOVAKIA
BELARUS
BELGIUM
SPAIN
AUSTRALIA
BULGARIA
CROATIA
MEXICO
MULTI
BRAZIL
NETHERLANDS
NORWAY
ARGENTINA
JAPAN
OTHER
AUSTRIA
ESTONIA
PORTUGAL
SWITZERLAND
CHILE
PERU
BOSNIA
IRELAND
SOUTH AFRICA
Total

Freq.
221
126
122
105
47
42
41
40
35
30
30
24
23
22
18
18
15
15
15
13
12
11
11
11
10
9
8
7
5
5
4
4
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
1,119

Percent
19.75
11.26
10.9
9.38
4.2
3.75
3.66
3.57
3.13
2.68
2.68
2.14
2.06
1.97
1.61
1.61
1.34
1.34
1.34
1.16
1.07
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.89
0.8
0.71
0.63
0.45
0.45
0.36
0.36
0.36
0.36
0.27
0.27
0.18
0.18
0.18
100
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Cum.
19.75
31.01
41.91
51.3
55.5
59.25
62.91
66.49
69.62
72.3
74.98
77.12
79.18
81.14
82.75
84.36
85.7
87.04
88.38
89.54
90.62
91.6
92.58
93.57
94.46
95.26
95.98
96.6
97.05
97.5
97.86
98.21
98.57
98.93
99.2
99.46
99.64
99.82
100

3.9.1.3: Top Listeners of Hate Music
Ideally, we would want data from recent top listeners of hate music, but we were only
able to extract historical top listenership data from archive.org. Though we found that 85%
of the accounts we scraped from archive.org still existed at the time of analysis (16,396 out
of an initial 19,236), once we exclude all non-US nationals, a majority of the initial
archive.org sample appeared to be lapsed users. Only 28% of the 5,038 users in our sample
of interest have listened to any music (far-right or otherwise) in our time windows of interest.
A summary of these exclusions is found in the Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Top listeners of hate music after exclusions
Hate Music
Listeners
19,236

Archive.org Total
After Excluding Banned/Deleted
Accounts
After Excluding Non-US Nationals
After Excluding Lapsed Accounts

16,396
5,038
1,368

3.9.1.4: Friends of Top Listeners of Hate Music
We pulled the complete friends list of each of the 1,368 hate music listeners in our
sample. We found that only 94 hate music listeners did not have Last.fm friends. This yields
a network of 119,577 friends of hate music listeners. The average hate music listener in our
sample has an average of 87.4 friends; the median hate music listener has 28 friends. Of
those 119,577 friends, 89,621 friends are unique (i.e., some hate music listeners have the
same friends). As illustrated in Table 3.4, we then exclude all subjects who affirmatively self-
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reported living outside of the United States,63 which leaves 45,602 participants. Of those
participants, 34,719 are not themselves top listeners of hate music. After excluding users
who have not listened to any music during the time period of interest, we are left with
16,756 unique active users. An additional 313 of those subjects listened to hate music
previously but were not classified as top listeners.
Table 3.4: Friends of top listeners of hate music after exclusions

Unique Friends Total
After Excluding Non-US Nationals
After Excluding Friends Who Themselves are Top Hate
Music Listeners
After Excluding Friends Who are Lapsed Listeners
After Excluding Friends Who Listened to Hate Music
Previously

Friends of Hate
Music Listeners
89,621
45,602
34,719
16,756
16,443

3.9.2: Issues with Naïve Sample of Top Listeners of Hate Music
There is evidence to indicate that the 1,368 sample of “top” listeners of hate music
includes many users who are not current, frequent listeners of hate music. This sample only
devoted 2% of their daily music consumption to hate music on average. As seen in Figure
OA3, the decreasing trend may indicate survivorship bias: only users who are ideologically
motivated persisted in our sample, whereas other users ceased to listen to far-right music—
perhaps they abandoned far-right views or never held them in the first place (i.e., some farright artists have releases that do not qualify as hate music). Most importantly, Last.fm does
not specify how much music a user must listen to appear as a “top listener” for a particular

As stipulated in our original PAP, we have a loose definition of likely-US nationals. They include users who
affirmatively declared that they are from the US, but also users whose country data is missing and users who
specify likely spurious location data (e.g., Antarctica, DPRK, Vatican City).
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artist. For obscure hate music bands, it may have been possible to listen to the artist just a
few times and end up in our top listener sample. We find that only 52% of all users classified
as top listeners of hate music have listened to any hate music in the time period of interest
(576 days in total).
Figure 3.7: Percent of daily listening that is hate music in our naïve sample of top listeners
of hate music
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Each point denotes the daily average across all users in the sample. The horizontal line represents the average
across all days.
The distribution of hate music listenership is highly unequal. The top 1% of hate
music listeners have listened to over 50% of all hate music listened. Hate music
consumption in this sample has a Gini coefficient of .87, whereas non-hate music has a Gini
coefficient of .68. As specified in our amended PAP, there are several ways we can reduce
attenuation bias in our data to the population of active far-right listeners (without
conditioning on a post-treatment outcome). Namely, we can limit our analysis to only those
individuals who have appeared as top listeners:
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1) of more hate bands than average
2) of the same hate band more times than average.
As seen from Figures 3.8-3.9, both approaches produce samples with lower levels of
attenuation bias. As seen in Figure 3.10, combining the two criteria produces the best sample
of high-frequency hate music listeners, with nearly 10% of users’ daily listening devoted to
hate music.
Figure 3.8: Percent of daily listening that is hate music among users who were top listeners
of more hate bands than average
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Each point denotes the daily average across all users in the sample. The horizontal line represents the average
across all days.
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Figure 3.9: Percent of daily listening that is hate music among users who were top listeners
of the same hate band more times than average
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Each point denotes the daily average across all users in the sample. The horizontal line represents the average
across all days.
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Figure 3.10: Percent of daily listening that is hate music among users who were top listeners
of the same hate band more than average and more hate bands than average
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Each point denotes the daily average across all users in the sample. The horizontal line represents the average
across all days.

3.9.3: Registered Analyses in Original PAP
Our original PAP stated that we would analyze the impact of Trump-related
unanticipated events, planned events, and the combination of both on hate music
listenership (“Trump effects”). However, as noted in the original PAP, any Trump effects
due to planned events are likely to be dampened by users anticipating the events. The change
in Last.fm policy regarding hate bands left us severely underpowered, so an effect that we
expect is already-muted also has greater imprecision from reduced sample size. As such, it is
not surprising that the impact of planned events and the combination of the unanticipated
and planned events are not statistically significant. Due to the attenuation bias in our sample
of top listeners of far-right music, even unanticipated events only approach significance. But
before completing the collection of this data, we did register an amended PAP, which is
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what we abide by for our main analyses (reported in the main paper). For completeness, we
nevertheless report the analyses specified in our original PAP below.
Table 3.5: Trump effects of planned events

Time
Post-event Indicator
Time*Post-event
Indicator

H1a

H1b

H1c

0.0029
(0.0020)
0.0397
(0.0258)

0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.0006
(0.0019)

0.0002
(0.0001)
-0.0019
(0.0016)

-0.0050

0.0001

0.0003

(0.0032) (0.0002)
(0.0002)
383,040 3,047,240 2,982,980
1,368
14,442
14,162
H1a describes effects among our “Top Listener” sample. H1b describes effects among friends of our “Top

N1 (User-Event-Days)
N2 (Users)

Listener” sample who are themselves not in the “Top Listener” sample. H1c describes effects among friends of
our “Top Listener” sample who have not listened to hate music previously.
Table 3.6: Trump effects of unanticipated events

Time
Post-event Indicator
Time*Post-event
Indicator

H1a

H1b

H1c

0.0033
(0.0015)
-0.0289
(0.0190)

-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0008
(0.0016)

-0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0020
(0.0014)

-0.0007

0.0000

0.0001

(0.0024) (0.0002) (0.0002)
N1 (User-Event-Days) 842,688 6,866,160 6,718,824
N2 (Users)
1,368
16,710
16,397
H1a describes effects among our “Top Listener” sample. H1b describes effects among friends of our “Top
Listener” sample who are themselves not in the “Top Listener” sample. H1c describes effects among friends of
our “Top Listener” sample who have not listened to hate music previously.
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Table 3.7: Trump effects of unanticipated and planned events

Time
Post-event Indicator
Time*Post-event
Indicator

H1a

H1b

H1c

0.0032
(0.0012)
-0.0075
(0.0154)

0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0004
(0.0013)

-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0008
(0.0011)

-0.0021

0.0000

0.0001

(0.0019)

(0.0002)

(0.0001)

N1 (User-Event-Days) 1,225,728 9,913,400 9,701,804
N2 (Users)
1,368
16,756
16,443

H1a describes effects among our “Top Listener” sample. H1b describes effects among friends of our “Top
Listener” sample who are themselves not in the “Top Listener” sample. H1c describes effects among friends of
our “Top Listener” sample who have not listened to hate music previously.
Table 3.8: Anticipation effects for planned events among top listeners of hate music 64

1-Day
Lead

No Lead
Time
Post-event Indicator
Time*Post-event Indicator
N1 (User-Event-Days)
N2 (Users)

0.0029
(0.0020)
0.0397
(0.0258)
-0.0050
(0.0032)
383,040
1,368

0.0027
(0.0022)
0.0344
(0.0256)
-0.0038
(0.0032)
383,040
1,368

2-Day
Lead

0.0022
(0.0025)
0.0341
(0.0266)
-0.0027
(0.0032)
383,040
1,368

3-Day
Lead

0.0015
(0.0028)
0.0360
(0.0290)
-0.0015
(0.0034)
383,040
1,368

4-Day
Lead

0.0013
(0.0032)
0.0328
(0.0328)
-0.0005
(0.0036)
383,040
1,368

3.9.4: Registered Analyses in Amended PAP
The results of the amended PAP are presented in the paper. The below figures
illustrate alternative sample specifications.

We do not purse the anticipation effect analysis with unanticipated events, since the effect of unanticipated
Trump-related events for our “Top Listeners” sample was not statistically significant, so the procedure
specified in our original PAP is not applicable.
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Figure 3.11: Friends of top hate listeners who are more active and more central have
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Figure 3.12: Friends of top hate listeners who are more active and more central have

Impact of Trump Events on Hate Music Listens
(in tracks played per day)

statistically significant Trump effects (Alternate 2)
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3.9.5: Robustness Checks
3.9.5.1: Attenuation of the Trump Effect on Friends of Top Listeners of Hate Music
In our amended PAP, we used three variables to identify active and (potentially)
influential members of the far-right music scenes: 1) the number of hate bands the user was
a top listener of, 2) the number of times the user was a top listener of the same hate band,
and 3) the eigenvector centrality of the far-right user in the Last.fm friends network of top
listeners of hate music.
As noted in the main text, there is reason to believe that the number of times a user
was a top listener of the same hate band may be an imperfect measure of how embedded a
user is in a far-right music scene. From Figure 3.14, we see that this may indeed be the case:
higher levels of listenership of the same hate band does not seem to translate to larger peerinfluence effects. This is in stark contrast to the other two variables illustrated in Figure 3.13
and 3.15, which illustrate clearly increasing trends. It is not obvious why this variable is a
poor predictor of social influence. Some possible explanations include: these users may be
fans of non-racist material from some of the more popular hate artists (e.g., Skrewdriver’s
first album) or they may listen to far-right music without embracing the far-right ideology.
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Figure 3.13: Attenuation of Trump effect on friends of far-right listeners across number of
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Figure 3.14: Attenuation of Trump effect on friends of far-right listeners across number of
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Figure 3.15: Attenuation of Trump Effect on friends of far-right listeners across far-right
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3.9.5.2: Alternative Variables to Address Attenuation
There are variables that may be used to identify Last.fm users active in far-right
music scenes besides the ones registered in our amended PAP. These include 1) the most
recent date a user was a top listener of a hate band, and 2) the degree of the far-right user in
the top listener Last.fm friends network (i.e., a user’s number of friends who are also top
listeners of hate music). We run two interaction models to determine if these alternative
variables can reduce attenuation bias in our sample by screening for only active hate music
users. Though recency does not predict higher peer influence effects (p=.63), degree does
(p=.049).

3.9.5.3: Alternative Dependent Variable
To determine if users are increasing their total music listenership to include hate
bands or are substituting non-hate-bands for hate-bands, we check our main effects using a
different dependent variable: the percent of daily tracks listened that are hate music. As seen
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in the Figure 3.16, we find suggestive evidence that our results are driven by a substitution
effect.
Figure 3.16: Trump effect on friends of far-right listeners in terms of % of daily tracks that
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(% of daily listening that is hate music)

are hate music
.2

.15

Friend Likely Inactive in Far-Right Music Scene
Friend Likely Active in Far-Right Music Scene

.1

.05

0
(2)
(1)
Least Active/Central

(3)

(4)

(5)

How Active/Central is the Far-Right Friend?
<= Hate
Bands than
Mean

<= Hate
Bands than
Mean

<= Times a
Top Listener
than Mean

<= Times a
Top Listener
than Mean

<= Hate
Bands
than
Mean

> Hate
Bands
than
Mean

> Hate
Bands than
Mean

> Hate Bands
than Mean

> Times a
Top Listener
than Mean

> Times a
Top Listener
than Mean

<= Central
than Mean
N=8,877

(6)
Most
Active/Central

> Central
than Mean
N=11,108

N=12,784

160

N=3,079

N=1,375

N=769

3.9.6: Placebo Checks
This section covers three types of placebos: 1) music, 2) events, and 3) users.

3.9.6.1: Music Placebo
Our original PAP stipulated that we use mainstream (i.e., Top 40) and similar niche
music as placebos to test the hypothesis that users do not modify their overall (i.e., non-hate)
music consumption as a result of Trump events, but this decision was due to Last.fm’s API
limitations. The API initially allowed for look-ups based on user name and artist name.
Midway through analysis, Last.fm eliminated that functionality, so we had to scrape the
entirety of a user’s listenership history in our time windows of interest. As such, we have a
placebo that better reflects overall music consumption (i.e., all non-hate music that a user
listened to) and this is the placebo dependent variable we use in all subsequent analyses
reported here.
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Figure 3.17: Impact of Trump-related events on non-hate music listenership of friends of
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It is worth noting that Trump-related events appeared to reduce consumption of
music among users who are friends with users who are likely inactive in the far-right scene.
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For completeness and to abide by our original PAP, we also include placebo tests that
correspond to Hypotheses 3-4 below.
Table 3.9: Impact of planned events on non-hate music listenership

Time
Post-event Indicator
Time*Post-event
Indicator

H1a

H1b

H1c

-0.0175
(0.0167)
0.2842
(0.2148)

-0.0077
(0.0086)
0.0597
(0.1101)

-0.0061
(0.0086)
0.0416
(0.1109)

0.0110

0.0225

0.0235

(0.0267) (0.0137) (0.0138)
N1 (User-Event-Days) 383,040 3,047,240 2,982,980
N2 (Users)
1,368
14,442
14,162
H1a describes effects among our “Top Listener” sample. H1b describes effects among friends of our “Top
Listener” sample who are themselves not in the “Top Listener” sample. H1c describes effects among friends of
our “Top Listener” sample who have not listened to hate music previously.
Table 3.10: Impact of unanticipated events on non-hate music listenership

Time
Post-event Indicator
Time*Post-event
Indicator

H1a

H1b

H1c

-0.0514
(0.0122)
0.2916
(0.1571)

-0.0178
(0.0052)
-0.2125
(0.0665)

-0.0180
(0.0052)
-0.2084
(0.0669)

0.0300

0.0253

0.0250

(0.0195) (0.0083) (0.0083)
N1 (User-Event-Days) 842,688 6,866,160 6,718,824
N2 (Users)
1,368
16,710
16,397
H1a describes effects among our “Top Listener” sample. H1b describes effects among friends of our “Top
Listener” sample who are themselves not in the “Top Listener” sample. H1c describes effects among friends of
our “Top Listener” sample who have not listened to hate music previously.

163

Table 3.11: Impact of unanticipated and planned events on non-hate music listenership

Time
Post-event Indicator
Time*Post-event
Indicator

H1a

H1b

H1c

-0.0175
(0.0167)
0.2842
(0.2148)

-0.0147
(0.0045)
-0.1288
(0.0576)

-0.0143
(0.0045)
-0.1315
(0.0579)

0.0110

0.0244

0.0246

(0.0267) (0.0072) (0.0072)
383,040 9,913,400 9,701,804
1,368
16,756
16,443
H1a describes effects among our “Top Listener” sample. H1b describes effects among friends of our “Top

N1 (User-Event-Days)
N2 (Users)

Listener” sample who are themselves not in the “Top Listener” sample. H1c describes effects among friends of
our “Top Listener” sample who have not listened to hate music previously.

3.9.6.2: Event Placebo
3.9.6.2.1: List of Placebo Events
11/21/2015

Louisiana gubernatorial runoff

2/2/2016

Ted Cruz wins Iowa

3/12/2016

Guam, DC, and Wyoming primaries result in Trump losses

2/25/2017

Special Election in Delaware Senate

9/26/2017

Special Elections in Florida Senate and New Hampshire House of

Representatives
12/12/2017

US Senate Seat in Alabama Called for Democrat
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Impact of "Placebo" Events on Hate Music
Listens (in tracks played per day)

Figure 3.18: Impact of placebo events on hate music listenership of friends of far-right users
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3.9.6.3: User Placebo
Figure 3.19: Impact of Trump-related events on hate music listenership of non-US friends
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3.9.7: Original PAP
This PAP was originally posted on https://osf.io/z5g27/ but is reproduced here for
convenience.

3.9.7.1: Overview
This study aims to analyze time-series data to isolate the impact of Trump’s victories
and other highly publicized Trump-related events on hate music listenership. While many
pundits and political experts have remarked that Trump’s xenophobic rhetoric has
revitalized and normalized hate groups in America, to this day, there have been no studies
causally identifying that impact in a quantitative empirical study outside of the lab. The
research design contained in this document outlines a means of capturing a salient metric of
subscription to hate groups and far-right ideologies. We propose a design that will rigorously
evaluate the impact of various public events involving Trump (which includes primary and
general election victories, noteworthy rallies, and other highly public events) on hate music
listenership.

3.9.7.2: Background
Pundits and news outlets have remarked that Trump’s presidency has normalized
public displays of racism (e.g. see Bass, 2018; Raghunathan, 2018), but there is still a paucity
of empirical evidence that causally links Trump’s electoral victories and public statements
with increases in racist and discriminatory beliefs, speech, and behavior. One study looked at
individual behavior in financially-incentivized games immediately before and immediately
after the 2016 election, finding that participants were less likely to cooperate after the
election and men appeared to adopt more aggressive strategies towards women (Huang and
Low, 2017). Another study by Crandall, Miller & White (2018) looked at a survey of attitudes
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from Trump and Clinton supporters before and after the election. They found that the
acceptability of prejudice towards targeted groups (e.g. Muslims, Latinos) increased but did
not increase for other unpopular groups (e.g. alcoholics, atheists). Additionally, Southern
Poverty Law Center reports a spike in hate crimes immediately after the election (Southern
Poverty Law Center, 2016). But a critic could claim that racism has always been a problem in
America; the Trump presidency may have simply led the media to highlight raciallymotivated crimes that were unreported in the past (or to interpret behaviors as hate-related
that previously would not have been seen as hate). We propose a means of causally
identifying the impact of Trump’s victories and public statements on the activation of racist
and xenophobic ideologies by leveraging a novel dataset.
Trump has received an overwhelming wave of support from neo-Nazi and other
white supremacist groups like the KKK (Hooton, 2016; Oppenheim, 2017). Further, it has
been argued that his reluctance to denounce these groups has led to a resurgence white
supremacism in America (e.g., Smith, 2017, Raghunathan, 2018). To address this question
rigorously, we propose examining the actions of these communities that occur immediately
after a public, Trump-related event. In many cases, looking at a simple pre/post comparison
is insufficient, because there may be other confounding variables that are driving the
correlation. One means of causally identifying the impact of a Trump-event on hate group
behavior is by leveraging a research design that focuses specifically on immediate effects
within a potential outcomes framework. In many cases, this kind of design cannot be
implemented because there are very few behaviors that occur immediately after a highly
public event. White supremacist rallies must be organized in advance—even hate crimes are
unlikely to happen immediately after a white supremacist learns that Trump won a pivotal
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primary election. However, here we identify a behavior that does occur on a much more
continuous basis: music consumption.
Music consumption is particularly important for hate groups, as it has been used
extensively by neo-Nazis and white supremacists to organize and recruit youths (Messner,
Jipson, Becker, & Byers, 2007; Corte, & Edwards, 2008, Shekhovtsov, 2013). Indeed, some
scholars claim hate music scenes are a primary mechanism for new member recruitment (e.g.
see Corte & Edwards, 2008). As such, music by hate bands is a crucial part of many
members’ day-to-day behavior. And some of that behavior is available in a publicly available
dataset collected via the last.fm API. To clarify, we are not claiming that simply listening to
hate music necessarily translates to hate crimes or hate speech. However, subscription to
hateful/far-right ideologies is a necessary pre-condition for certain socially harmful behavior
(such as “ideologically motivated violence” (Adamczyk, Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich,
2014)). We are attempting to estimate subscription to hate ideologies by using hate music
listenership as a proxy.
Last.fm is one of the largest public repositories for music consumption information
(Henning, & Reichelt, 2008). Although the majority of listened-to-music comes from the
most popular artists, there is an insular community of far-right users who listen to hate
bands. By looking at their public listenership65 behavior over time, we are able to use public
announcements of Trump-related events as a series of exogenous treatments in an
interrupted time series design. This would allow us to measure the impact of, for instance,

Whether users view the tracking of song listens on last.fm as public behavior is not wholly clear. Since last.fm
accounts are usually not personally identifiable, there is a level of anonymity to listenership. However, some
users do include enough personally identifiable information to match to their social media accounts. Some
users may be aware that their listenership is publicly available on last.fm; others may not remember that they
enabled the app on their Spotify account.
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Trump’s general election victory on hate band song plays. Further, by looking at users who
have never listened to hate bands prior to Trump’s electoral successes, we can even test
whether the Trump victories either created new recruits or impelled crypto-racists to listen
to hate music.

3.9.7.3: Hypotheses
3.9.7.3.1: Primary Hypotheses
H1. We expect that Trump-related public events will increase hate music listenership:
a. among individuals who have listened to hate music extensively in the past
(i.e. “Top Listeners” of hate music artists)
b. individuals who have listened to hate music occasionally or not at all ((i.e.
friends of “Top Listeners” of hate music artists)
c. among individuals who have not listened to hate music in the past (i.e. friends
of Top Listeners of hate music artists who have not listened to hate music
before any Trump-related event included in this study)

3.9.7.3.2: Secondary Hypotheses
H2. We expect that, for planned Trump-related events, listeners of hate music will increase
their listenership of hate music a few days before the event.
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3.9.7.3.3: Robustness/Placebo Checks
H3. We expect that both unanticipated and planned Trump-related events will not
increase mainstream (i.e. Top 40) music listenership by Top Listeners of hate
music. 66
H4. Similarly, we expect that Trump-related events will not increase listenership of music
similar to hate music by users who are similar to hate music listeners but themselves
are not hate music listeners.

3.9.7.4: Dependent Variables
The main dependent variable of interest is daily play counts of a select set of artists
by the sample of last.fm users under analysis. This data will be scraped directly from last.fm
databases using a custom R wrapper that interfaces with the last.fm API. The list of hate
bands is determined as all bands that are tagged as rac, white power, hatecore, rock against
communism, white power, nsbm, or ns black metal.67 This yields approximately 6,000 unique
bands. 68

This test helps ensure that far-right users are not simply listening to more music. Rather, they are specifically
consuming more far-right music.

66

Last.fm uses a user-based genre tagging system, where every registered last.fm user is able to tag an artist as
being in a particular music genre. Many other hate music genre tags have been clearly vandalized and so we
refrain from using artists in those tags. Every effort will be made to ensure that there are no cases of artists
who are clearly not hate bands included in our hate music list.

67

This number is derived after some manual data cleaning. (For instance, the hate genre tags were associated
with hundreds of variants of Russia’s 2008 entry into Eurovision, Dima Bilan—clearly not a hate band.)
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Our primary outcome variable will be a daily play count of all 69 hate bands a given
user has listened to in the dates ranging from 14 days before to 14 days after70 every Trumprelated event. Cases where an individual appears to have listened to more hours of music
than there are hours in a day will be excluded. The secondary dependent variables will be 1)
Top 20 artists music listenership, and 2) favorite niche music listenership (i.e. non-hate top
artists of friends of hate band listeners).71

3.9.7.5: Independent Variables
The independent variable of interest is a set of Trump-related public events. We
composed two sets of events 1) unexpected events and 2) planned events. Unexpected
events are unanticipated victories, speeches, tweets, or announcements. Planned events are
events where the timing is known in advance, so selection effects may be at play. However,
any selection effects are likely to bias our estimates downward, since, with planned events, a
user could potentially choose to listen to hate music before the event specifically because of
that event. While a user could similarly pre-plan to listen to more hate music after the event,
it would still be an effect tied to the event. Unless the timing of the event is tied to other
points in time that meaningfully impact listenership (e.g. Hitler’s birthday), we can still
reasonably claim that the timing of the event is independent of potential outcomes. The list
of unexpected events and planned events can be found in the Appendix. We will run three

Since hate band listeners are likely to listen to other hate bands, for any given user, we scrape not only listens
of the band that user is a top listener of, but also all other hate bands in our dataset.

69

Some users may have over a decade of frequent music listenership, so to ensure the scraper is
computationally feasible, we must limit our data to as small of a time-period as is reasonable for a time-series
analysis. The 14-day window was selected based on findings from prior last.fm research (Ternovski & Yasseri,
2017).

70

With the exception of cases of clear tag vandalism, we will exclude all artists that are found in any two of the
following categories: hate music, mainstream music, and favorite niche music.
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separate analyses: one that uses only planned events, another that uses only unanticipated
events, and a third that uses the combination of the two.

3.9.7.6: Population of Interest
Unfortunately, the structure of last.fm’s API only provides listening data at the level
of the individual, rather than total listenership by music artist. As such, even though we can
identify hate bands, we are not able to obtain daily aggregate play counts for each artist. We
can, however, extract a given artist’s “Top Listeners” or users who have listened to that artist
most frequently according to last.fm.72 We can thus use our list of hate music to extract top
hate music listeners. This procedure yields the sample studied under hypothesis H1a. To
construct the sample of individuals examined by H1b, we will also scrape hate band
listenership of friends of Top Listeners of hate music. This will ensure that we are sampling
not only the fervent far-right, but also more “casual” listeners of hate music. To address
H1c, we will use this same sample as in H1b but further limit the sample to only those users
who have not listened to any hate music prior to any of the included Trump-related events.
None of these samples are representative and will include users within and outside of
the United States. Our analysis will be limited to users who report being in the United States
or do not disclose a real country (e.g. users who say they are from Antarctica will be
included). A secondary analysis will also examine the effect of Trump events on hate band
listenership among users in other countries.

The top listeners page also requires that the user listened to that artist relatively recently. Unfortunately, the
exact timeframe used in the generation of this list has not been published by last.fm.
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3.9.7.7: Analysis
In the current analysis, we are not able to distinguish between people who were and
were not exposed to the Trump event. In fact, due to the global reach of social media
platforms like Twitter and the extensive media coverage of all Trump-related events, it is
likely that relatively few people fail to be exposed to the event in some way at some point.
As such, to understand the “control group” behavior of music listenership, we can only do
the following: 1) examine whether hate music listeners change their listenership of non-hate
music immediately after a Trump event and 2) analyze whether non-hate music listeners who
are similar to hate-music listeners change their listenership habits to niche music immediately
after Trump events. But these can only serve as placebo control tests, since we are not able
to assess how comparable these dependent variables are to the hate-music listenership. As
such, we determine that the most appropriate methodology to evaluate whether there is an
impact of Trump events on hate music listenership would be a time-series RDD or an
interrupted time series. An RDD can be appropriate in this context, as it requires only that
the timing is randomly determined and, given continuous outcome data, it would yield a
robust estimate of the instantaneous effect (e.g. see Imbens, & Lemieux, 2008). 73 But RDD has
rarely been used in time-series contexts, because few effects are truly instantaneous.
A closely related approach is the interrupted time series (ITS) estimator, which is
widely used to measure the impact of some event in time on a running outcome (e.g. see
Bernal, Cummins, Gasparrini, 2017; Briesacher et al., 2013). The average music listenership
patterns should be continuous and generally stable over a narrow window of time.

The problem in the context of hate music listenership and Trump events is that we do not have a good
means of assessing exactly when a user is exposed to the Trump-related event. As such, an instantaneous
treatment effect would likely bias the estimate downward.
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Exogenous events could have immediate impacts on music choice and if we are able to
isolate a class of such events, we can credibly measure an event impact on music listenership.
Since hate-music listenership is the consumption of politically radical music, this behavior
can be viewed as a low-impact, low-effort political behavior. As such, highly public political
events that inspire and/or encourage hate, could mobilize and/or activate low-effort haterelated activities such as the consumption of hate music.
The ITS estimator can be formalized as follows. First, let Yt,i be the outcome variable
of interest for individual i at time t. Our primary analysis would look at hate music
listenership among two sets of users: HL (top fans of hate bands) and FHL (friends of top
fans of hate bands) in the time period of 14 days before and 14 days after a Trump related
event. So Yi,t, would be the daily play count of any hate band by individual i at day t. Second,
we let De be a binary treatment variable such that it is equal to one at time T ≥ te, where te is
the date of Trump-related event e. To aggregate the data, the time before and after event e is
rescaled as in conventional RDD procedures (Imbens, & Lemieux, 2008). In other words,
the cutoff te is moved to 0 for every e. The timing of an unanticipated Trump event can be
thought of as being randomly assigned. 74 This means that if Trump-events do lead to
increased hate music listenership, the variable De should be positively associated with Yi,t.
Using the standard interrupted-time series framework, we estimate the impact by

It is arguable that the “unanticipated” definition is not stringent enough; after all, unexpected victories are
tied to planned events. For instance, Trump’s Republican primary victory in New Hampshire was inextricably
linked to the New Hampshire primary itself—the date of which was made public well in advance of the
contest. While Trump’s victory was probabilistic, the date of the contest was not. The crucial question here is
whether a hate music listener listens to more hate music because of the victory or because of the contest itself.
So long as the choice to listen to more hate music is tied to Trump’s victory and not the event itself, our
identification strategy is defensible. As a robustness check, we will determine if Trump losses are also
associated with increases in hate music listenership. Additionally, we will check if election contests that do not
involve Trump or far-right politicians are associated with increases in hate music listenership.
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𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽𝜉𝜉 ∗ 𝜉𝜉 + 𝛽𝛽𝜁𝜁 ∗ 𝜁𝜁 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒

where T is the running time variable, 𝜉𝜉 are the event fixed effects, and 𝜁𝜁 are the individual
fixed effects.

To address the question in H2, we evaluate whether hate music listeners anticipate
Trump-related events and listen to hate music before the event.75 We expected planned events
would have anticipation effects (i.e. a hate music listener will consume hate music leading up
to the event).76 However, even our unanticipated events list may still exhibit anticipation
effects (i.e., there are predictions in the media or a user might have the strong prior belief
that a particular primary contest will yield a Trump win). To quantify these effects, we will
use the following method. We will first randomly select a holdout sample, H. In this sample
H, we will shift the rescaled treatment cutoff t back until the estimate is no longer statistically
significant. This would give us a sense as to how many days before the event users begin to
modify their listenership behavior in anticipation of the event. We will test this new cutoff in
the test data T, where T ⊖H.

To disentangle whether the increase is due to the event itself or some unobserved

confound, we pursue a series of placebo control tests. The same methodology as used to
evaluate the H1 hypotheses is applied to placebo control data but with the expectation that
there are no differences between the observed 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒 (1) and the inferred 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒 (0). Namely,

we have a similar outcome variable Ui,t (listenership of non-hate music by individual i at time
t). This variable can be one of the following variants: 1) listenership of mainstream music by
Such anticipation effects have been observed in related research on last.fm music consumption (Ternovski &
Yasseri, 2017).

75

76

This would bias any estimates of the event’s impact downward.

176

individuals who are also top fans of hate bands (hypothesis H3), and 2) listenership of
favorite niche music by friends of users who listen to hate music but do not themselves listen
to hate music (hypothesis H4). 77 Since the sample in H4 is rather complicated it is useful to
formalize: let i be any user that has listened to hate music in our dataset. Let j be any user
who is friends78 with user i, but who has not listened to any hate music in any of the time
frames of interest. For each user j, identify their top listened to artists A. We expect that A
listenership will not increase after Trump-related events for users j. Since last.fm users
exhibit high levels of interest-based homophily (e.g. see Bisgin, Agarwal, & Xu, 2012), we
expect this population to be most similar to individuals who listen to hate music.

3.9.7.8: Full List of Planned Trump Events
December 7, 2015 – South Carolina rally, calling for “total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what
the hell is going on.” (Trump, 2015 qtd. in Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
June 3, 2016 – Redding rally: “Look at my African American over here. Look at him.”
(Trump, 2016 qtd. in Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
July 19, 2016 – Trump officially awarded Republican nomination (Rafferty, 2016)
July 21, 2016 – Trump speaks at RNC (Plumer, 2016)
August 9, 2016 – North Carolina rally, Trump “suggesting violence against Mrs. Clinton or
liberal jurists” (Corasaniti & Haberman, 2016)

77

In this case, niche music is defined as whatever artists that user has listened to most frequently.

We use a loose definition of a “friend” connection. Any user that is follower or is following another user is
considered in the “friends network” of that user.
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September 26. 2016 – Second Presidential debate, Trump says that if he were in charge of
the law Clinton “would be in jail” (Roberts, Jacobs, & Siddiqui, 2016)
January 20, 2017 – Trump’s inauguration (Collinson, 2017)
August 15, 2017 – Press conference, Trump on the rioting from the pro-Confederate rally in
Charlottesville: ““I think there is blame on both sides.…You also had people that were very
fine people on both sides.…Not all of those people were neo-Nazis, believe me. Not all of
those people were white supremacists by any stretch.” (Trump, 2017 qtd. in Finnegan &
Barabak, 2018)
August 22, 2017 – Phoenix rally, Trump on the removal of Confederate monuments:
““They’re trying to take away our culture. They’re trying to take away our history. And our
weak leaders, they do it overnight. These things have been there for 150 years, for a hundred
years. You go back to a university and it's gone. Weak, weak people.” (Trump, 2017 qtd. in
Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
September 22, 2017 – Alabama rally, Trump on the black football players protesting racial
discrimination during National Anthem: “Wouldn’t you love to see one of these NFL
owners, when somebody disrespects our flag, to say, ‘Get that son of a bitch off the field
right now. Out. He’s fired. He’s fired!’” (Trump, 2017 qtd. in Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)

3.9.7.9: Full List of Unanticipated Trump Events
February 28, 2015 – CNN Interview in an answer about David Duke and the KKK: “Well,
just so you understand, I don’t know anything about David Duke, OK? I don’t know
anything about what you’re even talking about with white supremacy or white supremacists.
So I don’t know.” (Trump, 2015 qtd. in Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
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June 16, 2015 – Tweet: “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best.
They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of
problems.…They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists, and some, I
assume, are good people.” (Trump, 2015 qtd. in Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
November 22, 2015 – “Trump retweets fake, racially charged crime data from non-existent
group” (Bradner, 2015)
February 9, 2016 – Won New Hampshire Primary (Balz, Eilperin, Fahrenthold, 2016).
February 20, 2016 – Won South Carolina Primary, “clears path to nomination” (Jacobs,
Bixby, Siddiqui, Sullivan & Gabbatt, 2016)
February 23, 2016 – Won Nevada Caucus, “further solidifies standing as the front-runner for
the GOP nomination” (Goldmacher, 2016)
February 28, 2016 – “Donald Trump Retweets Post with Quote from Mussolini”
(Haberman, 2016)
March 1, 2016 – Super Tuesday, “With a big Super Tuesday, Trump has the Republican
nomination in his sights” (Barabak, 2016)
March 15, 2016 – Trump wins Florida, Rubio drops out. (Mazzei, Sherman, & Clark, 2016)
May 3, 2016 – Ted Cruz drops out of race leaving “Donald Trump as the only candidate
capable of clinching the nomination outright” (Glueck & Goldmacher, 2016)
May 26, 2016 – “Trump reaches delegate count needed to clinch Republican nomination”
(McCarthy, 2016)
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June 5, 2016 – CBS interview, calling U.S. District Judge Gonzalo Curiel “a member of a
club or society very strongly pro-Mexican” (Trump, 2016 qtd. in Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
July 2, 2016 – Trump retweets anti-Clinton graphic previously posted “on an anti-Semitic,
white supremacist message board” (Diamond, 2016).
July 5, 2016 – Trump tweets about “setting the record for the most GOP primary votes
ever” (Doran, 2016).
October 7, 2016 – Publication of recording where “Trump brags about groping women”
(Graham, 2016).
November 8, 2016 – Trump wins Presidential Election “in stunning upset over Clinton”
(Tumulty, Rucker, & Gearan, 2016)
January 25, 2017 – “Trump orders construction of border wall, boosts deportation force.”
(Diamond, 2017).
January 27, 2017 – Trump’s “Muslim Ban” Executive Order signed (Yuhas & Sidahmed,
2017)
March 4, 2017 – “Trump, citing no evidence, accuses Obama of ‘Nixon/Watergate’ plot to
wiretap Trump Tower” (Rucker, Nakashima & Costa, 2017).
July 2, 2017 – “Trump appears to promote violence against CNN with tweet.” (Nakamura,
2017).
November 29, 2017 – Trump retweet of far-right Nationalist who was “recently arrested for
inciting hatred and violence against Muslims.” (Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
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December 23, 2017 – New York Times report claims Trump said Haitians “all have AIDS”
and Nigerians “[o]nce they had seen the United States… would never `go back to their huts’
in Africa” (Shear & Davis, 2017; Finnegan & Barabak, 2018)
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3.9.8: Amended PAP
This PAP was originally posted on https://osf.io/z5g27/ but is reproduced here for
convenience.
Pre-Analysis Plan Amendment (1/29/2020)

3.9.8.1: Overview
The pre-analysis plan remains at osf.io/z5g27, however due to a new last.fm policy
that prevented us from executing the pre-analysis plan exactly as planned, we are registering
this amendment. Please note that, as of this date, we have not collected dependent variable
data and so we are still blind to the eventual results. This amendment document covers three
main modifications: 1) data sources, 2) data cleaning, and 3) two additional hypothesis. Due
to last.fm’s new censorship policies, we now make use of data from archive.org. We also
take additional steps to confirm that our list of hate music artists is accurate and each band
name uniquely identifies a far-right band. Finally, we add two hypotheses to leverage hate
music listeners’ friends networks and the amount of hate music they have listened to when
analyzing their impact on last.fm friends who have not previously listened to hate music. All
three modifications are described in detail below.
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3.9.8.2: Data Sources
Last.fm has recently taken action against hate music pages and censored a large
subset of artist pages associated with the far-right. In Figure 1, we can see the difference
between a censored page and an uncensored artist page. Furthermore, in Figure 2, we can
see the effect of this censorship policy on the Listeners pages of both bands. Please note that
these changes are also reflected in last.fm’s API.
Figure 1. Uncensored (left) and Censored (right) Artist Pages

Figure 2. Uncensored (left) and Censored (right) Listener Pages
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As such, we make use of last.fm’s lengthy history online and archive.org’s Internet
archiving project. Using the list of hate bands we had compiled before last.fm’s censorship
policy went into effect, we extract all listeners associated with hate bands on archive.org.
(Please note, we draw on all relevant last.fm snapshots that are available on archive.org.)
Since, currently, there is no distinction between Top Listeners and Recent Listeners, we
extract both historic Top Listeners and Recent Listeners. Our original Pre-Analysis Plan
explicitly focused on Top Listeners and not Recent Listeners so as to avoid conditioning our
inclusion criteria on a dependent variable generated post-treatment (i.e. Recent Listeners
have listened to hate music after our analysis window). However, since we can now determine
that a last.fm user was a listener to a given hate music band before our analysis window, this
concern is no longer relevant, so we can combine Recent and Top Listeners. 79 To be explicit,
because we now have historic snapshots of hate music listeners, we only include last.fm
users in our list of hate music listeners if they listened to hate music before 2015.
Since last.fm did not censor song listens or last.fm friends networks, the rest of our preanalysis plan need not be modified.

3.9.8.3: Data Cleaning
A closer look at our list of hate bands revealed that despite the precautions we took
to avoid vandalized genre tags, there were artists who were clearly mistagged (e.g., j-pop
artist, Kahimi Karie) or spurious (e.g., Geico [the Insurance Company]). Additionally, we
noted that some hate bands had the same name as artists who had no connection to far right
ideologies (e.g., Evil). As such, for every artist where we were able to successfully extract

Additionally, last.fm never publicized the exact algorithm for calculating Top Listeners, so we no longer need
to rely on a proprietary black-box procedure.
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listeners from archive.org, we manually looked up the last.fm artist page in a web browser
and inspected the genre tags, songs, album titles, the shout-box, the artist biography, pictures
of the artists, and related artists. We then hand-coded them as either “mistagged/fake”,
“suspect”, and “multi.” Mistagged/fake was used in cases where it was clear that the artist
was either not a hate music artist (e.g., several Eurovision pop stars) or not a real music artist
(e.g., politicians, cartoon characters, etc.). “Suspect” was used in cases where the connection
to far-right ideologies was either disputed (based on the shout-box activity and/or artist
biography), the band was a troll artist (e.g., certain grindcore bands), or the ideologies were
not immediately clear (e.g., anti-racist hatecore). Finally, an artist was tagged “multi” if the
biography or the shout-box made it clear that multiple artists shared the same band name.
One important note: there were a few cases where multiple artists shared the same name, but
all were explicitly far-right; these cases were not tagged as “multi,” since, for our purposes,
they are no different from uniquely named far-right bands.
To reduce the amount of noise in our data, we exclude all artists (and the
corresponding listeners) who were tagged as either “mistagged/fake,” “suspect,” or “multi.”

3.9.8.4: Additional Exploratory Hypotheses
We also noted that the collected data allows us to have greater precision when
assessing whether friends of far-right music listeners experience increases in hate music
listenership following Trump-related events (Hypothesis H1c). Particularly, we can 1) map
the network of far-right users and 2) evaluate how much far-right music a given user has
listened to in the past. Both data may estimate how radicalized a user is. Specifically, we
believe that if we map the network of far-right music listeners, individuals that are more
central in the network are likely to be more strongly enmeshed in neo-Nazi and other far192

right music scenes. Similarly, individuals who listen to more hate music (both in terms of
time t [i.e., the number of archive.org snapshots] and quantity q of hate bands listened to)
should, on average, have stronger affinities to far right ideologies. As such, both types of
listeners are likely to be more influential in radicalizing their last.fm friends. Therefore, we
add the following two hypotheses:
H1c1: Music listeners who have not listened to hate music in the past should have
larger treatment effects if they are friends with active hate music listeners who have
higher levels of eigenvector centrality
H1c2: Music listeners who have not listened to hate music in the past should have
larger treatment effects if they are friends with active hate music listeners who have
listened to more hate music (in terms of t (number of archive.org snapshots) and q
(number of hate bands listened to))
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4. Making Sense of Voting “Habits”: Applying the
Process Model of Behavior Change to a Series of
Large-Scale Get-Out-the-Vote Experiments

4.1: Abstract
While there is compelling evidence that the act of casting a vote in one election
makes it more likely that the voter will vote again in future elections (Coppock and Green
2016), there is still a lack of clarity as to how and why such a “habit” develops. In this paper,
I apply a new theoretical framework, the Process Model for Behavior Change (PMBC)
(Duckworth and Gross 2020), to voting to more cohesively bridge the economic cost-benefit
model of voting with the psychology-motivated voting-as-a-habit literature. This new
theoretical frame gives greater clarity as to how a vote in one election might beget a vote in
another election, while yielding testable predictions as to which circumstances are more
favorable for developing turnout persistence. This paper also makes use of nine large-N,
door-to-door voter mobilization field experiments in various election contexts (~1.8 million
voters in total) to evaluate predictions from the PMBC model and from prior empirical
research. Consistent with prior empirical research, my analysis finds that being persuaded to
vote in one election does lead to increased turnout four years later. However, the PMBC
predictions and my empirical research both diverge from the conclusions of several prior
empirical studies. For instance, being induced to vote in low salience elections does not
necessarily translate to voting in downstream elections. These results illustrate the usefulness
of the PMBC theoretical framework to reconcile and make sense of, at times, contradictory
empirical results in the voting-as-a-habit literature.
199

4.2: Introduction
Political science has made tremendous headway in uncovering the mechanism
behind why people vote since the canonical formalizations of Riker & Ordershook (1968)
and Downs (1957), who conceptualized the decision to cast a ballot as hinging on a costbenefit equation. There is now copious evidence that social image also plays a key part in
voters’ decision to vote or abstain (e.g., Green, McGrath and Aronow, 2013; Rogers,
Ternovski & Yoeli; 2016, Fujiwara, Meng, and Vogl, 2016; DellaVigna, 2016; Gerber et al.,
2016). This literature has a well-developed theoretical framework and strong empirical
evidence validating many aspects of the theory. There has also been a branch of empirical
studies investigating if voting is “habit-forming.” (Solvack and Vassil, 2018; Coppock &
Green, 2016; Garcia Bedolla & Michelson, 2012; Franklin & Hobolt, 2011; Meredith, 2009;
Gerber, Green & Shachar, 2003). Coppock and Green’s (2016) overview of the existing
literature and empirical contributions provide compelling evidence that voting in one
election does cause an increase in the likelihood that the same individual will vote in a future
election. But there are key components of the theoretical framework that are, as yet,
undeveloped. For one, a voting “habit” does not satisfy psychologists’ definition of habit as
an action that becomes automatic from continuous repetition (Lally and Gardner, 2013)—
the long gaps of time between elections preclude voting from becoming truly automatic
(Dinas, 2012). But more pressing is the concern that if voter is habit-forming, why are there
so many cases where voting in one election does not lead to another vote in a subsequent
election? Why do so many voters lapse, while others vote only sporadically? As Coppock and
Green (2016) concluded in their empirical contribution and review of existing literature,
turnout persistence “is more complex than suggested by prior work in this area.” (p. 1060).
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And I argue that complexity demands a cohesive, comprehensive theoretical framework that
yields concrete predictions that can be empirically validated.
The paucity of a compelling theoretical framework for turnout persistence is partly
explained by the difficulty of reconciling habit with existing models of voter behavior. An
economic perspective on habit is too narrow: voting persistence in this context is reduced to
a lagged turnout variable in an equation modelling the likelihood of future turnout. This
approach fails to provide concrete predictions as to why voting could be habit-forming in
the first place. 80 On the other hand, the psychological perspective must grapple with the fact
that turnout persistence fails to meet the strict criteria psychologists have for habitual
behavior. How can voting be habitual, when the behavior not automatic, is not repeated
frequently, and there may be years between each election? Fortunately, recent developments
in judgement and decision-making have led to a new theoretical framework that can clearly
depict the mechanism of seemingly habitual behavior without the need to determine whether
a behavior is, strictly-speaking, a psychological habit.
One of the key contributions of this paper is leveraging this new theoretical
framework, Duckworth & Gross’s (2020) Process Model of Behavior Change (PMBC), to
give greater clarity as to how “habitual” voting relates to economic (i.e., cost-benefit) models
of voting. The PMBC model incorporates the classic cost-benefit analysis into a stage of
cognitive decision-making (the Appraisal Stage), which can be skipped under the right
circumstances through a cognitive shortcut (such shortcuts are usually habits). This model
predicts several key factors that should lead to stronger “habitual” voting effects: 1)

Note that economic models of voter habit explicitly attempt to disentangle habit formation from the
“stability over time in the benefits and costs of voting” (Fujiwara, Meng, & Vogl, 2016, p. 161).

80
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contextual cues that bring attention to an election should be similar to that of past elections,
2) past voting experiences should be subjectively positive, and 3) repetition of the first two
factors across elections should yield voting patterns that resemble habitual behavior.
The second key contribution of this work is empirical. Through a partnership with a
large-scale political organization, I make use of an ~1.8 million voter dataset to evaluate
downstream turnout effects that are caused by upstream voting behavior. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the largest such experimental evaluation. This data has three key
advantages:
1. The sample is predominantly older and allows us to look at the effect of GOTV
outreach among a population that has had many previous opportunities to evaluate
their individual costs and benefits of voting but failed to become frequent voters.
This allows us to better guard against the possibility that it isn’t the act of voting that
leads to future turnout, but, rather, it is the large informational bolus from voting
for the first time that permanently updates a new voter’s cost-benefit equation of
voting.
2. The data includes 8 different states with large sample sizes across 5 election
contexts, which allows us to establish a greater degree of generalizability.
Additionally, the size of my sample and the diversity of the election contexts also
allows me to evaluate which specific variables are conducive to developing habit-like
voting behaviors.
3. The field experiments in this paper specifically use GOTV outreach that is designed
to foster habitual voting by leveraging plan-making intentions and using consistent
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contextual cues across elections. This also helps guard against the possibility that the
cost-benefit equation of voting has changed.
In sum, this paper presents a novel theoretical framework from the cognitive sciences
and applies it to the puzzle of voting persistence. By applying the PMBC model to previous
studies, I am able to generate concrete predictions as to the circumstances of when turnout
persistence should be stronger or weaker. I then test these predictions in a large-N dataset.
As such, this paper has implications both for 1) public policy by providing some guidance as
to how to develop “habitual” voting among an older population and 2) political science as
the PMBC model and my empirical results better define the mechanism behind turnout
persistence.
This paper is organized as follows. First, I provide a brief summary of the commonlyused cost-benefit model of voting. I then explicate the key issues this type of model has in
incorporating turnout persistence (or “habitual” voting) by discussing economic models of
habit and how habit is defined by psychologists. I propose that the best way to cohesively
bridge these literatures is through Duckworth and Gross’s (2020) PMBC theoretical
framework. In the next section, I apply the PMBC model to voting. I then discuss the results
from the voting-as-habit literature through the lens of the PMBC model. In the following
section, I turn to my empirical work; I describe the data used in this paper and explicate
concrete predictions borne out of the PMBC model that I test in this paper. In the final two
sections, I present the results, discuss implications, and conclude.

4.3: The Calculus of Voting
To construct a theoretical model of why casting a vote makes an individual more
likely to vote in subsequent election, we must first establish the mechanism for why any
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citizen votes in the first place. Our understanding of why voters turn out to the polls has
developed considerably since the canonical formalizations of Riker and Ordershook (1968)
and Downs (1957). Their pioneering work noted that there is some cost of voting and, in
large elections, a single vote is highly unlikely to matter, so what is the benefit of turning out
to vote? Why do so many people still incur the personal cost (e.g., time costs, transportation
costs, etc.) of voting even though it is highly improbable that their vote will decide the
outcome of an election? Downs (1957) wrote of the perceived likelihood of being the pivotal
voter and Riker and Ordershook (1968) added the “warm glow” variable to the model. In
other words, a voter considers how close the election will be in their mental calculus, but
also anticipates a warm glow after fulfilling one’s civic duty at the polls. And so, the voter
may incur the cost of voting even in elections that aren’t close. Their reliance on the concept
of the “rational voter” and insistence on including a “pivotality” variable (i.e., the expected
probability that one’s vote will decide an election) set off a heated debate between the
Downsian political economists and psychology-influenced political scientists (for summaries
see Blais, 2000; Green and Shapiro, 1996). As such, there was a proliferation of theoretical
models and empirical research that attempted to better understand what the Downsian
school called the “paradox of voting” (for a summary of the relevant approaches and a metaanalysis of empirical research, see Smets & Van Hem, 2013). But though some elements of
the original model continue to be controversial (i.e., do people really think about the
probability that they can swing a presidential election?), even some of the leading critics of
the rational voter model came to use cost-benefit equations to model an individual’s decision
to vote or abstain in their own work (e.g., see Gerber, Green and Larimer, 2008). Therefore,
as a first step, I assume that a cost-benefit equation is one key determinant of a would-be
voter’s decision-making process.
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There is also some consensus as to several of the variables included in that equation:
there likely exists some cost of voting and that there may be some intrinsic benefit of voting
(e.g., Gerber, Green & Larimer, 2008; Meredith, 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2016; Fujiwara,
Meng and Vogl, 2016) which we conceptualize as the original “warm glow” variable from
Riker and Ordershook (1968). 81 Critics of the “pivotality” variable (i.e., the variable that
denotes the expected probability of casting the vote that swings an election) maintain that it
is likely so small that it could be treated as zero (e.g., Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2008), but
because this variable is still included in many economic models of voting (e.g., DellaVigna et
al., 2016; Fujiwara, Meng and Vogl, 2016), I include it in my cost-benefit equation with the
acknowledgement that it may be zero (for a complete formalization, see DellaVigna et al.,
2016).
Aside from considering these well-established cost and benefits of voting, it has
become increasingly clear that there is a powerful social element to voting. Gerber, Green
and Larimer (2008) experimentally induced prospective voters to turn out via social pressure
by publicizing their neighbors’ voting records.82 The social pressure intervention has been
replicated in many other field experiments (for overviews and meta-analyses, see Green &
Gerber, 2019; Green, McGrath and Aronow, 2013) and the concept of “social image” was
finally incorporated into formal models of voting (e.g., DellaVigna et al., 2016). In other
words, there is a widespread belief that voting is an important part of what it means to be a

This variable is also referred to as the “civic duty” benefit of voting (e.g., Gerber et al., 2016), but since this
benefit may imply some extrinsic social dimension (i.e., “duty” implies some obligation to others, which may be
enforced through social sanctions), I opt to use “warm glow.”
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This intervention exploited the fact that whether or not someone has voted is public record in the United
States.
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good citizen,83 so there may be negative social repercussions for abstaining and potentially
positive social rewards for turning out to the polls. And indeed, scholars have found that
voters relinquish monetary rewards to tell others that they vote (DellaVigna et al., 2016) and
pay to find out if others voted (Gerber et al., 2016). This is all to say that there are strong
norms that citizens should vote, so people may turn out to vote because they perceive or
anticipate some form of real or imagined social sanctions for being a non-voter (Fujiwara,
Meng, and Vogl, 2016; DellaVigna, 2016; Gerber et al., 2016).
For the purposes of this paper, I use the DellaVigna et al. (2016) model as the core
cost-benefit model 84 for three reasons: the costs and benefits in this model are commonly
used in other formalizations, it has extensive empirical validation backing its assertions, and
it is parsimonious. However, this paper does not hinge on the choice of cost-benefit models
and alternative models could easily supplant the DellaVigna et al. (2016) model in my
analyses. 85
In the DellaVigna et al. (2016) model, there are three benefits and two costs. The
benefits are
1. the expected utility of being the pivotal voter (i.e., your vote decides the election),
2. the “warm glow” of voting,

“90% of respondents on the 1984 GSS claimed voting was a very important civic obligation" (Rolfe, 2012, p.
50)
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Though for conceptual clarity in later discussions, I decomposed their “social image” functional into social
cost and social benefit.
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In fact, the exact cost-benefit equation can vary from person to person. In the theoretical framework I
propose in this manuscript, the cost-benefit equation is simply one stage in an overarching process of recurring
behavior. The cost-benefit equation for any given individual outputs an expected utility; the other stages in my
theoretical framework use only the resulting expected utility and do not refer to the specific costs and benefits
that produced that expected utility.
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3.

and the social utility of voting (e.g., being able to truthfully report having had voted
to peers and family)

whereas the costs are:
1. the transactional cost of voting (time, transportation costs, opportunity cost, etc.),
2. and the social cost of not voting (e.g., either telling the truth and being socially
sanctioned for not voting or the cognitive cost of lying about one’s abstention).86

4.4: Reconciling “Habit” with the Calculus of Voting
There may be yet another factor that determines whether any given individual casts a
ballot: voting appears to be “habit-forming” (Solvack and Vassil, 2018; Coppock & Green,
2016; Garcia Bedolla & Michelson, 2012; Franklin & Hobolt, 2011; Meredith, 2009; Gerber,
Green & Shachar, 2003). It has long been noted that prior voting is an excellent predictor of
future voting (e.g., Brody and Sniderman, 1977), but it was not clear if voters were simply
running the calculus of voting in their head each time and coming to the same result (i.e., the
benefit of voting exceeds the cost of voting) or if voting truly became habitual. Coppock and
Green (2016) conclude that the body of empirical evidence “leaves little doubt that voting is
habit-forming” (1046), but there are still lingering questions as to the mechanism of habitformation. For instance, as Dinas (2012) points out, a voting “habit” isn’t really a habit in the
psychological-sense. Psychologists commonly define habit as a set of “behavioural patterns
enacted automatically in response to a situation in which the behaviour has been performed
repeatedly and consistently in the past.” (Lally and Gardner, 2013; 137). Though it is
important to emphasize that habits also require “routine contextual cues” in the

Note that the theory of expressive voting (e.g., Rogers, Fox, and Gerber, 2013) can be incorporated in the
“warm glow” variable and the social cost/benefits of voting (e.g., Etang, Fielding, & Knowles, 2016).
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environment (Beshears et al., 2020). In other words, an individual receives some cue (e.g., it’s
morning and I’m in my car about to go to work) and takes some automatic action (e.g., I
take the same route I always take without deliberating or actively thinking about as to which
streets to take). In short, a conventional psychological model of habit-formation is not fully
compatible with the notion of habitual voting for two reasons. First, habitual actions are
“automatic,” which implies an “absence of awareness, conscious control, mental effort and
deliberation” (Lally and Gardner, 2013; 137). It is unlikely that even the most consistent of
voters are “unaware” going to the polls as one would drive down a familiar route.87 The
second issue is that to translate a deliberative behavior to an automatic behavior, substantial
repetition is required to achieve any level of automaticity—for instance, a study looking at
the adoption of healthy daily behaviors found that the behavior became automatic only after
66 days on average (Lally et al., 2010). Even if someone votes in three elections every two
years (e.g., a municipal election, a party primary, and a general election), that voter would
only be expected to develop a voting “habit” after 44 years of being a voter.88 This stands in
stark contrast to the fact that much of the voting-as-a-habit literature examined much
shorter time horizons but still found turnout persistence.
On the other hand, economics has a rich literature of incorporating consumer habit
in formal models of economic behavior (e.g., Koford and Miller, 1991; Carroll, Overland &
Weil, 2000; Meer, 2002). And from this perspective, Fujiwara, Meng & Vogl (2016) defined
voting habit as “voting today, holding constant voters' characteristics, affect[ing] voting
decisions in the future” (Fujiwara, Meng & Vogl, 2016; p. 165). To avoid confusing habit in
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For a more thorough criticism of construing persistent voting as “habitual,” see Dinas (2012; 435-436)
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(2 years / 3 votes) X 66 days
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a psychological sense with this narrow economic definition of habit, I adopt the term
proposed by Green & Shachar (2000): consuetude,89 defined as “merely engaging in the
activity makes it more likely that one will engage in the same activity.” (p. 562). As such, in
Fujiwara, Meng & Vogl (2016), voting consuetude is essentially formalized as a lagged
outcome variable (i.e., whether or not a given individual voted in the last election). But the
issue with this economic definition is that it is too narrow to yield concrete predictions as to
why the empirical studies found voting consuetude in some contexts but not in others (for a
brief overview of some of these inconsistencies, see Coppock and Green, 2016).
In short, these two strands of literature are both incomplete in their treatment of
voting consuetude. On one hand, the economic model is precise but so narrow that it, in
itself, provides no guidance as to the mechanism behind why one vote is more likely to lead
to more votes. 90 The psychological model of habit, on the other hand, has concrete
predictions as to how habits form (for a brief overview, see Lally & Gardner, 2013), but is
clearly inapplicable to an activity that may occur as rarely as once every few years and is
clearly never “automatic” in the psychological sense.
Fortunately, Duckworth and Gross (2020) present a more general decision-making
model that can better be reconciled with persistent voting behaviors. Specifically,
Duckworth and Gross’s (2020) Process Model of Behavior Change (PMBC) is a theoretical

“Consuetude is conventionally defined as habit or custom but lacks the unwanted connotations of those
terms. The term ‘habit’ calls to mind such activities as cigarette smoking or drug addiction, in which a person is
locked into a pattern of conduct by forces that are in some sense outside his or her control. Similarly, to call
voting a ‘customary activity’ directs more attention than we would like to the effects of the cultural context in
which voting occurs. Absent from common parlance, consuetude provides an empty vessel into which we may
pour… meaning.” (Green & Shachar, 2000; p. 561-562)
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Studies that use such formal models of voting tend to draw on other theories and empirical research for
concrete predictions (e.g., Fujiwara, Meng & Vogl, 2016).
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framework 91 for analyzing behavior change that incorporates both non-habitual activities and
habitual activities. But crucially, it does not require for an activity to be a habit in the strictpsychological sense. Instead, habit is just one of many types of heuristic decision-making
processes that are incorporated in the model.92 That said, it is important to emphasize (as
Duckworth and Gross (2020) themselves do) that these features are not novel and they have
all been discussed and studied extensively by many scholars in the past. Rather, this model is
an integration and distillation of existing behavioral research; its main goal is to provide a
parsimonious yet rich framework with which to analyze behavior change (Duckworth and
Gross, 2020; p. 45). Much like the Downsian scholars that attempt to reduce complex
cognitive process behind the decision to vote into simple testable models, the Duckworth
and Gross (2020) theoretical framework provides a similarly succinct encapsulation of key
cognitive processes behind individual behavior during repeated activities. 93
In sum, the reason why the PMBC is particularly useful to gaining a better
understanding of voting consuetude are as follows. First, unlike narrow definitions of voting
consuetude, the PMBC provides clear, testable predictions as to which circumstances are
more favorable for turnout persistence. Second, unlike the theories of habit formation that
are cited extensively by the voting-as-habit literature (e.g., Solvack and Vassil, 2018; Aldrich,
Montgomery & Wood, 2011) the PMBC avoids the paradox of how such an infrequent and
Duckworth and Gross (2020) themselves note that the “Process Model of Behavior Change” is actually a
theoretical framework rather than a model in the strict sense, but since they use the PMBC shorthand, I use
“model” and “theoretical framework” in this paper interchangeably.
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An example of heuristic decision-making that is not habitual would be entering a new cafeteria and opting
for a new healthy food option, because it is most prominently displayed (e.g., Just & Gabrielyan, 2018)
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My application of this model to voting consuetude follows in that tradition. All my analyses of mechanism
through the lens of this model have been touched on in the past by other scholars in a more ad hoc way (e.g.,
Rogers & Frey, 2014); my motivation for using the PMBC is to generate concrete testable predictions from a
coherent, self-contained theory and to evaluate those predictions in a large empirical dataset.
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clearly non-automatic behavior can be construed as habitual in the strict psychological sense.
Third, the PMBC is a parsimonious, rich, and coherently self-contained theoretical
framework. This avoids cherry-picking among many competing and often over-lapping
theories (for a critique of this commonly-used approach, see Smets and van Ham, 2013). As
such, applying the PMBC to voting consuetude allows us to reconcile inconsistencies in the
voting-as-a-habit literature. Namely, it is not uncommon for empirical studies to find
contradictory evidence. For instance, some studies found that previous voting in one type of
election does not translate to downstream voting in a different type of election (Michelson,
2003; Hill & Kousser, 2016), but other studies found voting consuetude effects even for
different types of elections (Garcia Bedolla and Michelson, 2012; Gerber, Green, & Shachar
2003). In the next section, I discuss the Duckworth and Gross (2020) model and how it
applies to voting consuetude to illustrate how this model can help make sense of the
sometimes-contradictory results from the voting-as-a-habit literature.

4.5: Skipping the Calculus of Voting; Voting as a “Habit”
The PMBC stipulates that any behavior occurs as part of a recursive cycle of four
stages. A graphical depiction of this model as applied to voting can be seen in Figure 4.1
(left). First, we encounter a situation—for instance, it is Election Day. Some element or
elements of the situation demand our attention (such as seeing news coverage of the
upcoming election). We appraise the situation (i.e., essentially apply our own personal costbenefit equation to determine if voting is worth the effort) and pick the appropriate response
(i.e., vote or not). But this model also emphasizes that because appraisal is cognitively taxing,
there exist shortcuts past the appraisal stage (see Figure 4.1 right). To be specific, this
cognitive shortcut economizes “on cognitive effort and are enacted not because we calculate
that their net benefits minus costs are optimal in the moment but rather because we have
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responded the same way in the same context and gotten a similar reward” (Duckworth and
Gross 2020, 41). Past voting causing future voting would therefore be described as a
sidestepping Appraisal Stage and, therefore, not weighing the costs and benefits of voting.
Figure 4.1: PMBC model as applied to voting before a voting “habit” (left) and after a
voting “habit” develops (right)

Adapted from Duckworth and Gross (2020, p. 40)
While repetition is undoubtedly necessary to make voting truly habitual, because the
PMBC is a process-driven model, we can focus on the mechanism behind the development of
shortcuts past the Appraisal Stage and we do not need to adjudicate whether persistent
voting is really a “habit” in the strict psychological sense. Particularly, the cognitive shortcut
does not have to imply that the Response is automatic in the sense that the initiation of the
action is not consciously recognized. Rather, one can construe this shortcut as simply a
failure to deliberate over whether a given action is worth taking. In other words, the
cognitive shortcut could simply be a line of reasoning such as “Last time I voted, I was glad
that I voted, so I may as well vote again.” This is distinct from a deliberative thought process
that has the individual thinking about how much time they’ll wait in line at the polling place,
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the times someone praised them for voting, etc. In other words, the cognitive shortcut could
simply be a failure to even cursorily engage in the specifics of a cost-benefit assessment. And
so, the PMBC model allows us to identify what elements are necessary for voting to persist
in a manner resembling a habitual action (i.e., voting without appraisal as to whether one should
vote or not). I delineate these necessary conditions below:
1. An individual’s attention must be triggered by some environmental cue
about election day (i.e. the Attention Stage).
2. Previous voting experience must validate that the voting calculus in the
appraisal stage was correct. (In other words, the cost-benefit calculation
should clearly show that the voter made the “right” choice in showing up at
the polls.)
3. There must be continuous positive reinforcement as the voting behavior is
repeated94 for the voter to begin to skip the Appraisal Stage and show up at
the polls as a cognitive shortcut.
We can now use the theoretical framework to re-evaluate existing empirical research on
voting consuetude, which I do in the next section.

4.6: “Voting-as-a-Habit” Literature and the PMBC Model
There have been two major approaches to isolating voting consuetude from
confounding variables: 1) a regression discontinuity at the point when a voter becomes
eligible to vote, 2) a 2SLS regression on downstream turnout among compliers in

As Dinas (2012) points out, voting in the upstream election and voting again the same year in a downstream
election should be not construed as a habit, so a longer time horizon is necessary to evaluate whether a shortcut
has formed.
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randomized (e.g., GOTV nudges) or natural experiments (e.g., rainfall). I discuss each of
these approaches in turn and apply the PMBC model to make sense of their findings.
The first approach is a temporal regression discontinuity design that uses the date at
which a voter becomes eligible to vote (Meredith, 2009; Franklin & Hobolt, 2011; Dinas,
2012; Coppock and Green, 2016). In other words, this approach compares the long-term
vote record of the voter who turned 18 just before an election to the long-term vote record
of the voter who turned 18 just after the same election. This design exploits the fact that
people cannot self-select to either group and assumes that the only meaningful difference
between the two groups is eligibility to vote. With this approach, researchers have found that
voting habits persist for at least twenty years (Coppock and Green, 2016), which is
consistent with the broader psychological literature on habit-formation—repeated habitual
actions should be self-reinforcing (e.g., Lally and Gardner, 2013).
To better see how this research would be interpreted by the proposed PMBC model,
it is useful to explicate each step for a young voter who becomes eligible to vote shortly
before an election. Under the PMBC model the Situation Stage is the upcoming election that
a young voter will be eligible for. Next, that young voter may be made aware of the
upcoming elections via campaign and non-profit outreach, media coverage, and
conversations with friends and family (i.e., the Attention Stage). If they are not made aware
of the upcoming election, they will therefore abstain without ever assessing the costs and
benefits of voting. If they are made aware of the upcoming election that they are eligible to
vote in, the young voter will proceed to the Appraisal Stage, since they have not voted
before and, thus, have no cognitive shortcuts past the Appraisal Stage. As mentioned earlier,
for the Appraisal Stage, I use a variant of DellaVigna et al.’s (2016) model, which has three
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benefits and two costs. The benefits are the expected utility of being the pivotal voter (i.e.,
your vote decides the election), the “warm glow” of voting, and the social utility of voting
(e.g., being able to truthfully report having had voted to peers and family). The costs are the
transactional cost of voting (time, transportation costs, opportunity cost, etc.) and the social
cost of not voting (e.g., either telling the truth and being socially sanctioned for not voting or
the cognitive cost of lying about one’s abstention).
What is important to note is that the new voters must estimate these variables with
limited information and those estimates may be wildly inaccurate. Additionally, these
variables can be manipulated exogenously. For instance, social pressure GOTV outreach
explicitly (e.g., Gerber, Green and Larimer, 2008) or implicitly (e.g., Rogers, Ternovski and
Yoeli, 2018) emphasizes that whether or not someone voted is public record and this tactic
has consistently increased turnout even in competitive elections (e.g., Green, McGrath and
Aronow, 2013). This is to say that, under this theoretical model, receiving a piece of mail
that emphasizes that whether or not you voted is public record and people may ask you
about it is likely to increase the expected cost of not voting. The key takeaway is that social
and campaign outreach that calls attention to an upcoming election can also affect the
perceived variables in the cost-benefit model used in the Appraisal stage of the PMBC
decision-making model. Hence, the young voter in our example would either choose to vote
or abstain and proceed to the Situation Stage of the PMBC model. In this example, the
Situation Stage can be construed as encompassing both the experience at the polls and the
subsequent social interactions about voting. 95

For a more detailed discussion of how social interactions after voting can exacerbate voting consuetude, see
Fujiwara, Meng, and Vogl (2016; 182-3).
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At the Situation Stage, the voter will therefore get important information that
updates the values of each variable used in the cost-benefit analysis, but the voter and the
non-voter have systematically different sets of information. For one, the voter can update
the “warm glow” variable depending on one’s experiences at the polls. Someone who had a
positive experience may assign a higher value to their “warm glow” benefit, while someone
who waited in a long line and was affected by voter ID laws (e.g., they cast a “provisional”
ballot because their identification did not meet state requirements), may decrease the value
assigned to the “warm glow” variable. 96 The non-voter would thus only be able to update
this variable through second-hand information (e.g., talking to friends and family who
voted). And as Meredith (2009) points out, the voter may also be able to reduce the
transaction cost of voting by getting important first-hand logistical information about voting
(e.g., knowing where to go, what the ballot looks like, how voting machines work, knowing
more about the candidates). The non-voter would not get the benefit of this cost reduction.
The voter and non-voter will get markedly different pieces of information that affect the
social cost and social benefit of voting. The non-voter will get more information about the
social cost of not voting and the voter will get more information about the social benefit.
On the next election day (which may be years later), our example youth voter
encounters a similar situation and must again get some reminder to bring their attention to
the election. If they are made aware of the election they may again proceed to the Appraisal
stage with updated cost-benefit values, which may be updated again in a similar way.
Ultimately, this updating of cost-benefit terms can also be considered in a reduced form: was
It’s worth noting that there are some scholars who asserted that the warm glow variable from voting is so
large that it doesn’t lead to voting consuetude, but is also “transformative” in changing individuals’ overall
political engagement (e.g., Jakee and Sun, 2006). A large meta-analysis has found little evidence that voting is
transformative (Holbein et al., 2021).
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the decision to vote or not vote “correct”? In other words, in casting a vote did the voter
feel that the benefits justified the costs and vice versa. This aspect is critical in habitformation because a desirable behavior (i.e., voting) only starts to become a habit if there is a
positive benefit to that behavior and the contextual cues drawing attention to the upcoming
election are similar (Duckworth and Gross, 2020). At some point, an individual can therefore
sidestep the Appraisal Stage because the cost-benefit maximization equation has led to
positive results in the past.
The results from this RDD literature could imply that over the course of multiple
elections, newly eligible voters develop a persistent heuristic-driven shortcut past the
Appraisal stage. But there does remain one alternative explanation that I alluded to earlier:
divergences in the voting record of the voter who became eligible to vote just before an
election versus that of the voter who didn’t may be driven by divergences in the
informational boluses the two types of individuals receive (i.e., this is an exclusion violation).
The key part is that newly eligible voters may have highly inaccurate estimates of the costs
and benefits of turning out to the polls and voting for the first time could potentially provide
a major correction to a misestimated cost or benefit. The amount of information a new voter
receives from voting in each successive election is likely diminishing on average. As such, to
better disentangle whether it is the act of voting or the information received from the voting
experience that is responsible for future votes, it would be useful to examine the
development of heuristic shortcuts among more seasoned voters.
Some of the empirical research in the voting-as-a-habit literature does indeed make
use of randomized controlled experiments to include the development of voting consuetude
among older voters (e.g., Coppock & Green, 2016). This population is composed of people
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who have already made it a habit to abstain in elections or those individuals who have gotten
a good sense of the costs and benefits of voting but did not become frequent voters. It is
worth emphasizing that the PMBC model was constructed to gain a better understanding of
how to modify existing, undesirable behaviors and supplant them with healthy, desirable
behaviors (e.g., healthier eating choices) (Duckworth and Gross, 2020), which makes the
PMBC model particularly suitable for studying the long-term implications of inducements to
vote among a broader population of individuals who have “unhealthy voting habits.”
For this population of infrequent voters, the voting-as-a-habit literature makes use of
2SLS regression to look at the long-term vote histories of individuals who were induced to
vote due to random or as-if random interventions. Most of this literature using this approach
made use of randomized field experiments that were originally conducted not to build a
voting habit but to simply get voters to vote in a particular upstream election (e.g., Gerber,
Green, Shachar, 2003; Michelson, 2003; Garcia Bedolla and Michelson, 2012; Coppock and
Green, 2016). Among the most successful of these interventions is the social pressure nudge
(Green, McGrath, and Aronow, 2013) and this outreach explicitly targets the social cost and
social benefit terms in the cost-benefit equation at the Appraisal Stage.
While these experiments analyze a more experienced voting base and therefore likely
avoid the problem of large informational boluses from turning up at the polls for the first
time, they may have a different exclusion restriction violation. As Fujiwara, Meng, and Vogl
(2016) note, it is possible that the observed downstream effects of these nudges are due to
lasting changes in the cost-benefit equation during the Appraisal Stage as opposed to a
cognitive shortcut past the Appraisal Stage. To be clear, social pressure nudges aim to
increase both the social cost and social benefit of voting by emphasizing that whether or not
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someone voted is public record. The treated individual may thus anticipate more people
asking about whether they voted, but after a few elections they may realize that being asked
about voting is not as frequent a situation as they expect, which may lead to cessation of
voting after just a few elections. And indeed, this is what Coppock and Green (2016) see in
their analysis of downstream voting among compliers of GOTV field experiments, which
stands in stark contrast to their findings using eligibility criteria of young voters (where
frequent voting persists two decades later).97 It is also worth noting that the initial social
pressure outreach studied in the experiments analyzed by Coppock and Green (2016) had
some level of novelty and may have triggered awareness at the Attention Stage in a way that
temporarily broke a habit of non-voting, by both providing a different contextual cue and
changing the expected social costs of continuing to abstain.
One additional strategy used in the past to overcome this exclusion restriction is the
use of unexpected shocks like rainfall (Fujiwara, Meng and Vogl, 2016), but as the authors
themselves note, it is still very possible that people will still commit a misattribution error
and allow an obviously unrelated event color their perceptions of future events. 98 This rain
study is also limited by the fact that the unit of observation was county-level data and as the
authors note their habit effects may be amplified by social interactions among voters.
Indeed, it is worth noting that anticipated social costs of abstention correlate strongly with
local turnout rates (Gerber et al., 2016), so a lower-than-anticipated turnout in a county after

Of course, a very plausible alternative explanation is that this difference in voting persistence may simply be
an artifact of two systematically different types of voters.

97
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See Achen and Bartels (2017) for prominent examples of voters making misattribution errors.
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heavy rain may be communicated by peers and the media, thereby causing an adjustment of
the social value of voting in the Appraisal Stage of the PMBC model.
The data used in this paper does not necessarily circumvent all potential violations of
the exclusion restriction, but it does provide a different perspective in that the exogenous
shock is not solely focused on increasing upstream turnout (as with social pressure nudges), 99
but also cultivating a habit in the same way public health interventions attempt to make
health behaviors automatic for individuals (e.g., Lally et al 2010). How the cost-benefit
equation of voting would change from this intervention is less clear aside from potentially
reducing the transaction cost of voting. 100

4.7: Data
I partnered with a large-scale US labor organization that continually runs door-todoor outreach programs with millions of working class Americans. Their outreach strategy
focuses on building a relationship with voters through recurring contact via in-person
conversations; importantly, both individuals in the control and treatment groups get
subsequent in-person contact.101 Aside from recurring non-election contact ranging from
attempts to increase health insurance uptake to issue-based advocacy, the organization also
does voter mobilization during election years. Election year contact consists of freeform
conversations at the door with several guiding questions, a Get-Out-the-Vote (GOTV)
99

Or reducing turnout, as with rain on an Election Day.

A reduction of the transaction cost of voting could be construed as the informational benefit of voting, but
this endogeneity cannot be completely eliminated in any study of in-person voting (for a more detailed
discussion of this mechanism see Meredith, 2009). It is also possible that talking to someone in-person about
an upcoming election may change the social cost or social benefit of voting, but that effect is likely to be
smaller than that of social pressure nudges, because the canvassers’ script did not reference whether or not
someone votes is public record—nor did it instruct canvassers to ask about participants’ prior turnout.

100
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Although they emphasize door-to-door contact, they also employ direct mail, phone and digital outreach.
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component, and a persuasion component regarding some issue and/or candidate. The
GOTV component is rooted in behavioral psychology research on encouraging habitformation. Particularly, the script has the canvasser ask about the voter’s plan to vote (i.e.,
“When do you normally go- on your way to work? When you get off? Just before dinner?”),
which has proven to be an effective GOTV intervention even in high salience election
contexts (Nickerson and Rogers, 2010). 102 The script also includes a component encouraging
voters to talk to their friends and family about the election. (A de-identified sample script
can be found in the Supplementary Materials.)
This treatment is distinct from prior analyses of downstream turnout effects for
three reasons. First, the treatments are specifically tailored around building a voting-habit.
Implementation intentions (commonly known as “plan-making nudges”) have proven to
have medium to large effects on translating intentions to actions (Gollwitzer and Sheeran,
2008). This component is therefore designed to affect the formation of a cognitive shortcut
unlike many of the prior field experiments in the voting-as-a-habit literature.103 That said, it
should be noted that the component of the script that encourages participants to talk to their
friends and family about the election could conceivably alter one’s social cost/benefit of
voting in the Appraisal Stage. Still, because it does not explicitly reference that whether or
not someone votes is public record, it is less likely to affect the cost-benefit equation as

Additionally, door-to-door canvassing has proven to have the largest persistence effects in prior research
(Garcia Bedolla and Michelson, 2012; 188).
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The impacts on the cost-benefit equation in the Appraisal Stage may still occur. It is possible that the planmaking component may lower the transactional cost of voting by providing implicit information about how
much time voting takes, but it should be noted that the vast majority of the individuals in our sample have
voted before and already have some information about the voting process. It is therefore less likely that their
expected transactional costs of voting will change meaningfully as a result of the conversation. (This would not
be the case if the sample was predominantly new voters.)
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compared to social pressure GOTV nudges. Social pressure nudges, in contrast, may
illustrate that the cost of not voting is higher than expected. An encouragement to simply
talk about the election is only likely to affect the social cost of not voting in very indirect
ways and is therefore much less likely to affect the cost-benefit calculation than the social
pressure intervention. Additionally, recurring contact by the same organization 104 and
encouragement to talk about the election with friends and family attempts to keep the same
contextual cues for the Attention Stage in future elections, so that the Appraisal stage can
more easily be sidestepped. In summary, one key goal of this program was to affect longterm voting behavior of individuals; this stands in contrast to most field experiments in the
voting-as-a-habit literature, which were designed to maximize short-term (i.e., upstream)
voting behavior.
The partnering organization selected a sample of individuals to be included in their
outreach program based on organizational election goals and logistical availability (e.g., the
geography had to be dense enough to warrant the cost of door-to-door canvassing). They
randomized a percentage of their program sample to an uncontacted control group in nine
separate large-N field experiments.105 The experiments were conducted in 8 different states
and included five different election contexts, with a total sample of over 1.8 million
households. (A summary of the nine experiments can be found in Table 4.1.) Turnout

104

The recurring contact is made without knowledge of the treatment assignment in any given election.

The sample is balanced across treatment and control conditions in terms of household income, age (and
age2), sex, race, political party, and whether they voted in the 2012, 2010, and 2008 general elections (chisquared p-values for each experiment do not exceed 0.05).
105
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among all targets was measured in subsequent elections. Randomization was conducted on
the individual level. 106

Some precincts were not canvassed due to programmatic and/or logistical reasons after randomization but
before treatment implementation. Since treatment and control units were balanced within precinct, we can
exclude these units from the analysis without biasing our results.
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Table 4.1: Overview of all experiments

Control

Treatment

Total

What's on the ballot?

Population
Turnout
Rate

Sample
Turnout
Rate

N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%

29,054
50.1
267,630
49.96
224,905
50.01
75,679
30
24,004
20.04

28,937
49.9
268,096
50.04
224,828
49.99
176,579
70
95,765
79.96

57,991
100
535,726
100
449,733
100
252,258
100
119,769
100

US Senate, US Congress, State-level offices, 3 ballot
initiatives

53%

0.7

US Senate, US Congress, State-level offices, 2 ballot
initiatives

49%

0.76

US Senate, US Congress, State-level offices, 3 ballot
initiatives

42%

74.00%

US Congress, State-level Offices, 3 ballot initiatives

33%

0.49

US Congress, 4 ballot initiatives

54%

63.00%

N

16,494

32,784

49,278

%

33.47

66.53

100

3 Supreme Court Seats

27%

60.00%

N

52,291

153,690

205,981

%

25.39

74.61

100

Democratic Mayoral Primary

26%

57.00%

N

14,544

122,488

137,032

%
N

10.47
7,114

89.53
60,857

100
67,971

Presidential Election battleground, US Senate, US
Congress, State-level offices

69%

0.68

%

10.47

89.53

100

State-level offices

48%

75%

Election

2014 Mid-Term Election (Iowa)
2014 Mid-Term Election (Illinois)
2014 Mid-Term Election (Michigan)
2014 Mid-Term Election (New York)
2014 Mid-Term Election (Washington)
2015 Pennsylvania Supreme Court
General Election
2015 Philadelphia Mayoral Democratic
Primary Election
2016 Presidential Election (North
Carolina)
2017 Gubernatorial Election (Virginia)
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As seen in Tables 4.2-4.3, the demographics of the sample in each experiment
differed substantially. These differences are partially an artifact of geography. (e.g.,
individuals randomized in the Philadelphia experiment are predominantly black, because
Philadelphia is a black majority city). But a major part of these differences is due to strategic
considerations: namely, the organization is tasked with engaging with working class voters
and so their targets will not be representative of the wider electorate. Furthermore, the
organization’s sampling criteria reflected their expectations as to people who are likely to be
receptive to their GOTV outreach (which explains why such a high proportion of
individuals across all experiments voted in the 2012 general election). To account for
demographic differences in the samples, I control for all available observable covariates.107
Still, no amount of control covariates can capture certain intrinsic differences between
populations and so one drawback of some of the subsequent subgroup analyses is that they
may be driven by unobservable differences in the sampling criteria.

I do not use sampling weights as weighting to a particular population will inevitably reflect arbitrary choices
by the researcher (for a more thorough discussion of sampling weights, see Gelman (2007)).
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics (demographics)
Which experiment?
MI
NY
WA
2014
2014
2014

PA
2015

Philly
2015

NC
2016

VA
2017

Whole
Sample

IA 2014

IL 2014

18-29

6%

10%

3%

3%

8%

6%

7%

1%

27%

8%

30-49

28%

35%

21%

32%

26%

27%

34%

29%

40%

25%

50-64

36%

30%

37%

43%

34%

33%

34%

35%

21%

29%

65+

30%

25%

38%

22%

32%

33%

25%

35%

12%

38%

% Female

54%

60%

53%

48%

54%

53%

60%

60%

56%

59%

White

72%

0%

83%

83%

91%

86%

41%

36%

34%

81%

Black

17%

0%

8%

11%

2%

3%

52%

57%

51%

18%

Hispanic

4%

0%

6%

1%

5%

3%

5%

5%

6%

0%

Democrat

24%

56%

0%

0%

30%

0%

98%

98%

67%

0%

Republican

6%

5%

0%

0%

39%

0%

2%

2%

5%

0%

Party Unknown

66%

100%
$50,000
$75,000
66%

100%
$50,000
$75,000
66%

23%
$50,000
$75,000
66%

100%
$50,000
$75,000
0%

0%
$30,000
$50,000
0%

0%
$30,000
$50,000
0%

0%
$30,000
$50,000
28%

100%
$50,000
$75,000
0%

535,726

449,733

252,258

119,769

49,278

205,981

137,032

67,971

Age

Gender
Race

Partisanship

Median Household
Income

$50,000 $75,000

% Married

47%

0%
$50,000
$75,000
51%

Total N

1,875,739

57,991
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics (vote history)

% Voted in 2012
General
% Voted in 2010
General
% Voted in 2008
General
Total N

Which experiment?
MI
NY
WA
2014
2014
2014

PA
2015

Philly
2015

NC
2016

VA
2017

Whole
Sample

IA
2014

IL 2014

90%

99%

93%

98%

83%

92%

92%

90%

60%

91%

73%

76%

87%

79%

56%

73%

67%

74%

27%

62%

85%

85%

89%

92%

81%

80%

85%

91%

52%

84%

1,875,739

57,991 535,726 449,733 252,258 119,769 49,278
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205,981

137,032 67,971

4.7.1: Predictions
This data gives us the opportunity to test concrete predictions borne out of the
PMBC and the voting-as-a-habit literature, while avoiding the file-drawer effect of
conventional meta-analyses and literature overviews. I explicate each prediction in turn.

Prediction 1: Voters induced to vote in one election type (e.g., presidential) will exhibit stronger
vote consuetude effects in future elections of the same type. To bypass the Appraisal Stage, the
contextual cues in the Attention Stage need to be similar to previous instances where the
outcome from the Situation Stage was positive. As such, more similar contextual cues in an
election make it more likely that an individual will bypass the Appraisal Stage as a direct
result of prior behavior.

Prediction 2: Voters induced to vote in a low-salience election will not exhibit stronger vote
consuetude effects. Contextual cues of a lower salience election are likely different from a high
salience election. Higher salience elections have greater social and media coverage. As such,
the context cues in the higher salience election may call attention to the election in a
different way, which would make it less likely for an individual to take a cognitive shortcut to
turn out. Rather, the novel cues are more likely to trigger a re-appraisal of the cost-benefit
equation.

Prediction 3: Voting in an election where one’s chosen candidate won should be positively
associated with voting consuetude formation. The PMBC model stipulates that positive
reinforcement is key to strengthening the heuristic shortcut past the Appraisal Stage. As
such, casting a vote in an election where your preferred candidate wins should provide a
larger “warm glow” than individuals who voted and their candidate lost. Since a larger warm
glow term makes it more likely that the outcome of the cost-benefit analysis in the Appraisal
228

Stage is positive, the individual would thus get some positive reinforcement, which should
make subsequent voting in an election with similar context cues more likely.

Prediction 4: Household income may be associated with voting consuetude formation. This final
prediction is dependent on a number of assumptions that have mixed support in the existing
literature. Fujiwara, Meng and Vogl (2016) noted that the cost of voting is relatively higher
for individuals with lower household incomes. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of
voting for higher income individuals may be higher and thus discourage some higher income
individuals from voting. A meta-analysis of 40 published studies found that income was
positively correlated with likelihood to turn out, but the relationship failed to be significant
in nearly half of the studies included in the meta-analysis (Smets & van Ham 2013). As such,
this prediction rests onprecarious theoretical ground and the empirical results from this
prediction should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism.
That said, the proposed mechanism is as follows. There is a documented association
between lower levels of income and higher levels of geographic mobility (e.g., Purcell, 2020),
which would imply that contextual cues in different geographies are likely to be different and
hence detrimental to the formation of heuristic shortcuts. This is consistent with Coppock &
Green’s (2016) conclusions that movers were less likely to exhibit voting consuetude. And
so, the PMBC framework implies that lower income individuals would be less likely to
exhibit voting consuetude.

4.8: Results
This section is organized as follows. First, I analyze the upstream effects of the
experiments in this sample. I then explicate my analysis strategy for voting consuetude and

229

analyze the main effects. Finally, I evaluate predictions as to which circumstances are more
(or less) conducive to voting consuetude.

4.8.1: Upstream Effects
As a first step, I analyze all the field experiments together in an OLS regression (with
experiment fixed effects and robust standard errors) to measure the impact of the treatment
on upstream elections. Overall, the organization’s GOTV outreach increased turnout by 0.3
percentage points (Intent-to-Treat, se = 0.0007, p<0.001). It is standard practice (e.g.,
Gerber and Green 2012) to take into account that not all households were successfully
contacted and evaluate the Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE), where the complier is
the individual who was successfully contacted by a canvasser. 108 I find that, at the door, the
organization’s GOTV canvass had a 1.8 percentage point impact on voter turnout (CACE,
se = 0.0038, p<0.001). This overall effect is nearly identical to the most recent meta-analysis
of door-to-door canvassing (Green & Gerber, 2019), which similarly finds a CACE of 1.8. 109
This is all to say that the upstream impact of the doorknock treatment in this paper is typical
of door-to-door mobilization efforts.

4.8.2: Analysis Strategy
I use the analysis strategy leveraged by Coppock and Green (2016), where V1 is
defined as voting in the upstream election and V2 is voting in a downstream election, Z is an
indicator denoting whether or not the individual was assigned to receive a doorknock
This does not necessarily mean that the entire script was delivered. “Successfully contacted” denotes that the
individual on the canvass list opened the door and affirmatively identified themselves.

108

The meta-analysis decomposes treatment effects by turnout in the control group. Among the studies that
had a control group turnout rate between 50% and 70% (the control group in my data had a turnout rate of
67.6%), the CACE was 1.8 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.4, 3.3] (Green & Gerber 2019, p. 211).
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GOTV treatment at time 1.110 The main estimand of interest is a (different) CACE—the
effect of voting in an upstream election on downstream voting among those who vote
� =
because they receive the GOTV doorknock. The estimator is thus 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐸𝐸� [𝑉𝑉2𝑖𝑖 |𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 =1]− 𝐸𝐸� [𝑉𝑉2𝑖𝑖 |𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 =0]
𝐸𝐸� [𝑉𝑉1𝑖𝑖 |𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 =1]− 𝐸𝐸� [𝑉𝑉1𝑖𝑖 |𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 =0]

for every household i in the experiment. This is estimated via two-

stage least squares as is standard practice (Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996).
To check for weak instruments, I examine the impact of each treatment on upstream
elections by experiment (see Table 4.4). Though some experiments were underpowered on
their own, most of the outreach programs had upstream treatment effects that were well
within range of one another. The only exception is the 2014 canvass program in
Washington, which appears to have had a near-perfect zero impact on turnout in the 2014
general election (p=0.95). The extremely small magnitude of the upstream coefficient is
likely to blow up our CACE estimates in this experiment. 111 As such, in all subsequent
analyses, the Washington data is omitted. Please note that including the Washington data in
all subsequent analyses does not substantially change the reported results since it accounted
for just ~6% of the entire sample.

110 As in Coppock and Green (2016), we must assume non-interference, which may be more plausible in our
case, as the intervention does not publicize the vote history of neighbors, which may be a topic of conversation
in close-knit communities.

I report all downstream CACEs for all experiments in the Supplementary Materials and find that this is
indeed the case.

111
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Table 4.4: Upstream effects by each experiment

Intent-to- Treatmenttreat
on-Treated
Experiment Effect on Effect on
Upstream Upstream
Election
Election
2014 IA
n=57,991
2014 IL
n=535,726
2014 MI
n=449,733
2014 NY
n=252,258
2014 WA
n=119,769

0.0140
(0.0034)
0.0016
(0.0010)
0.0022
(0.0012)
0.0019
(0.0018)
0.0002
(0.0030)

0.0666
(0.0164)
0.0101
(0.0063)
0.0112
(0.0061)
0.0139
(0.0136)
0.0006
(0.0104)

0.0116

0.0652

(0.0045)

(0.0254)

2015
PHILLY
MAYORAL

0.0078

0.0249

n=205,981
2016 NC
n=137,032
2017 VA
n=67,971

(0.0023)
0.0024
(0.0036)
0.0074
(0.0053)

(0.0074)
0.0532
(0.0817)
0.0497
(0.0354)

2015 PA
SUPREME
COURT
n=49,278
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4.8.3: Overall Downstream Effects
Since the initial canvasses were conducted anywhere from 2014 to 2017, the only
downstream election for which we can use all of the data is the 2018 general election.112,113
When I regress data from all experiments (with experiment fixed effects and robust standard
errors) in a 2SLS regression with voting in the 2018 general election as the instrumented
variable, I estimate a CACE of 0.57 (p=0.004). 114 This “habit” effect is somewhat lower than
Fujiwara, Meng, and Vogl (2016)’s estimate of 0.9, though the 95% confidence interval [0.18,
0.96] for my data does include 0.9. Still, the somewhat higher CACE in Fujiwara, Meng, and
Vogl (2016) is consistent with their explanation that their effect is possibly inflated by social
interactions. My CACE estimate is somewhat higher than the ~4-year downstream CACEs
reported in Coppock and Green (2016), which range from 0.13 to non-significant (and
directionally negative). This somewhat more muted voting consuetude comports well with
the PMBC framework. Namely, the Coppock an Green (2016) experiments all had
treatments that focused on impacting an individual’s cost-benefit equation (whether it was
emphasizing civic duty, using social pressure, or simply informing voters that they were
being observed), which, if successful, should temporarily impact the cost-benefit equation
among compliers. Though it is also possible that these treatments did create voting heuristics
that simply faded due to some mixture of a lack of positive reinforcement (e.g., bad
experiences at the polls) or a lack of similar contextual cues. However, the persistence of

112

Due to administrative issues, the 2018 primary turnout was never appended to my data.

It is possible to analyze downstream CACEs for 2016 primary and general elections for a smaller subset of
my data. I do this in a subsequent analysis below.

113

114

This is the case with and without covariates.
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consuetude across different election types suggests that it is more likely that the cost-benefit
equation was impacted.

4.8.4: Evaluating Predictions from Prior Research
The most important contribution of this study is that the variety of election contexts
and the large sample-size allows us to independently test predictions as to the circumstances
in which voting consuetude is more (or less) likely to occur. This allows us to better
understand the mechanism behind voting consuetude. I address each prediction in turn
below. Table 4.5 summarizes my predictions, my empirical findings, and the empirical
findings of previous studies that looked at a similar population of voters (i.e., not new
voters).
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Table 4.5: Summary of predictions & results across multiple studies

Study

Ternovski
2021
N=~1.8M
9
experiments

P1: Voters
induced to vote in
one election type
will exhibit
stronger vote
consuetude effects
in future elections
of the same type.
P2: Voters
induced to vote in
a low-salience
election will not
exhibit stronger
vote consuetude
effects.
P3: Voting in an
election where
one’s chosen
candidate won
should be
positively
associated with
voting consuetude
formation.
P4: Household
income may be
associated with
voting consuetude
formation.

Coppock
& Green
2016
N=~1.2M
3
experiments

Fujiwara,
Meng &
Vogl
2016
N=~50k
1 natural
experiment

Hill &
Kouser
2016
N=~150k
1
experiment

Garcia
Bedolla &
Michelson
2012
N=~133k
14
experiments

Michelson
2003
N=~3k
1 experiment

Gerber,
Green,
and
Shachar
2003
N=~25k
1
experiment

Yes

Yes

Yes
(mixed)*

Yes**

No**

Yes**

No**

Yes

No

N/A

Yes

No

Yes

N/A

Yes

N/A

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Yes

N/A

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

* = One set of studies did yield results that were consistent with my prediction, but a second set of studies did
not. The authors believe the second set failed to replicate due to inadequate statistical power. ** = These
studies only had data on the effect of voting in one election type upstream on voting in a different type of
election downstream. Thus, we are unable to determine if the effects they find are higher for elections of the
same type (i.e., we have no counterfactual within study).
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Prediction 1: Voters induced to vote in one election type (e.g., presidential) will exhibit stronger
vote consuetude effects in future elections of the same type. According to PMBC, contextual cues are
key to triggering heuristic shortcuts past the appraisal stage. Since different types of elections
have different levels of media coverage, voting consuetude should be stronger for elections
of the same type.
In my data, there are four cases where the upstream and downstream election is of
the same type (all federal mid-term elections). 115 In Table 4.6, I present the initial upstream
turnout effect in the first column, the CACE of mid-term turnout on turnout in a
downstream presidential primary and general elections in the next two columns, and the
CACE of mid-term turnout on a mid-term downstream election in the final column. It does
appear that downstream voting persistence among compliers was small to null in the
presidential election,116 but was very strong in the following mid-term election. My data
therefore comports strongly to both the PMBC model and Coppock and Green’s (2016)
finding.
It is important to point out that the conventional explanation for these differences
would focus on ceiling effects. Particularly, if the base rate of voting in the control group is
very high, the maximum possible effect size among compliers is therefore much lower than
an election with a low turnout rate. The turnout rates in the control group for 2016 general

As mentioned in the Analysis Strategy subsection, Washington data was excluded due to the lack of initial
upstream effects. The inclusion of this data does not meaningfully change the results. I also omit the 2016
North Carolina presidential experiment from this comparison as I do not have data for the 2020 presidential
election; that said, the downstream effect in North Carolina on the following mid-term election was not
significant (p=0.277), but the magnitude was high (0.69). As such, it is likely this analysis is underpowered and I
therefore cannot draw any conclusions from the North Carolina analysis.

115

Note that there is a somewhat higher (but non-significant) CACE in the presidential primary, which may be
driven by lower base rate of turnout as predicted in Coppock and Green (2016).
116
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and the 2018 general elections in my sample are not dramatically different (74% in the 2018
midterm versus 86% in the 2016 presidential) and the CACE for the 2018 midterm is over
four times larger than the CACE for the 2016 general. As such, I conclude the PMBC
explanation is more likely than the conventional base rate explanation.
Table 4.6: CACEs and election type

Midterms Only (IA, IL,
MI, NY)

Upstream
2014 General
Election
(1st Stage)

2016
Presidential
Primary
Election

2016
Presidential
General
Election

2018 Midterm
General
Election

0.0023

0.4246

0.2212

0.959

(.0007)

(.3176)

(.2255)

(.3506)

Prediction 2: Voters induced to vote in a low-salience election will not exhibit stronger vote
consuetude effects. This prediction is related to Prediction 1. PMBC predicts that context cues
will be different in different types of elections and voting in a lower salience election will be
a markedly different event (in terms of, for instance, media coverage) as compared to voting
in a presidential election.
A common means of defining salience is examining the actual turnout on Election
Day (e.g., see Coppock and Green, 2016). In our data, the 2015 PA Supreme Court election
and the 2015 Philadelphia Mayoral Primary clearly qualify with turnout well under 30%. 117
As seen in Table 4.7 below, despite the fact that the canvass in Pennsylvania and
Philadelphia had an upstream treatment effect size that was about 3.4 times as large as that
of the rest of the experiments, we find that there were no lasting downstream effects among

And indeed, local media coverage of these election has called turnout “low” (Holmberg 2015) or even “bad”
(Kerkestra 2015).
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compliers. In contrast, nearly 95% of participants induced to vote by the initial GOTV
contact in the remaining states turned out downstream in the 2018 mid-term election. One
alternative explanation to the PMBC interpretation is that the compliers who were
successfully turned to vote in the 2015 PA and the 2015 Philadelphia elections were already
high-propensity voters and their lack of subsequent voting consuetude is simply that they are
already voting in higher salience elections. However, we find that the control groups in the
2015 PA and the 2015 Philadelphia studies turned out at 72.3% in the 2018 mid-term
election, while all other individuals in the controls groups of my sample turned out at a rate
73.8% in the 2018 mid-term election. As such, we should not expect such a strong
divergence in downstream turnout effects if they are simply driven by a turnout ceiling.
Still, one could construe the NY 2014 general election as low salience, as well. Even
though there was a gubernatorial election, Andrew Cuomo was predicted to win handedly
(RCP 2014) and turnout was only seven percentage points higher than the Philadelphia
Mayoral race. When I include NY as one of the three low salience elections (in the second
row of Table 4.7), there is, again, no persistence in the 2018 general election among these
low salience experiments, despite an upstream effect that’s nearly twice as large as the
upstream effect of all other experiments. The other experiments, in contrast, again have large
and statistically significant CACEs in the 2018 general election.
Salience is not only measured by the actual turnout; it can be construed as races that
lack higher office seats on the ballot. In the remaining two rows, I try two more
combinations of low salience races and, in both cases, find null downstream CACEs. This
stands in contrast to Coppock and Green (2016) and Garcia Bedolla and Michelson’s (2012)
findings but is consistent with Michelson (2003) and Hill & Kousser (2016).
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Table 4.7: Salience and downstream CACEs
2018
Midterm
General
Election

Lowest Projected Turnout
+ No Federal Race on
Ballot

Low
Salience

(PA, Philly)

High
Salience
Low
Salience
Lowest Projected Turnout

No
President/Governor/Senate
Race on Ballot

(PA, Philly, NY)

High
Salience
Low
Salience

No Federal Seats on Ballot

(All others)

(All others)
(PA, Philly, VA)

High
Salience
Low
Salience

(All others)
PA Philly VA NY

High
Salience

All others

0.0085

-0.0736

(.0021)

(0.2241)

.0025

0.8829

(.0007)

(.3068 )

0.0050

0.0267

(.0014)

(.2643)

0.0028

0.9463

(.0007)

(.3195)

0.00835

-0.0087

(.0019)

(.2094)

.0024

0.9038

(.0007)

(.3279)

0.0053

0.0792

(.0013)

(.2411)

0.0027

0.9717

(.0008)

(.3426)

Prediction 3: Voting in an election where one’s chosen candidate won should be positively
associated with voting consuetude formation. This prediction is borne out of the fact that heuristicshortcut formation should only occur through positive reinforcement of the behavior. While
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it is impossible to know how much positive utility an individual gets out of voting in a
particular election, we have do have one approximate metric available—whether an
individual’s chosen candidate won. Although, it is not possible to know who a given
participant voted for, the targeting criteria of our partner organization is overwhelmingly
Democratic. That said, party registration is missing from a large portion of our data. So, for
this analysis, I remove registered Republicans and assume individuals with missing
registration data prefer the Democratic candidate to win. The degree to which this
assumption is violated will determine how accurate this analysis is. With these caveats in
mind, I find that participating in an upstream election where the Democratic candidate won
was associated with persistent downstream effects among compliers four years later. This
was not the case in states where the Republican won (see Table 8). I should emphasize that
these results are only based on a comparison of two sets of experiments and there may be
other confounding environmental variables that are responsible for this difference in voting
consuetude.
Table 4.8: Race Outcome and CACEs

Dem Win (IL 2014, MI
2014) 118
Dem Loss (IA 2014, NC
2016)

Upstream
Election (1st
Stage)

2018 Mid-term
General
Election

0.0019

1.3969

(.0008)

(.6173)

0.0090

0.2013

(.0026)

(.2856)

Since the election context is different in the 2017 Virginia experiment, I exclude it from this comparison.
However, adding the VA data results in a highly similar CACE of 1.31 (p=0.02).
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Prediction 4: Household income may be associated with voting consuetude formation. When I
look at the initial upstream effect among participants with lower than the mean income level
in our sample ($50,000 - $75,000), 119 the upstream treatment effect is actually higher than the
upstream treatment effect for participants who have a higher than mean level of income
(0.43 percentage points [p<.01] vs. 0.20 percentage points [p=.04]). In other words, the
GOTV outreach in this study appears to be more effective for lower income individuals in
upstream elections. But the downstream CACE for higher income households is twice as
large as for lower income households (1.1 [p=.08] vs. 0.45 [p=.02]). In short, these findings
offer some support for the PMBC prediction that voting consuetude is less likely to occur
for lower income voters.

4.9: Discussion and Conclusion
My results indicate that the PMBC theoretical framework may provide additional
insight into why voting consuetude forms in some contexts but not others. Its predictions
appear to validate in a novel large-scale dataset, but since the predictions were not
preregistered before the data was collected, it is imperative to replicate these results in future
studies and assess some of the alternative explanations that might yield the same results. It is
also worth noting that even though the experiments were conducted in different election
contexts in different states, the types of voters included in these samples are nevertheless not
nationally representative and reflect the labor organization’s strategic targeting criteria (i.e.,
working-class, Democratic-leaning voters). As such, it is unclear whether these results
generalize to a broader population. Additionally, though I assert that the treatment did not

The income variable is modelled by the data vendor, Catalist, by appending commercial consumer data to
the voter file.
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include any social pressure interventions (which might credibly change the cost-benefit
equation in the short-term), the conversations were freeform and we have no way of
knowing if there were large numbers of canvassers who went off-script. This possible
limitation is, however, unlikely, as the labor organization employs paid canvassers who
receive extensive training.
One possible alternative explanation to voting consuetude is raised by what Rogers
and Frey (2014) termed “rip currents,” where compliance to an upstream GOTV
intervention leads to subsequent attention from campaigns and non-profits. In other words,
this alternative explanation claims that it’s not that there is a permanent change to an
individual’s cost-benefit equation or the act of voting creates a self-reinforcing intrinsic
impetus to vote; rather, the rip currents hypothesis claims that the people who are
successfully nudged to the polls by a campaign are subsequently targeted by more campaigns
and non-profits with nudges that are similarly successful in inducing these individuals to vote
in downstream elections.
However, the empirical evidence suggests that this is unlikely to be the main driver
behind voter consuetude. Two studies addressed this theory and found little evidence in
support of this hypothesis. First, Coppock and Green (2016) find that voting consuetude
isn’t more pronounced in battleground states where one would except stronger “rip
currents.” In other words, since battleground states attract more campaign activity, those
voters who are successfully mobilized in an upstream election should receive more campaign
attention under the rip current hypothesis. 120 However, one drawback of this analysis is that

Coppock and Green (2016) also provide an overview of other studies that looked at subsequent campaign
contact across upstream treatment conditions; Dinas (2012) and Green, McGrath, & Aronow (2013) found
very modest effects of treatment on subsequent campaign contact.
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more campaign activity may also mean more people are targeted—even those who were not
successfully mobilized 121—which may dilute any rip current effects. The second piece of
evidence is the analysis in Rogers et al. (2017), where the authors explicitly analyzed whether
campaigns and non-profits were more likely to engage in downstream contact of participants
who were in an upstream treatment group (as compared to participants in control). The
initial field experiment included ~664,000 Democratic-leaning subjects randomized to
GOTV outreach before the 2011 Senate Recall Election in Wisconsin. In 2016, these
subjects were subsequently matched to two databases of campaign contact information.122
While Rogers et al. (2017) did find some evidence of increased levels of downstream
outreach of individuals in the 2011 treatment group, the differences were modest and the
authors concluded that “the downstream turnout effects… [that they found] cannot
plausibly be attributed to the treatment and control groups' differential exposure to
mobilization activity.” (p. 92).123
Furthermore, an increase in subsequent campaign contact still comports to the
PMBC theoretical framework in that repeat outreach may mean that individuals are receiving
similar context cues in future elections. The key question is whether or not the subsequent
campaign contact affects the Appraisal Stage or simply calls attention to an upcoming

One common campaign strategy is discussed in Arceneaux & Nickerson’s (2008) meta-analysis: “[i]n highsalience elections, campaigns target unlikely voters out of the belief that everyone else is going to vote without
their encouragement, whereas in low-salience elections they assume the opposite and focus on those voters
who have reliably voted in the past” (p. 5).

121

The first database was maintained by the Obama for America campaign (which ran Barak Obama’s
campaign in 2008 and 2012) and the second, by Catalist, a Democratic-leaning data clearinghouse that tracked
voter contact data of several large Democratic-leaning non-profits (Rogers et al. 2017).
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The only sizable increase came in the form of direct mail (8.1 percentage points more in the treatment
group), which is unlikely to explain the entirety of consuetude effects. A meta-analysis of direct mail outreach
finds a 0.5 percentage point impact; even the most effective intervention (social pressure) has, on average, only
a 2 percentage point impact on turnout (Green & Gerber 2019; p. 214).
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election. Future research should attempt to disentangle these effects by comparing outreach
that targets variables in the cost-benefit equation versus outreach that consists of repeating
context cues. For instance, one possible experimental design could test continual
informational treatments (e.g., identical text messages reminding an individual of an
upcoming election day every election) versus the impact of a one-off, upstream social
pressure treatment on downstream turnout. PMBC would predict that while the information
treatment should have a lower upstream effect, compliers in the informational treatment
should develop stronger voter consuetude years later (as compared to compliers in the social
pressure condition).
Another related alternative explanation is that voting starts a self-reinforcing process
(e.g., Rogers & Frey 2014). This explanation is related to the informational boluses one gets
from voting, which may include iteratively reducing transaction costs (e.g., learning the best
time to go to one’s local polling place), inflating the warm glow of voting or the social
benefits of voting. Under this explanation, the economic model is sufficient to explain
voting consuetude without the need for the PMBC theoretical framework. However, it is
difficult to reconcile this mechanism with, for instance, Coppock and Green’s (2016) finding
that downstream treatment effects of social pressure mailings eventually faded. 124 If voting
consuetude is always driven by a self-reinforcing adjustment of costs, we would expect that
the specifics of the initial motivation for voting shouldn’t affect the longevity of effects.

Previously, Davenport et al. (2010) found similar decays in downstream effects from social pressure
interventions. (There is some overlap in data used in Coppock and Green (2016) and Davenport et al. (2010);
to be clear, in this footnote, I refer to studies included in Davenport et al. (2010) but not included in Coppock
and Green (2016).)
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There may still be other explanations that do not comport with the PMBC model
and in no way, should my empirical assessment be viewed as conclusive evidence that voting
consuetude is explained solely by the PMBC theoretical framework. The goal of this paper is
to present a new theoretical framework with empirical evidence illustrating this framework’s
value. Future studies should directly and independently test the predictions that come out of
my application of PMBC to turnout persistence. Specifically, I predict to increase the
chances of developing voting consuetude (particularly among older voters), the following
conditions should hold. First, the contextual cues in one election should be as similar as
possible in future elections. This implies that organizations tasked with increasing turnout
may want to attempt using the same prompt to remind voters that it’s Election Day from
one election to the next. Second, it is important that voters successfully persuaded to turn
out to the polls have a net positive experience voting. This makes it more likely that a voter
will begin to skip the Appraisal Stage and adopt a cognitive shortcut in response to a
contextual cue. The implication is the voters who did not have a positive experience voting
(e.g., long lines, their preferred candidate lost) may benefit from receiving a different
contextual cue next election to stop the development of a non-voting habit. And finally, for
voting to become truly habitual, repetition is key. This means that in certain contexts and
with frequent elections, a voting habit in the strict-psychological sense maybe possible. For
instance, Solvack and Vassil (2018) find promising persistence effects in online voting in
Estonia.
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4.11: Supplementary Materials
4.11.1: Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 4.2: Average treatment effects for upstream and downstream elections by
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Table 4.9: Upstream intent-to-treat effect and CACEs for downstream elections by
experiment

1st Stage
Experiment (Upstream
Election)
2014 IA
n=57,991
2014 IL
n=535,726
2014 MI
n=449,733
2014 NY
n=252,258
2014 WA 125
n=119,769
2015 PA
SUPREME
COURT
n=49,278

0.0140
(0.0034)
0.0016
(0.0010)
0.0022
(0.0012)
0.0019
(0.0018)
0.0002
(0.0030)

2016
Primary
CACE

2016
General
CACE

2018
General
CACE

-0.1727
0.0701
0.2225
(0.2136)
(0.1963)
(0.2333)
1.2897
0.6913
1.7542
(0.9389)
(0.5664)
(1.1250)
0.4255
-0.2773
1.0485
(0.5964)
(0.4953)
(0.6810)
0.1986
0.6927
0.4395
(0.9400)
(0.9494)
(0.9907)
-11.0919
15.2327
18.5140
(199.5858) (259.6603) (315.9351)

0.0116

-0.3215

0.1649

-0.2050

(0.0045)

(0.3925)

(0.1970)

(0.3364)

2015
PHILLY
MAYORAL

0.0078

0.2097

0.2504

0.0239

n=205,981
2016 NC
n=137,032
2017 VA
n=67,971

(0.0023)
0.0024
(0.0036)
0.0074
(0.0053)

(0.2676)
NA
NA
NA
NA

(0.2159)
NA
NA
NA
NA

(0.2739)
-0.2869
(1.8542)
0.6973
(0.6410)

Washington was omitted from the main analysis since it is very likely that this analysis suffers from too weak
an instrument. The first stage impact on upstream turnout was close a to a perfect zero with a p-value 0.95.
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4.11.2: Anonymized Canvasser Script and Training Documents
November 4, 2014
Governor: Mark Schauer;
US Senate: Gary Peters
[REDACTED] Persuasion Rap
Introduction
Hi, my name is ___ with [REDACTED]. Are you [name]? Great! We’re out today talking
with folks in [insert community] about the election for Governor and the Michigan House.
QUESTIONS
Question 1
Are you planning to vote in the election?
[Do not record]
Question 2 (Voter ID Governor)
Thank you. If you were going to vote today in the election for Governor would you support
for Republican Rick Snyder or Democrat Mark Schauer?
[Record Response: Snyder-R, Schauer-D, Unsure/Undecided]]
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MARK SCHAUER
PERSUASION AND ENDORSEMENTS
[REDACTED] is an independent organization that represents 120,000 Michiganders who
want an economy that works for working people. We are not part of any political party or
campaign and support candidates based on their record.
[IF SCHAUER]
We are also supporting Mark Schauer to be the next Governor. Thanks for your support!
Hand over lit. Go to Peters Endorsement
[IF UNDECIDED]
[REDACTED] has researched the issues and we have found that Mark Schauer has the
strongest record of supporting working families and the issues important to the community.
That is why he has the support of tens of thousands of working men and women in
Michigan and will work to create good jobs and improve our schools.
So can we count on your vote for Mark Schauer for Governor?
Do not record response. Hand over lit. Go to Peters Endorsement.
[IF OTHER CANDIDATE]
I understand. How you vote is a personal decision. [REDACTED] has done the research on
the issues and we believe that Mark Schauer has the strongest track record of getting things
done for working people and will be the strongest leader for Michiganders .
Hand over lit. Go to Peters Endorsement.
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US SENATE:
GARY PETERS
ENDORSEMENT
[REDACTED] has done the research and found that Gary Peters has the strongest record
of fighting for Michigan. In Congress he helped deliver on the loans to save the auto
industry jobs and start to turn around Michigan’s economy.
Go to Plan Making.
PLAN MAKING
[IF SCHAUER or UNDECIDED FOR STATE HOUSE]
Great! Thanks for your support. As you probably know, this election will determine the
direction Michigan takes and turnout is going to be high.
The polls open at 7 am and close at 8 pm on Election Day. When do you normally go- on
your way to work? When you get off? Just before dinner? [LISTEN FOR RESPONSE &
FOLLOW UP IF APPROPRIATE. DRAW RESPONSE OUT OF VOTER.]
[FOR VOTERS WHO COMMIT TO TURNOUT]
Thanks. You know one of the best ways to increase Mark Schauer’s chances of winning is
to talk to your family about why this election matters to you. Have you had a chance to talk
to your family about this election? [LISTEN FOR RESPONSE & FOLLOW UP IF
APPROPRIATE]
Sample follow up question: “How do they feel about the Governor’s race? Did you share your reasons for
voting for Mark Schauer?”
257

Thanks, Goodnight.
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2014 Michigan General Election For Governor
Mark Schauer
PERSUASION TALKING POINTS
Crumbling Infrastructure: Fixing our roads and bridges is not Governor Snyder’s priority.
The delay means an added $1.8 billion in costs for taxpayers, nearly $400 per year in
unnecessary auto repairs for the average driver and countless hours of frustration. Experts
say that one in four bridges rated as structurally deficient.

Mark Schauer will finally fix our roads and bridges by getting corporations to pay their fair
share in taxes for the infrastructure they rely upon to conduct business.

Jobs and the Economy: Rick Snyder promised to focus on job creation, but in the last four
years, Michigan has trailed the nation and neighboring states like Ohio in adding new jobs.
Instead of creating jobs, Snyder has pursued divisive policies like “right to work” that hurt
middle class Michiganders.

Mark Schauer has a record of defending Michigan jobs and workers. In Congress he
supported the $80 billion investment to stabilize the auto industry. Since then, the money
has been repaid and the Big Three are profitable. Schauer also wants to repeal the divisive
Right to Work law, arguing that “Snyder cannot point to one job that’s been created as a
result of right to work.”
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Failing our Schools: In his first year in office, Governor Snyder cut over $1 billion in state
school funding- more than $400 per pupil. As a result, class sizes have increased, learning
environments have suffered and more than 50 school districts have experienced a credit
down grade.

Mark Schauer will stop the diversion of Michigan School Aid fund dollars away from the
classroom- nearly $400 per pupil that has resulted in increased class sizes and poorer learning
environments, and threatens our finances.
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Training Memo
Please distribute only to trainers
Opening the Rap: Canvassers have found it works better to use the words “upcoming
election” with voters versus “out talking about issues”. They found that voters perceive “out
talking about issues” as a longer conversation compared to “upcoming election”. Again work
with folks on what approach works best for them – if there is push back on “upcoming
election” it may be better to approach the voter with “out talking about issues in our
community”

Inclusive Language: Reminding the voter that we are part of the same community and share
the same interests facilitates a more collaborative conversation. For example, “That is why
so many folks here in our community have decided that they are voting for Mark Schauer”
assures the voter that we are looking at the issues from the same perspective. This approach
assumes support. By contrast, exclusive language like “you” and “they” imply social distance
and that you are attempting to convince the person to share the perspective.

Part of Something Bigger and Enthusiasm: It’s common for voters to want to feel like they
are part of a larger effort to achieve a shared goal. Using language that conveys the point
helps frame their decision to vote as part of a larger effort and makes them more likely to
turnout. For example, “We have been talking to a lot of people who tell us that they are just
tired of all of the negative attack ads that don’t do anything to fix the economy and other
problems we are all facing. I am sure you probably feel the same way, right,” or “This is
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going to be an important election, and we are expecting high turnout” are effective ways to
convey that just like in school, all of the popular students are participating. It is for the same
reason that it is important to show the voter that we are enthusiastic about supporting
candidates who support our issues.

Clean IDs/Recording Responses: Capturing the initial response to issue and candidate ID
questions is an important part of building the longer term political program. For example,
know where we had the highest initial rate of support for candidate verses undecided voters
informs where we prioritize future passes. While recording an ID after we have given some
indication of our preferred candidate has value, the goal is to find those voters who are most
likely to be with us.

Plan Making: An important part of plan making is that we walk voters through thinking
about when and where they are going to go vote. Using time prompts and inclusive
language, and effective plan making conversation helps the voter think about voting in the
context of their own lives. For example, “It will be important to have plan on when you go
to the polls. I like to go in the morning before work, but a lot of people like to go in the
evening before dinner. What about you- when do you plan to head to the polls?” involves
emphasizing everyday events that people plan their days around.

Talk To Your Family: A new part of the canvass is asking supportive voters to discuss the
election with other voting members of their family. Research studies performed by the
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[REDACTED] have shown that asking voters talk to family members about voting for Mark
Schauer can increase overall vote probability for Schauer. The study found that getting
supporters to talk to their family members about the election was over THREE TIMES
MORE EFFECTIVE than existing practices of getting uncommitted household members to
support a candidate.
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